University of Memphis

University of Memphis Digital Commons
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
2019

Sovereign Justice: Royal Prerogative and Justice in the Works of
Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton
Melissa Haickel Bagaglio

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Bagaglio, Melissa Haickel, "Sovereign Justice: Royal Prerogative and Justice in the Works of Spenser,
Shakespeare, and Milton" (2019). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2436.
https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd/2436

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by University of Memphis Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of
Memphis Digital Commons. For more information, please contact khggerty@memphis.edu.

SOVEREIGN JUSTICE: ROYAL PREROGATIVE AND JUSTICE IN THE WORKS
OF SPENSER, SHAKESPEARE, AND MILTON
by
Melissa Haickel Bagaglio

A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Major: English

The University of Memphis
May 2019

In loving memory of my parents,
José Aniesse and Violeta Haickel

ii

Acknowledgements
The process of writing this dissertation has been full of obstacles, and its
completion is in large part thanks to the support and encouragement of my committee
members, Catherine Gimelli Martin, Joshua Phillips, Darryl Domingo, and Carey
Mickalites. They have been tireless in their understanding and dedication, and their
selfless commitment has served to reaffirm my desire to follow in their footsteps. I am
especially indebted to Drs. Martin and Phillips, who served together as co-chairs and
brought a depth of knowledge matched by few others in the field of early modern British
literature. Their generosity, dedication, and thoughtful feedback always helped me move
forward and often opened new avenues of thought I had not previously considered. They
have taught me more than I could ever say and have provided an example of what a good
mentor should be. I am also grateful to all the professors and colleagues with whom I
have had the pleasure to work, especially Dr. Lorinda Cohoon, Mirella Silva, Ashley
Rattner, and Rhonda Powers. Finally, I want to thank my family for their continuous and
unwavering encouragement of my academic endeavors, especially my loving and
supportive husband, Brian, who is my inspiration: “With thee conversing I forget all
time; / All seasons and their change, all please alike” (Paradise Lost, 4.639-40).

iii

Abstract
My dissertation joins a vibrant conversation in the intersection of literature and
law to investigate the changing attitude towards the royal prerogative as it relates to law,
mercy, and equity in the English early modern period. The royal prerogative, the
sovereign’s rights and privileges under English law, has long been a contentious aspect of
the British legal system with many attempts over the centuries to limit the use of these
powers. During Tudor times, royal prerogative was closely associated with the courts of
Chancery and Star Chamber, which were highly regarded courts of equity. However, the
same courts became associated with corruption during the Stuarts’s reign, and Star
Chamber was eventually abolished by the Long Parliament. Using current theoretical
concepts of authority, particularly Giorgio Agamben’s homo sacer series, I examine how
Edmund Spenser, William Shakespeare, and John Milton portrayed the societal shift in
writings that appeared concurrently with major events related to the English monarchy.
Specifically, I examine ideas about law, mercy, and equity and their relation to royal
prerogative in Book V of Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, Shakespeare’s Henry V and
Macbeth, and Milton’s Paradise Lost to argue that these authors use legal language in
their works to characterize the shifting nature of sovereign justice. Closely examining
their rhetorical moves also reveals their attempts at affecting policy and making the shift
towards reduced prerogative powers and legally limited sovereignty, the powers now
assigned the executive branch of government. I believe that actively engaging with these
authors and their ideas about authority and justice is important for understanding and
giving us perspective on our own issues of violence and legality that have surged in
recent history, especially as they relate to extraordinary powers.
iv
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Introduction
While much attention has been given in recent years to political theology and
sovereignty, especially as scholars theorize about them in the medieval and early modern
periods, early concepts of sovereign justice remain lesser known and understood.1 As
issues of state violence and juridical legitimacy have rapidly expanded in recent history,
our exploration of the early modern period has become ever more pertinent. The way the
tribunals of the post 9/11 world function legally and where and how exceptions to the law
are made without regard for the rights of the accused have much in common with the
tribunals of early modern England, where the idea of equity had recently taken hold and
courts like Chancery and Star Chamber began to function as exceptional courts not bound
to the common law. The first true crisis involving this practice emerged later when King
Charles I manipulated the system to create a state of emergency, which eventually
became one of the causes of the English civil war.
In a state of emergency, the sovereign subverts the judicial power due to “reasons
of state,” which in the British early modern period, was a theory strongly associated with
the royal prerogative. A contentious but significant aspect of the British governmental
system, royal prerogative is still exercised in the United Kingdom.2 Over the centuries,
1

For example, Deborah Kuller Shuger, Political Theologies in Shakespeare's England: The
Sacred and the State in Measure for Measure (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001); Graham L Hammill, Julia R.
Lupton, and Étienne Balibar, Political Theology and Early Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2012); Victoria Ann Kahn, The Future of Illusion: Political Theology and Early Modern Texts
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).
2
A modern case involving prerogative that I will briefly discuss in my third chapter is R.
(Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] UKHL 61 [Bancoult
(no.2)]. A recent decision aimed at curbing the use of prerogative powers by the government is R (Miller) v.
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin). However, when deciding
on the application of the Miller case, the English Supreme Court recognized that some prerogative powers
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there have been many attempts to define prerogative powers more narrowly, but still
“there is no single accepted definition of what constitutes the Royal Prerogative.”3
Nevertheless, the extent of the prerogative powers the sovereign held was much greater
and even harder to define before England became a Constitutional Monarchy. One thing
that has not changed over time is that “the defining characteristic of the prerogative,”
according to Thomas Poole, “is that its exercise does not require the approval of
Parliament.”4 Thus, the most simplistic definition of the prerogative is that it entails
discretionary powers, which here means exceptional powers and refers to the sovereign’s
power to decide on the exception.5
This dissertation explores the trajectory of what I call sovereign justice, that is,
justice that stems from the sovereign’s exercise of royal prerogative, from the end of the
Elizabethan period to the early years of the Restoration (1590-1674). It is particularly
concerned with the aspects of justice that relate to equity and mercy, but both the law
itself and its creation are included. I explore ideas about law, mercy, and equity and their
relation to royal prerogative in Book V of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene,

are necessary for the “essential and effective operation of the state.” R (on the application of Miller and
another) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017], UKSC, para 49 cited in Gail Bartlett
and Michael Everett, The Royal Prerogative, Commons Briefing papers SN03861, 17 August 2017.
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN03861.
3

Bartlett and Everett, The Royal Prerogative, Commons Briefing papers SN03861.

Thomas Poole, “United Kingdom: The Royal Prerogative,” International Journal of
Constitutional Law 8, no. 1 (2010): 146. Bradin Cormack argues that “Along with the Reformation, the
early Tudor experiment in fiscal feudalism made the royal prerogative present in a new way, effectively
reshaping the prerogative, not by retheorizing it, but by continuously testing its limits as part of the
Crown’s insatiable pursuit of money.” A Power to Do Justice: Jurisdiction, English Literature, and the
Rise of Common Law, 1509–1625 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 35.
4

5

See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans.
George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005) and Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer:
Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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William Shakespeare’s Henry V and Macbeth, and John Milton’s Paradise Lost. Using
political theology as my general theoretical framework, particularly as discussed in
Giorgio Agamben’s homo sacer series, I examine how these three authors expressed
advanced political views about sovereign justice in writings that appeared concurrently
with major events related to the English monarchy. It is worth noting that all three
authors situate their fictions in distant times and, in three of the works, foreign places.
These are times and places that do not coincide with the events they actually comment
upon, but that are nonetheless appropriate in dealing with issues of sovereign justice.
They all distance themselves from their own periods, making their scenes as remote as
the beginning of human history or set in a wholly imaginary land. When they do occur in
Great Britain, they are only as close in time and place as late medieval England. All three
authors understood the limits of what could be said openly, and used the artifice of
fiction, fantasy, and recreated history to broaden their reach.
My decision to study the relation between the royal prerogative and concepts of
justice through the lens of literary works instead of legal texts stems from the sense that
literature is a reflection of a people’s attitudes. Furthermore, the works discussed here
seem to reflect the authors’ attempts at influencing public policy or at least popular
opinion to engender changes in how justice is exercised.6 And during this time period
there is in fact a definitive shift in how royal prerogative is perceived, ranging from a
source of justice through the proper use of equity to a source of oppression due to judicial
6
See the Introduction in Ian Ward’s Shakespeare and the Legal Imagination (London:
Butterworths, 1999) where he says that “Literature plays a ‘vital’ political role, by ‘cultivating powers of
imagination that are essential to citizenship’” (9). See also David Norbrook, Poetry and Politics in the
English Renaissance (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).
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or legal corruption. The literary texts examined here at once reflect this shift and attempt
to influence policy. An especially important aspect of this changing outlook is that justice
requires a legitimate source of authority in order to be effective, although that authority
varies in each of the texts I explore.
The dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first chapter focuses on the fifth
Book of The Faerie Queene, “The Legend of Artegall or of Justice.” This focus is
important as well as fairly unique, since this book has largely been ignored by critics over
the years. In Book V, Spenser portrays the source of legitimate authority as residing
in/within the sovereign through divine right, which he presents by directly addressing
Elizabeth, calling her his “Dread Souerayne Goddesse,” and saying that she sits “in
th’Almighties place.” In the poem, the Faerie Queene is another sovereign who
commands authority and, through Artegall acting as her instrument, executes justice.
Mercy and equity are important parts of the sovereign’s justice and must be exercised
with the good of the commonwealth in mind, while the law is naturally an important
parameter for justice.
The Faerie Queene sends Artegall, the knight of justice, to rescue Irena, the
fictive queen of Ireland. Due to his upbringing as Astraea’s ward, Artegall has been fully
educated on theories about justice and the role of equity in it, since Astraea is the
mythical goddess of justice. In Spenser’s allegory, Artegall is the embodiment of justice
in the world; however, once he sets out to execute the Faerie Queene’s justice, what we
witness as he moves through her land is a flawed knight who must learn how better to
exercise fairness in the world around him before he can be an effective representative of
true justice. At first, Artegall is overly reliant on force and violence, which has led critics

4

of the book to argue that it serves as an apology for violence against the Irish. In contrast
to these critics, I argue that Spenser grounds his concept of the law not on force but on
equity, and so Book V allows us to see justice maturing past violence into true “right.”
What it finally presents is thus a critique of wild violence, looking instead toward a legal
and just solution to the conflicts presented here. This evolution is important to
understanding what Spenser was trying to accomplish with his allegory, which is an
original attempt to influence and effect change, especially regarding English policies
towards Ireland.
The second chapter uses Henry V to further explore the importance of legitimate
authority and the monarch’s proper performance in exercising justice. Unlike Spenser,
who portrays the source of the sovereign’s authority as divine, Shakespeare shows Henry
V legitimating his authority through other, far more practical means—heredity, bloodline,
performance, and force—because of how his father illegitimately achieved the crown.
Henry’s pursuit of legitimacy is an important aspect of this chapter because in the
playwright’s eyes, it is a necessary condition for the effective use of state power. Early in
the play, however, we find that Henry is willing to create a state of emergency by
declaring war with France (one of his prerogative powers) to achieve abiding legitimacy
and further his goal of uniting Britain.
What ultimately becomes apparent after examining the different episodes in
which Henry is tasked with acting as a judge is that his version of justice is heavily
reliant on royal prerogative. Henry often operates on the threshold of the law and many of
his decisions are, at the very least, “extralegal,” but his able performances make him
effectively seem as if he acts only within the law. In this sense, he mirrors Elizabeth I,
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who, the Lord Chief Justice Viscount Caldecotte says, was able “to do without objection
or even without notice things which, done by a Stuart King, would have provoked a
riot.”7 Like Elizabeth, Henry finds a way to become an effective king by using royal
prerogative and performance to reinforce his authority. Yet, that prerogative is power
held arbitrarily, and so creates a government that is not fully bound by law. It does not
leave a clear path to be followed because it relies on the personal judgment of each
individual rather than the true rule of law. Thus, one of the arguments Shakespeare
appears to be making in Henry V is that an overly extensive use of prerogative powers is
not the way to create an effective and lasting government because the king’s subjects
must trust that the person exercising that power will know how to use it effectively.
Furthermore, the person must also be trusted not to abuse said power, which, as we will
see in Macbeth, is a risky proposition.
Chapter 3 examines Macbeth’s actions as king and the legal language in the play
to argue that justice is not possible in a world where language cannot be trusted, and
where the king (believes he) is above the law. With Macbeth, we see precisely what
happens when a “legitimate” sovereign breaks his coronation oath to preserve the
commonwealth and work for the good of his people. In breaking the laws of the land,
Macbeth ceases to have any legitimate authority and cannot achieve justice for his
people. His use of prerogative powers creates a state of emergency in Scotland, and the
turmoil that ensues means that justice becomes elusive.
The topicality of Macbeth helps us discover how ideas about legitimacy and
justice were shifting under the new King of England and Scotland. James I favored

7

Viscount Caldecote, “The King's Prerogative,” The Cambridge Law Journal 7, no. 3 (1941): 315.
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broader prerogative powers and, as he made clear in his treatise, The Trew Law of Free
Monarchies, he believed the king was above the law.8 Similarly, Macbeth decides to act
outside the law and precisely because of that, justice cannot work; he uses his position as
sovereign to quell any and all potential threats to his power. In his hands, the royal
prerogative becomes another tool of oppression, and his tragedy serves to underscore the
lesson that, to achieve justice, the sovereign must also be under the law.
In the seventeenth century, ideas about the rule of law continued to be debated
after Charles I ascended the throne. The king’s prerogative became a heated topic as the
Court of Star Chamber went from “one of the sagest and noblest institutions of the
kingdom” to one that became a “fearful tool of arbitrary power.”9 Furthermore, the idea
that the sovereign had a divine right to rule contended with a contractual theory in which
the sovereign and his people each had one part of the contract to fulfill. Later conflicts
over royal prerogative increasingly led critics of King Charles to “use the language of
economic contract to describe the political relation of sovereign and subject.”10 Whereas
in the sixteenth century William Tyndale said a sovereign should be obeyed whether he is
good or bad, the writers of this period start arguing that the obligation between the
sovereign and his people works both ways. Through sermons, pamphlets, and other
writings, these authors claimed a sovereign has certain duties towards his people and if he

8
In the treatise, James writes that only God can serve as judge over a king (71-82), and “that the
kings were the authors and makers of the Lawes, and not the Lawes of the kings.” James VI and I, Political
Writings, ed. J. P. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 73.
9

Shuger, Political Theologies in Shakespeare's England, 90.

10

Victoria Ann Kahn, Wayward Contracts: The Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640–
1674 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 11.
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does not fulfill them, they have the right to revolt. The language of contract is one that
becomes more important as the years go by until it culminates in Milton’s Paradise Lost.
Macbeth’s example as a sovereign who has no regard for the rule of law serves as
a striking contrast to Milton’s God in Paradise Lost. Macbeth also contrasts with
Milton’s God in another important way, the language of justice they use. In Macbeth,
verbal equivocation plays a very large role because language seems out of balance most
of the time, as even the plain “truth” is misrepresented. In Paradise Lost, God uses very
plain language because He wants to ensure that Adam fully understands the covenant he
is entering with Him. Milton’s own political concept of the contract depended on the
parties involved willingly entering into the contract as well as each doing their part, ideas
that permeate his prose writings. Victoria Kahn emphasizes that “Milton interpreted
Scripture to argue against absolute sovereignty,” making his social contract conditional
and subject to renegotiation.11 My fourth and last chapter thus focuses on Milton’s prose
works and Paradise Lost to show how Milton uses contractual language to describe the
legal bond between God and Adam. The end result emphasizes the importance of justice
and liberty in the good of the commonwealth, in this case Adam and Eve’s dominion.
Milton’s legal language weaves a very intricate message about fidelity to the law,
something that he had found lacking under all three Stuart kings. In Milton’s conception,
when God places himself under the law, he serves as the ultimate example of a just
sovereign.
Taken as a whole, my analysis of these four literary texts shows a definite, if also
gradual, evolution towards legally bound sovereignty with limited exercise of royal

11

Kahn, Wayward Contracts, 121.
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prerogative as an important criterion for justice to flourish. The growth of the royal
prerogative in the Tudor period is, at first, lauded by Spenser who sees its use to increase
equitable solutions to legal problems as a way to find an answer for the problems in
Ireland. With the arrival of the Stuarts onto the English throne, the use of prerogative
powers intensifies as they increasingly resort to personal rule, something Shakespeare
warns against, first, with his portrayal of Henry V as a ruler who only appears to be under
the law and later with Macbeth, who uses prerogative to eliminate opposition and
maintain power. Finally, through the example of a God who is law abiding, in Paradise
Lost Milton shows the importance of having a sovereign that is bound to the laws for the
creation of a free commonwealth. Sovereign justice will only give way to true/divine
justice when the sovereign’s powers are constrained by the rule of law.
This dissertation examines how these three authors portrayed increasingly
advanced political views towards sovereign justice in writings that appeared concurrently
with major events of the English monarchy. It joins the conversation in the intersection of
literature and law to explore the changing attitudes towards royal prerogative and its
relation to justice through the lens of literary works. I argue that closely examining these
authors’ rhetorical moves also reveals their attempts at affecting policy, eventually
making the shift towards reduced prerogative powers and legally limited sovereignty.
Thus, with this dissertation, I hope to further the conversation related to ideas of justice
and its connection to royal prerogative and legitimate authority in the early modern
period.

9

Chapter 1: Equitable Justice
In his prefatory Letter to Sir Walter Raleigh, Edmund Spenser writes that in The
Faerie Queene, his intention is “to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and
gentle discipline” through the “doctrine of ensample,” and thus chooses the “historye of
king Arthure, as most fitte for the excellency of his person.” He claims to be following
the example of the “antique” poets in portraying a virtuous man, and he labours “to
pourtraict in Arthure, before he was king, the image of a braue knight, perfected in the
twelue priuate vertues, as Aristotle hath deuised,” in the twelve books he plans for The
Faerie Queene (FQ, 714-16).1 Spenser did not live to complete his project, but six of the
planned books were published before his death. The fifth of these books concerns “The
Legend of Artegall or of Ivstice” and explores the virtue of justice through the adventures
of the knight Artegall, who was raised by Astraea, the goddess of justice.
Book V has remained a source of interest to scholars because of its numerous
allusions to real life events. One of the events the Book alludes to is the trial of Mary
Queen of Scots, and it caused Spenser serious trouble during his own lifetime. In a letter
from Robert Bowes to Lord Burghley, Bowes writes of King James VI’s complaint of
Spenser’s treatment of his mother in the portrayal of Duessa at Mercilla’s [Elizabeth’s]
court: “The K[ing] hath conceaved great offence against Edward [sic] Spenser publishing
in prynte in the second book p[ar]t of the Fairy Queene and ixth [sic] chapter some

1
Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton, Hiroshi Yamashita, and Toshiyuki
Suzuki (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2001). Citations to The Faerie Queene are from this edition and cited
parenthetically by book, canto or proem, and stanza, while references to editorial matter are cited by title
abbreviation and page number.
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dishonorable effects (as the k. demeth thereof) against himself and his mother decessed.”
Later in the letter, Bowes states he has convinced the king that the book had not been
“passed with priviledge of her mats [sic] Commision[er]s,” but nevertheless the king
“still desyreth that Edward [sic] Spenser for his faulte, may be dewly tryed & punished.”2
Because of examples like this, scholars have spent considerable time trying to determine
the possible meaning and sources of events and characters. For instance, in the case of the
final cantos, some have concluded that the Irena episode reflects Spenser’s own views of
the situation in Ireland and the need to use force against the Irish rebels.3
Spenser was well-educated and held different government offices during his
lifetime, and while there certainly are allusions to real events that should not be ignored,
looking at the poem only as a political allegory of those events leads to an
oversimplification of what Spenser is trying to accomplish in this section of his poem. As
T. K. Dunseath sensibly notes, “By emphasizing history as such, we often lose sight of
the poem and Spenser’s artistic purpose,” and, he goes on to explain, “Book V is the most
heavily ‘historical’ because its subject is justice, and justice has as its province
governments and men.”4 Thus, we must remember that Book V is part of Spenser’s

T. K. Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice in Book Five of The Faerie Queene (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1968), 3.
2

3

For a breakdown of the historical allegory in Book V, see: The Works of Edmund Spenser: A
Variorum Edition, ed. Edwin Greenlaw et. al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1936), Book V, 299-335 and
Michael O’Connell, Mirror and Veil: The Historical Dimension of Spenser’s Faerie Queene (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1977), 125-60. Also, Karin Boklund-Logopoulou, “Law, Justice,
and Poetry in Faerie Land” in The Letter of the Law: Literature, Justice and the Other, ed. Stamatina
Dimakopoulou, Christina Dokou, and Euterpē Mētsē (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, Academic Research, 2013)
offers a quick overview of Spenser’s life in Ireland and what she perceives as the connection between Book
V and A View of the Present State of Ireland, Spenser’s political prose treatise written around the same time
as the second part of The Faerie Queene (books IV-VI).
4

Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice, 7.
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continued allegory and the political allegory’s purpose is to serve as a means to represent
justice as a moral and social virtue.
Dunseath is not alone in criticizing the narrow reading of Book V. More recently,
Andrew Hadfield has made a similar argument by pointing to the possibility that
Spenser’s poetry has long been misread.5 Hadfield proposes that it is worth investigating
Spenser’s work more closely with the thought that he may not have been as conservative
as most critics think. To this end, he proposes we begin this investigation by
acknowledging the importance of the law in Spenser’s life and thought, and that we
examine some of the darker passages of Book V with this knowledge in mind.
I would like to argue alongside Dunseath and Hadfield that a new reading of Book
V is in order. I agree with other critics who see a shift in the allegory in the second half of
poem, from one that focuses on private virtues to one that is concerned with more public
ones, which is why the historico-political allegory becomes more pronounced. However,
we must not forget Spenser’s intent to teach using the “doctrine of ensample,” which is
something that continues into the second half of the poem. Following the example of one
of Spenser’s knights is the best way to understand what Spenser is trying to convey about
a certain virtue. Therefore, focusing specifically on Artegall’s encounter with the
Amazonian queen Radigund and deliberately noting Spenser’s diction and rhetoric, we
may be able to better understand ideas about law, equity, and mercy that Spenser is trying
to convey with his Book of Justice.6 These ideas are important in understanding the
5
Andrew Hadfield, “The Death of the Knight with the Scales and Question of Justice in The
Faerie Queene,” Essays in Criticism 65, no. 1 (2015): 12-29.
6
See Andrew Zurcher, Spenser's Legal Language: Law and Poetry in Early Modern England.
Studies in Renaissance Literature, vol. 23. (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, Inc., 2007), 1-49, where he
argues little interrogation has been made into Spenser’s language, particularly because “Spenser’s verse
seems to exert an allegorical pull away from language and toward the larger structures of meaning which
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changes the English legal system was undergoing with the Elizabethans’ growing
reliance on royal prerogative and the advent of the courts of equity, a change that
continued into and throughout the next century.
The royal prerogative refers to the rights and privileges of the monarch under
English law, and its reach significantly grew during the Tudor period.7 One of the ways
the Tudors furthered the prerogative was by expanding the powers of courts of equity,
which, by this period of Elizabethan rule, had become highly regarded. These courts were
viewed as places where one could seek remedy from the strict interpretation of the law,
where exceptions could be made on individual cases. Spenser’s view of prerogative, then,
is in many ways a reflection of this experience. He sees the way these courts can benefit
the commonwealth. It is a much more positive view than the ones I will discuss in my
later chapters exploring Shakespeare’s and Milton’s works. However, even his view of
equity is still one that has its root in the laws, and this emphasis in the law is one that still
serves as a model for Shakespeare and Milton later.
The focus of this chapter is on Artegall’s encounter with Radigund and her fellow
Amazons, and how his experience with these women, from their first meeting until he is
freed by Britomart and later decides to part with her in order to fulfill his quest, shapes

these insignificant vestiges, these ‘poor minims’, encode” (6), and, like Hadfield, he proposes a new focus
on Spenser’s “language and ‘legal’ habit” (11). He reinforces his argument by discussing the importance
and attention given to words, their origins and usage in education at the time (19-41), as well as the
importance of law in hermeneutics (41-49). See also Bradin Cormack, A Power to do Justice, 133-76.
Cormack recognizes the importance of legal language to Spenser and claims that in Book V, “Spenser
argues that common law must suppress custom, just as it must suppress commonness” (167). In this way,
Cormack contends, Spenser is attempting to replace Irish customs, which are “seen and followed,” with
English law, which is read and thus subjective because of its need for interpretation, and, in this way,
“reasoning gives way to a violence rationalized by and as judicial interpretation” (168).
7

Cormack, A Power to Do Justice, 35.
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his understanding of law, equity, and mercy. I examine Artegall’s understanding of
equity when he first agrees to the terms of combat Radigund sets, and then look at how
his confusion of mercy with pity (pity is mercy’s vice according to Seneca) allows her to
capture him. This particular problem begins when Artegall accepts Radigund’s
“conditions” without questioning their validity and binds himself to them as to a contract.
In binding himself to Radigund’s terms, he commits a number of interpretive errors that
can be traced to ideas about equity and mercy as they relate to justice.8
I am particularly interested in exploring what happens to his sword, Chrysaor,
which is broken by Radigund but later somehow made whole and used by Artegall again.
Although his sword and its significance have been discussed by many critics, most
notably by Jane Aptekar in Icons of Justice, the discussion tends to focus either on the
sword’s origins or on its meaning as a symbol of masculine gender when the discussion
turns to its breakage and refashioning. I believe that exploring this particular episode is
essential to understanding Artegall’s fashioning as the knight of justice as well as what
Spenser is “showing” us about justice as it relates to law, equity, and mercy and why
legitimate authority (with its shifting source of power) was such a contentious topic in the
British early modern period. In contrast to other critics, I argue that Spenser is grounded
in the law, not force, and that Book V allows us to see justice mature past violence. While
force is part of justice, it is a crude way to solve conflicts. What Book V presents is a
critique of this wild violence and looks instead to a legal and equitable solution to the
conflicts presented here. These ideas are also important to understanding what Spenser

8

Briefly, equity refers to the legal system that serves to supplement or correct limitations in the
common law in England and became closely associated with Chancery. Mercy refers to clemency as
defined by Seneca.
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was trying to accomplish with his allegory in terms of his attempt to influence and effect
change, especially regarding English policies towards Ireland.

Artegall as the Instrument of Sovereign Justice
Book V of The Faerie Queene has long been seen as the least appealing of the
poem’s books. C. S. Lewis alleges the Book’s lack of popularity comes from Spenser’s
inclusion of “some flat and uninspired passages” as well as from the difference between
Spenser’s and our modern concept of justice. Many readers are unsettled by the brutal
nature of Artegall’s pursuit of this virtue, a brutality that C. S. Lewis sees as a reflection
of Spenser’s own experiences: “Spenser was the instrument of a detestable policy in
Ireland, and in his fifth book the wickedness he had shared begins to corrupt his
imagination.”9 Here, Lewis is referring to the violent policies relating to Ireland that
Spenser helped to enact as secretary to Lord Grey. Lewis’s analysis has greatly
influenced the direction of Spenser studies regarding Book V. One would be hard pressed
to find a single book or article on this subject written since Lewis’s remarks that does not
mention them either directly or indirectly. Many critics appear willing to accept Lewis’s
assertion about Spenser and continue to promote the idea of Spenser’s poetry in Book V
as “failed,” or similarly assume he wrote it with the goal of advancing British imperialist
ideas.10 However, these arguments against Book V seem particularly flawed when we

9

C. S. Lewis, The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition (London: Oxford University
Press, 1969), 347-49. For information about Spenser’s life and career in Ireland see chapters one through
three of Andrew Hadfield, The Cambridge Companion to Spenser (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001).
10
For example, Michael O’Connell, Mirror and Veil, 125-60; Karin Boklund-Logopoulou, “Law,
Justice, and Poetry in Faerie Land,” 29-44; and Angus Fletcher, The Prophetic Moment: An Essay on
Spenser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971) who sees Spenser following Virgil in writing a
prophetic epic (76). An older, but notable study examining these imperialist ideas is Frances A. Yates’s
“Queen Elizabeth as Astraea,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, no. 10 (1947): 27-82.
Here, she explores how writers of the time, both religious apologists and poets, used traditional ideas about
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consider that it follows a format similar to the other books of the epic, whereas the
knights are also shown getting sidetracked, falling into traps, and making mistakes along
the way before successfully completing their quest and becoming perfected in the virtue
explored in their book.
All of Spenser’s knights are in some way identified with their virtue from the
beginning of each book, which is why they are chosen for each quest. For example, in his
description of the Redcrosse Knight, Spenser tells us:
And on his breast a bloodie Crosse he bore,
The deare remembrance of his dying Lord,
For whose sweete sake that glorious badge he wore,
And dead as liuing euer him ador’d:
Vpon his shield the like was also scor’d,
For soueraine hope, which in his helpe he had:
Right faithfull true he was in deede and word,
But of his cheere did seeme too solemne sad;
Yet nothing did he dread, but euer was ydrad. (I.i.2)
With this stanza, Spenser informs us that Redcrosse symbolically bears the cross, a
symbol of the Christian faith, and that he is also “faithfull true” in actions and words,
qualities that allow us to connect Redcrosse to the virtue of holiness. All of Spenser’s
knights, including Artegall, go through different trials, and they all come to embody each

Virgo-Astraea as the just virgin to build a mythology around Elizabeth and her politics of nation and
empire building, and she also reminds us of the Tudor claim of Trojan descent and says, “When the Tudors
ascended the throne of England, so runs the myth, the ancient Trojan-British race of monarchs once more
resumed the imperial power and brought in a golden age of peace and plenty” (49).
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of their virtues by the end of each of their books. However, Artegall differs from the
other knights in one major way: he is the only knight who has been formally educated in
his virtue from a young age.
The first canto provides important background information about Artegall.
Hamilton reminds us of the meaning of Artegall’s name (equal to Arthur, as well as fair,
just, and judge of equity, V.i.3.note), and the Faerie Queene chooses him to restore Irena
to her rightful place:
For that to her he seem’d best skild in righteous lore
For Artegall in justice was vpbrought
Euen from the cradle of his infancie,
And all the depth of rightfull doome was taught
By faire Astraea, with great industrie. (V.i.4-5)
Spenser further tells us that Astraea, once she spotted the child “whom seeing fit, and
with no crime defilde” (V.i.6), used bribery and kidnapping to capture Artegall, and that
she later stole Jove’s sword, Chrysaor, to give to him.11 It is possible that this may mean
that, due to the human fall, the sword of justice can never “belong” to anyone but only be
borrowed or metaphorically “stolen” from its proper owner, Almighty God or Jove. We
also learn of Artegall’s tutelage under Astraea, who “all the discipline of iustice there him
taught” (V.i.6), including:
to weigh both right and wrong

11
For a more detailed discussion of Astraea’s use of “fraud” to allure Artegall, see, Judith H.
Anderson, “Spenser’s Faerie Queene, Book 5: Poetry, Politics, and Justice” in A New Companion to
English Renaissance Literature and Culture, Volume One and Two, ed. M. Hattaway (Oxford (UK): WileyBlackwell, 2010), 263-73, and David Lee Miller, “Gender, Justice, and the Gods in The Faerie Queene,
Book 5” in Reading Renaissance Ethics, ed. Marshall Grossman (New York: Routledge, 2007), 21-33.
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In equall ballance with due recompence,
And equitie to measure out along,
According to the line of conscience,
When so it needs with rigour to dispence.
…………………………………………….
Thus she trayned, and thus she him taught,
In all the skill of deeming wrong and right;
Vntil the ripenesse of mans yeares he raught (V.i.7-8)
Astraea’s decision to formally educate Artegall from earliest childhood onward gives him
an advantage over the other knights in the poem when he starts his quest. She teaches him
to discern and judge between right and wrong and to act equitably. Furthermore, unlike
the other knights who must wait until the end of their books to become “equal” to their
virtue, Artegall is already the knight of justice at the beginning of his quest because when
Astraea leaves the world of men, she leaves him in charge and even wills him her groom,
Talus, the iron man, to “doe what euer thing he did intend” (V.i.12). However, Artegall
commits errors along the way, such as his misinterpretation of his own standing as the
Knight of Justice and his misunderstanding of mercy and equity, because he has not truly
internalized all of Astraea’s lessons.
The Proem to Book V is the longest one in The Faerie Queene with eleven
stanzas (Book VI is the second longest with seven stanzas), and it begins with Spenser
lamenting the end of the Golden Age. Early in the Proem, Spenser informs us that “Right
now is wrong, and wrong that was is right” (V.Proem.4), a disorder he claims is reflected
in the heavens. We discover that during Saturn’s reign, “Peace vniuersall rayn’d mongst
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men and beasts” and that “Iustice sate high ador’d with solemne feasts, / And to all
people did diuide her dred beheasts” (V.Proem.9).12 He no longer reigns, and moreover,
the current state of the world is particularly distressing because justice is the:
Most sacred vertue of all the rest
Resembling God in his imperiall might;
Whose sovereign powre is herein most exprest,
That both to good and bad he dealeth right,
And all his workes with Iustice hath bedight.
That powre he also doth to Princes lend,
And makes them like himselfe in glorious sight,
To sit in his owne seate, his cause to end,
And rule his people right, as he doth recommend. (V.Proem.10)
Justice is not only the most sacred virtue but also the one that is most closely identified
with God, and it is in dealing justice that God’s power is best witnessed. If justice is
absent from the world, it seems that God’s glory is also not as easily encountered there.
Furthermore, justice is also identified with the monarch because it is in her role as a judge
that the monarch best resembles God. The monarch is even allowed to sit in God’s seat in
order to advance His cause.13 Because of the connection of God and monarch, it is not
surprising that in the next stanza, Spenser begins by directly addressing Elizabeth,

Miller, “Gender, Justice, and the Gods in The Faerie Queene, Book 5,” 21-33. argues that this
reversal in the world is also a reversal in language, which could undermine ideas about the divine rights of
the sovereign, since orthodoxy has been displaced and “the terms ‘virtue’ and ‘right’ have changed places
with their antonyms, ‘vice’ and ‘wrong’” (23). The problems in language presented in the proem imply that
Spenser cannot write about the virtue itself but only about the legend of its rhetoric.
12

Yates reads this stanza as Spenser’s sanctioning of the theory of the divine right of kings. Yates,
“Queen Elizabeth as Astraea,” 67.
13
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calling her “Dread Souerayne Goddesse,” saying she sits “in th’Almighties place,” and
ends by praising her great justice, “The instrument whereof loe here thy Artegall”
(V.Proem.11). Artegall is not only identified with the virtue that belongs to God and the
monarch, he is the instrument of that virtue. It is through him that divine justice will find
its place on earth again.
The idea of justice being identified with God and the monarch is the reason
Spenser portrays the “most formally elaborate icon of monarchy” in Book V. Here, we
see Mercilla executing justice because “the act which best exemplifies good monarchy is
the act of rendering justice: the act, in most cases, of making judgement,” argues Jane
Aptekar.14 The tradition that the principal task of the monarch is to maintain justice is an
old one. Aptekar discusses the tradition in general and claims that in England, “the
prince’s original constitutional function was to act as judge. The highest courts derive
from the monarch’s exercise of this function: the Court of the King’s (or Queen’s) Bench
descends from the governmental and judicial council at which the monarch used to
preside—on his judgement bench.”15 As A. C. Hamilton notes, Spenser was writing the
poem at a time when “the relation of justice to equity and mercy was being determined
and distributed among common-law courts and the courts of the crown” (FQ, 13). The
courts of the crown were ones that derived power directly from the sovereign’s
prerogative, which is why these royal courts are sometimes referred to as prerogative
courts or courts of equity.
14
Jane Aptekar, Icons of Justice: Iconography and Thematic Imagery in Book V of the Faerie
Queene (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 14.
15

Aptekar, Icons of Justice, 14. Fletcher, The Prophetic Moment, makes the connection between
Spenser’s portrayal of Mercilla and Richard Hooker’s account of the origins of justice and law, 169 note
50.
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Early modern theories of justice were rooted in the writings of classical authors
who discussed theories of justice, equity, and mercy. Possibly the most influential of
these authors was Aristotle, who dedicates one book of The Nicomachean Ethics to his
discussion of justice and distinguishes between what is lawful and what is fair.16 He also
relates justice, which he calls “the chief of the virtues,” to the other virtues.17 Aristotle
later discusses political justice—“justice between free and (actually or proportionately)
equal persons, living a common life for the purpose of satisfying their needs”—and says,
“This is why we do not permit a man to rule, but the law because a man rules in his own
interest, and becomes a tyrant; but the function of a ruler is to be the guardian of justice,
and if of justice, then of equality.”18 This need for an abstract justice that Aristotle finds
so important is exactly one of the things Judith Anderson finds problematic in the Book
of Justice.19 Although Aristotle clearly wants the law to lead us to justice, he understands
its limitations, because, as he says “the law lays down a general rule, and thereafter a case
arises which is an exception to the rule.” In these exceptional cases, equity must be
considered because “it is a rectification of law where law is defective because of its
generality.” However, equity is a constitutive element of justice; while “it is superior to
one sort of justice, it is not superior to absolute justice, but only to the error due to its

The editor notes that the Greek word δικαιοσύνη “would be described sometimes in English as
Justice, sometimes as Honesty or uprightness” Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. H. Rackham
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), 252-53 note a.
16
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Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 258-59.
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Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 290-93.

Judith H. Anderson, “‘Nor Man It Is’: The Knight of Justice in Book V of Spenser’s Faerie
Queene,” PMLA 85, no. 1 (1970): 65.
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absolute statement.”20 Equity is that part of justice that serves as a corrective to justice
itself while remaining a part of it. It is there to deal with the exception, which, similar to
the royal prerogative, is at once inside and outside the law.21
In England, the Protestant Reformation created a vacuum in the law. The break
with Rome and abolition of canon law, gave “even deeper roots to the idea of a sovereign
justice centered in the king and royal courts,” while the “new centering of meaning in
scripture allowed textual representation to emerge as the principal source of authority in
the European sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”22 The advent of this new system of
courts and the importance of interpretation in their development grew throughout the
sixteenth century, and understanding them is essential to understanding Spenser’s poem.
While discussing how Spenser constructs his theory of justice, Andrew Zurcher
explores the classical sources but settles on Christopher St. German’s Doctor and Student
as the most influential because of his “narrow focus about the contemporary English
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Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 312-17.

According to Carl Schmitt, the “sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” which, in the
English legal tradition, can be referred as the royal prerogative. Political Theology, 5.
21
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Cormack, A Power to Do Justice, 33. James Schiavoni sees this move as one away from civil
law and towards common law, which the monarchs did not like because civil law “favored royal
prerogative” (23). He further claims that Spenser favored royal prerogative and was hostile to common law,
specifically because of “ambiguities and nuances of interpretation” (25-26). “Royal Prerogative versus the
Common Law in A View of the Present State of Ireland and The Faerie Queene, Book 5,” in Renaissance
Papers 2010, ed. Andrew Schifflett and Edward Gieskes (Rochester: Boydell and Brewer, 2011). Brian
Lockey, “‘Equitie to Measure’: The Perils of Imperial Imitation in Edmund Spenser's The Faerie Queene.”
Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies 10, no. 1 (2010): 52-70 discusses the similarities between
English equity and Spanish Dominican use of natural law and the “(mis)reading” of the book as justifying a
Spanish conquest of England. He also sees similarities between the way Spenser deals with Radigund and
how the English Catholic exiles advocated a Spanish invasion of England. What Book V makes clear, he
says, “is how difficult it was for English Protestant writers, during this period, to imagine an imperial
identity based on the prior traditions of natural law, because such traditions directly conflicted with the
religious and legal traditions of England as well as with the gender identity of its sovereign” (64).
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common law status of equity and even more specifically, about the court of Chancery.”23
The court of Chancery began as a department where “writs and charters were drawn and
sealed. The head of the department, the chancellor, had the custody of the great seal of
England, which was used to authenticate the documents which his clerks prepared,” and
it evolved slowly, first into a court with a jurisdiction similar to the medieval King’s
Bench.24 Later Bills sought remedy directly from the chancellor regardless of whether a
case was pending at common law courts. The decrees made were appropriate only in the
particular case and bound only the parties to the suit, but the chancellors did not see
themselves as administering a different system of law. Instead, “They were reinforcing
the law by making sure that justice was done in cases where shortcomings in the regular
procedure, or human failings, were hindering its attainment by due process. They came
not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it.” The chancellor was free from rigid procedure
because the Chancery was a court of conscience, “in which defendants could be coerced
into doing whatever conscience required in the full circumstances of the case,” which
allowed the chancellor “to provide swift and inexpensive justice, especially for the poor
and oppressed” since many aspects of due process could be bypassed.25 During the Tudor
period, particularly during Cardinal Wolsey’s tenure as chancellor, reactions against
conscience arise because it was considered a variable standard and it left the impression
of arbitrariness.
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Zurcher, Spenser’s Legal Language, 124.
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John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History. (London: Butterworths, 2002), 99. I
will return to the great seal when I discuss Artegall’s sword, Chrysaor.
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Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 102-04. This ability to bypass due process is,
in the seventeenth century, one of the reasons the courts of Chancery and Star Chamber became tools of
oppression.
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It is against the idea of arbitrary justice that St. German writes as he is trying to
situate equity within the common law. Zurcher explains that what St. German is calling
equity was known in England under the name of conscience, “a term carrying a set of
descriptors and modifiers entirely different from those of ‘equity’. Where equity is a
‘ryghtwysenes’ in keeping with the true intent of the lawgiver, conscience is not so
strictly limited; it can include concepts more characteristic of Seneca’s clementia, such as
dispensations from severe, even equitable justice.”26 St. German argues against such
freedom of interpretation, claiming that although at that time Chancery was not bound by
precedent, it should be “bound only to rectify the common law insofar as it departed, in
its generality, from its own basis in the law of god or the law of reason,” and “while laws
may covet to be ruled by equity, equity is in fact based in, and to some extent ruled by,
the common law itself.”27 This binding of equity to the law is essential to our
understanding of Artegall’s errors in interpretation.
Spenser knew that in order for justice to work, the threat of violence had to be
real, but also that equity and mercy had to be present and exercised wisely. He
understood the importance of law and legal proceedings, especially because of his own
experience dealing with the courts in Ireland. And so, we see the law exercised in
Mercilla’s court in all its minutia with a trial that includes a parade of witnesses and
follows through with punishments once the legalities have been served. As such, the
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Zurcher, Spenser’s Legal Language, 133.
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Zurcher, Spenser’s Legal Language, 134-35. Baker explains that “The decrees operated in
personam; they were binding on the parties in the cause, but were not judgments of record binding anyone
else” (104). It is also important to note that until 1675, no appeals could be made in equity, “the only way
of reviewing a decision in equity was by reopening the matter before the chancellor himself, or his
successor, or by obtaining a commission of review.” An Introduction to English Legal History, 141.
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episodes in the first half of The Faerie Queene prepare Artegall for what he will
encounter at Mercilla’s court and to better understand his quest to save Irena. The
episodes up to when he leaves Britomart after she saves him from Radigund serve to
educate him about each aspect of justice—law, mercy, and equity—which allows him to
recognize them and become a successful Knight of Justice. Knowing that the poem is
dedicated to Queen Elizabeth and that Spenser’s intention is to fashion “a gentleman or
noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline,” it should then not be a leap to think that
Spenser was trying to “fashion” or influence Elizabeth’s notions about justice.28
Spenser’s preoccupation with the law and the proper exercise of justice is in fact
something he explores in all of the episodes leading up to Artegall’s encounter with
Radigund, and there are some striking similarities between Redcrosse’s description of
Artegall and John H. Baker’s description of the medieval itinerant royal justiciers. When
explaining to Britomart why it will not be easy to find Artegall, Redcrosse says:
Ne soothlich is it easie for to read,
Where now on earth, or how he may be fownd;
For he ne wonneth in one certeine stead,
But restlesse walketh all the world arownd,
Ay doing thinges, that to his fame redownd,
Defending Ladies cause, and Orphans right,
Where so he heares, that any doth confownd

28
At the end of her article, Boklund-Logopoulou makes a similar claim. She first calls for a
reading of the other books of the poem in view of the imperialist ideals she sees as what Spenser is arguing
for, and then concludes by suggesting that the person Spenser is trying to fashion is none other than the
queen herself, “Inviting her to see herself and her realm in Faerie land, Spenser is also engaged in
fashioning his queen into a fit ruler, a sovereign dispenser of ‘justice’ for the empire that he envisions.”
“Law, Justice, and Poetry in Faerie Land,” 43.
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Them comfortlesse, through tyranny or might;
So is his soueraine honour raisde to heuens hight. (III.ii.14)
Of the the medieval itinerant royal justiciers Baker writes:
the writs were read and the justices’ authority publicly proclaimed, local officials
delivered up their insignia of office as if to the king in person, and the justices
started into their long agenda (the ‘chapters of the eyre’), investigating crimes and
unexplained deaths, misconduct and negligence by officials, irregularities and
shortcomings of all kinds, the feudal and fiscal rights of the Crown, and private
disputes. The general eyres were not merely law courts; they were a way of
supervising local government through itinerant central government. They begat
fear and awe in the entire population. The justices did not always proceed
according to modern standards of probity or fairness: contemporaries complained
that the justices were apt to be errantes metaphorically as well as literally.29
Artegall must travel through part of Faerie Land before he can cross the sea to Irena’s
land. As he goes on his quest to free Irena, he will deliver justice to anyone he encounters
along the way, creating “fear and awe” in his wake, while also attempting to create a just
commonwealth. He is like the itinerant justicier serving as the instrument of the
sovereign, in this case the Faerie Queene, who is the central government, and his sword,
Chrysaor, is a symbol of the legitimate authority he exercises.

29

Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 16, emphasis added. Baker also informs the
reader that the French word “eyre,” a circuit travelled by an itinerant justice, became the name of the
institution itself.
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Legitimate Authority through Allegory
When Artegall’s sword is first introduced, we are told of its origins as Jove’s
sword, and Spenser spends a great deal of time discussing its provenance:
...Chrysaor it was hight;
Chrysaor that all other swords excelled,
Well prou’d in that same day, when Ioue those Gyants quelled.
For of most perfect metall it was made,
Tempered with Adamant amongst the same,
And garnisht all with gold upon the blade
In goodly wise, whereof it tooke his name,
And was of no lesse vertue, then of fame.
For there no substance was so firme and hard,
But it would pierce or cleaue, where so it came;
Ne any armour could his dint out ward,
But wheresoeuer it did light, it thoroughly shard. (V.i.9-10)
The sword is clearly magnificent, made of adamant and gold and so perfect that it
maintains its sharp edge and seems indestructible. Since the sword is an important
symbol of justice, Aptekar dedicates part of her study to exploring the meaning behind it.
She writes that it is in keeping with the idea of justice as carrying a sword, which
“represents the proper executive and punitive power of the king.” She further notes that
Lady Justice typically also carries a pair of scales, and that Spenser uses this
iconographical detail when “he recounts that Astraea taught Artegall ‘to weigh both right
and wrong / In equall ballance’ [1.7] and describes the Gyant’s misuse of the ‘huge paire
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of ballance in his hand’—ii.30.” Chrysaor, Aptekar explains, means “sword of gold”; it
has mythological associations with Jove as “the name Chrysaoreus was, according to
Strabo, a surname for Carian Zeus;” thus, “Artegall’s sword is Jove’s by name as well as
by origin.”30 Chrysaor links Artegall to Astraea and Jove as well as to Hercules since it
was the sword Jove used against the giants, “who could be defeated only with the help of
Hercules.”31 There is no question that the sword is deeply tied to ideas of justice. Yet,
when the sword is broken by Radigund and later reappears in Artegall’s fight against the
tyrant Grantorto, editors and critics have attempted to explain the episode away as either
a case of Spenser’s forgetfulness or as a symbol of Artegall’s manhood.32 Although I do
not contest the identification of the sword with Artegall’s masculinity, I believe that is
only one of its symbolic meanings. I propose the sword is also a legal symbol of

Aptekar, Icons of Justice, 32. Aptekar further recounts the significance of Artegall’s sword by
pointing to the fact that it is the only one in The Faerie Queene that has a name (this is a mistake since
Arthur’s sword is also named, Morddure, in II.viii.21). Pauline Henley proposes a secondary meaning of
sword’s name, “The word ‘Christ’ united with the Irish word ‘saor,’ a workman or artificer, would give a
hidden meaning which would delight the colonists, and appeal to Spenser particularly, for Grey’s policy for
Ireland, had he been given a free hand, would have been a Mahomedan conquest.” In: A Variorum Edition,
Book V, 164-65.
30

Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice, 55. For Dunseath, the link between Artegall and
Hercules is also important because the two heroes share many qualities and faults. See also Aptekar, Icons
of Justice, 153-200; and Jean MacIntyre, “Artegall's Sword and the Mutabilitie Cantos,” ELH 33, no. 4
(1966): 405-14.
31
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For example: A Variorum Edition, Book V, 264-65; Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice, 42;
John Henry Adams, “Assembling Radigund and Artegall: Gender Identities in Spenser’s Faerie Queene,”
Early Modern Literary Studies 18.1-2 (2015). Hamilton completely ignores the reappearance of the sword
in his edition of The Faerie Queene and simply points back to the note that relates its origins (FQ, 597).
Elsewhere, however, he claims Artegall uses Chrysaor only once. He says, “Though he wields the sword of
justice, he may use it only once in the book, and that is his final battle against Grantorto. (Earlier he chops
off Pollente’s head with the sword, but he has already won the battle through physical encounter.) Talus is
his executive power—and with the poet’s stubborn literalness, this becomes simple execution—while he
stands aside.” A. C. Hamilton, The Structure of Allegory in The Faerie Queene (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961),
171. I would argue this is incorrect since Artegall’s sword is mentioned when he fights Radigund. Although
Spenser does not identify Chrysaor by name in this case, it is safe to assume this is the sword Artegall
wields as we are not told of a switch, which is the case when Artegall exchanges his shield with
Braggadochio in V.iii.10.
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Artegall’s legitimate authority as the instrument of divine and sovereign justice. For,
whatever secondary characteristics may attach to Artegall, it is crucial here to remember
that he is first and foremost the Knight of Justice. Ultimately, the allegorical valence of
Chrysaor, then, must reside in its relation to justice.
When discussing judicial commissions, Baker informs us that “The usual means
of transmitting authority from the king to his itinerant justices was a commission under
the great seal,” which has been in use since the eleventh century and is “the most
important authentication in the realm.”33 As previously noted, Artegall shares some
similarities with the medieval itinerant justices, but his authority is greater still because
he was also instructed by Astraea on the correct exercise of equity. As such, his position
of authority is akin to that of the chancellor, who was the person entrusted with the
custody of the seal, and “Whoever was appointed to keep the seal necessarily possessed
the authority which the seal conveyed.” The seal is such an important source of authority
that, in the fourteenth century, it became high treason to counterfeit it.34
After Artegall willfully loses the contest, Radigund makes him her thrall and
“caused him to be disarmed quight, / Of all the ornaments of knightly name,” then “she
caused his warlike armes / Be hang’d on high, that mote his shame bewray; / And broke
his sword, for feare of further harmes, / With which he wont stirre vp battailous alarmes”
(V.v.20-21). In taking away Artegall’s knightly ornaments and his arms, she has stripped
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Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 16 and 99.
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Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 99-100. Baker also mentions that “in 1540 it
was held treason for a Chancery official to counterfeit patents by misusing the matrix of the true seal”
(528). See also Hilary Jenkinson, “The Great Seal of England,” Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 101,
no. 4902 (1953): 550-63; “Seals,” The National Archives, accessed June 01, 2017,
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/henryviii/parchment/seals.htm.
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him of his identity as the Knight of Justice. Traditionally, the great seal was broken at the
death of each sovereign and another made for the new sovereign. Astraea has already fled
earth and left Artegall to judge in her stead; therefore, by breaking his sword, it is as if
Radigund is breaking the great seal of justice. She strips Artegall of the divine authority
he held. I will return to the topic of the sword when I discuss their encounter, but we must
consider the possibility that Radigund is only able to succeed in stripping him of power
because of his willful negligence of his office.35
Generations of critics have pointed to the narrative structure of Book V as one of
its failures. Hamilton, for example, claims that “Spenser’s fiction seems to break down in
Book V,” that “his didaticism takes over the fiction,” and that by the end of Duessa’s
trial, the poetry “reads like a good imitation of Spenser, but not much more than that.”36
Part of the problem arises from what critics claim as episodic and disconnected events,
while others claim the problem relates to the historical dimension in the Book of
Justice.37 By focusing on the historicity or allegory of the poem, these critics fail to see
another structure emerge that serves to guide the narrative: the logical analysis of justice.
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It could be said that Artegall was negligent (possibly even treasonous since the seal/sword is
misused) the moment he agreed to Radigund’s “conditions.” Conditional bonds were documents under seal
that acknowledged that if “the condition was broken, the bond was forfeited and the penalty became due”;
Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 324. Typically, conditional bonds dealt with monetary
penalties, but the general wording of these types of bond are similar to Radigund’s contract or bond.
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Hamilton, The Structure of Allegory in The Faerie Queene, 170-73.
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For example, H. S. V. Jones, A Spencer Handbook (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1958). When discussing the first third of the Book, Jones says that, “there is no effort to weave this thread
of narrative interest into the subsequent action of the book” and that there is no attempt “as in Books III and
IV, to pattern the story by studied parallelism and contrast” (249). Although he does not see the Book as a
“complete” failure, O’Connell says that the “fiction is a bit mechanical and more than usually episodic” in
the first four cantos (133). He also claims “The poem fails when Spenser is unable, for a variety of reasons,
to make his poem an authentic vehicle of prophecy, to judge history in sufficiently moral terms. At certain
points he exhibits a compulsion to justify the claims of history beyond his desire to advance our moral
understanding.” Mirror and Veil, 126.

30

The idea of the book following a structure that relates to justice has gained some
support among scholars, although there is some disagreement on the driving force behind
the structure. James Phillips, for example, concludes that Book V is structured “according
to accepted principles of logical analysis,” in the same manner as “Renaissance theorists
on Justice arranged and developed their points.”38 These principles of logical analysis
would divide the Book into three focused sections: absolute law, equity, and mercy. I find
this structure compelling because these are the three aspects of justice I am also interested
in exploring. In addition, the definitions of these principles are similar to Spenser’s own
definitions of these three aspects of justice: “that is, Justice Absolute, which weighs ‘both
right and wrong / In equall balance with due recompence’; second, ‘equitie to measure
out along, / According to the line of conscience’; and finally, the quality of mercy, when
Justice ‘needs with rigour to dispense’ (i.7).”39 However, I find Phillips’s disposition and
his strict separation of these aspects in the Book reductive, and I would argue that
Spenser did not keep these three aspects strictly separate. There are many scenes, such as
the Radigund episode, that provide an example of more than one of these aspects. With
that said, there are clearly more examples of Artegall following absolute law and acting
the role of a strict judge in the first part of Book V.

James E. Phillips, “Renaissance Concepts of Justice and the Structure of The Faerie Queene,
Book V.” Huntington Library Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1970), 104. Another critic who makes an interesting
claim about the Book’s unity is W. Nicholas Knight, “The Narrative Unity of Book V of The Faerie
Queene: ‘That Part of Justice Which Is Equity’,” Review of English Studies 21, no. 83 (1970), 267-94. He
proposes the narrative unity of Book V is based on equity, which he says, “is supported by structural
connections, thematic recurrences, and allegorical consistency” (267). Zurcher, Spenser's Legal Language,
130-45, also sees the episodes of the first third of the book as expressions of English equity. According to
Zurcher, the episodes follow the precepts set by Christopher St. German in his Doctor and Student
dialogues where St. German “appropriates for the English legal constitution the traditional paradox of
pliant equity as a ‘rectification’ of straight justice” (132). An alternative unity is proposed by Fletcher, The
Prophetic Moment, who finds prophetic, typological coherence in Artegall’s story, 150.
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Phillips, “Renaissance Concepts of Justice,” 105-06.
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We are able to witness Artegall in the role of an orthodox judge, dispensing
verdicts and punishment accordingly, through most of the first third of Book V, which
immediately presents Artegall with a case following the pattern of Solomon’s judgement
between two women claiming the same child. In the episode with Sir Sanglier, Artegall is
called to the aid of the Squire who has lost his own Lady and is in a woeful state next to
another, now headless, Lady. After hearing the case, Artegall proposes they should cut
the two Ladies in half and the Squire and Sir Sanglier can each take half. He also
proposes that if one of them disagrees with his judgment, then that man must wear the
head of the dead Lady around his neck for one year to show the world what he had done.
Sir Sanglier offers the living Lady to be cut in half while the Squire says he will take the
dead Lady because he loves his Lady and does not wish to see her harmed. Artegall then
rules the Squire worthy of the living Lady and says that Sir Sanglier must carry the dead
Lady’s head around his neck (something Talus must enforce). This episode shows
Artegall’s ability to discern between moral and physical strength as well as his ability to
practice the principles of adjudication he learned under Astraea’s tutelage. In arguing
against Hamilton’s claims that Artegall does not question the lady who had been
kidnapped by Sir Sanglier because she “might not tell the truth, and so frustrate the
workings of justice,” Dunseath points to John Cowell, a contemporary of Spenser, and
states that Artegall was simply following judicial procedure since “in any criminal case
the accused is brought to the bar and is asked whether he pleads guilty or not guilty—
before the testimony of witnesses is heard.”40 Similar to the episode previously

Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice, 77 (emphasis in original). Likewise, Zurcher, Spenser's
Legal Language, 139-41 favors a reading of the Sir Sanglier episode as one where Artegall is practicing
legal principles, which he says are “very close to a Chancellor’s injunction on common law process” (140).
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mentioned in Mercilla’s court where procedure is respected, this is another case in The
Faerie Queene Book V where we see Spenser carefully attending to the legal customs of
his own time.
Order through power is another important motif of the early episodes in Book V,
especially if we allow that in this case, power rests in Talus and the sword, the might
necessary to execute justice.41 The idea of order through power is particularly striking in
the episode of the Giant with the scales. Here, Aptekar makes the connection between
that Giant’s rebellion and the giants who rebelled against Jove, saying that “The
maintenance of the status quo, and the position of the monarch was regarded as essential
for the health of the nation.”42 Dunseath also argues that the balance in this case is not the
one which we are accustomed to see alongside the figure of justice. On the contrary, the
Giant’s balance serves to subvert society’s “naturally” hierarchical order by dividing
everything equally among all people. He further reinforces Artegall’s supremacy over the
Giant when he reminds us that the argument is posited not in social or political terms, but

John Milton would later wish for “a man of iron, such as Talus, by our Poet Spenser, is fain’d to
be the page of Justice” (3:303), to assist him in his quest against tyranny, and also invoked the sword of
Justice, complaining that the Presbyterians “protest against those that talk of bringing [the king] to the tryal
of Justice, which is the Sword of God … in whose hand soever by apparent signes his testified will is to put
it” (3:193); “be he King, or Tyrant, or Emperour, the Sword of Justice is above him; in whose hand soever
is found sufficient power to avenge the effusion, and so great a deluge of innocent human blood” (3.197).
Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don M. Wolfe, 8 vols., vol. 3, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
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Aptekar, Icons of Justice, 28. Jones, A Spencer Handbook, 252-55, and O’Connell, Mirror and
Veil, 138-39 compare the Giant to the Anabaptists of Munster. Hamilton, The Structure of Allegory in The
Faerie Queene,189-90, reads the episodes in the first third of the book as an attempt to restore harmony to
society, with each episode serving as an example of the disorder that threatens the social structure (Sir
Sanglier, “between the sexes;” Guizor and Pollente, “class order;” Munera, money as “source of discord;”
Giant with the scales, “God’s divine order;” and after uncasing Braggadocchio and the false Florimell at the
tournament in honor of Florimell, “the restored human society is purged of discord”).
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in theological ones, which in essence question orthodox Christian doctrine, and therefore,
show that the Giant’s proposals are counter to divine law.43
As an instrument of sovereign justice, it is Artegall’s duty to eliminate anything
that might interfere with order. Stephen Greenblatt, on the other hand, associates the
Giant’s arguments with that of Spenser’s in the Proem and says that Talus’s action
against the Giant is necessary because it “exorcises the potentially dangerous social
consequences—the praxis—that might follow from Spenser’s own eloquent social
criticism” in earlier episodes, and without injustice in the world, Artegall would have no
purpose.44 However, the episode does not end with Artegall’s eloquent argument. Instead,
the episode ends with the Giant being thrown into the sea, his scales breaking into pieces,
and the crowd turning into a rebellious mob that are scattered and driven off by Talus.
Hadfield concludes this shows a lack of balance in Artegall’s dealings as a justiciar but
does not necessarily mean that Spenser sympathises with either side, only “that things
have gone badly awry and that there is a lack of equilibrium. In truth each side needs the
other in order to function, scales allied to the sword, and their conflict does not bode

Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice, 97. Schiavoni, “Royal Prerogative,” agrees with the
theological assessment, but says that it rests on the Old Testament rather than on the New Testament books.
He reads the episode with the Giant as Talus acting with no regard to legal procedure and using only
discretionary powers to deal with the Giant (28-33).
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Stephen Greenblatt, “Murdering Peasants: Status, Genre, and the Representation of Rebellion,”
Representations, no. 1 (1983): 22. Cormack, A Power to Do Justice,167-76 explores the episode of the
Giant with the scales and of Pollente and Munera as examples of Artegall’s intervention leading from “the
material to the immaterial, from the quantitative to the qualitative. From the sphere of distributive justice,
that is, Artegall moves to legal interpretation” (168); it is essentially a move from Irish custom to English
law. Conversely, Annabel Patterson finds the episode with the Giant to be an example of Spenser’s
ambivalence about his Irish experience. She draws this conclusion by reading Artegall’s argument with the
Giant alongside the discussion between Irenius and Eudoxius in A View, which, she says, is structured as a
debate but that Eudoxius’s side as well as other aspects of A View have previously been ignored. Patterson
also draws an interesting comparison between the Giant and the frontispiece of Hobbes’s Leviathan (10709) in her “The Egalitarian Giant: Representations of Justice in History/Literature,” Journal of British
Studies 31, no. 2 (1992): 97-132.
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well...He [Artegall] is an unbalanced and unstable figure of justice, too eager to appeal to
absolute principles of sovereignty and to use the sword.” Artegall’s propensity towards
violence is a constant reminder of his failures as a justicier in the first third of the book.45
Along these same lines, it is significant that the first time Artegall uses his sword
it is against Pollente, who has taken control of a bridge and charges an unfair tax of those
who try to cross it. He embodies economic injustice and greed, and, according to
Aptekar, is “a rebel against and a usurper of proper authority. He is a twofold foe of God,
for he is not only a pagan but also a disrupter of God’s order and right government.”
Here, Aptekar goes one step further to show that Spenser makes use of ambiguity in this
section and leaves the reader to wonder if “the hand, which did that vengeance on him
dight” is meant simply as the hand that wielded Chrysaor or as “the vengeance of God as
administered by the hand of his instrument, Artegall.”46 If we consider that Artegall is
God’s instrument and that Chrysaor belonged to Jove and was his instrument against the
giants, the vengeance of God becomes a more likely possibility, especially as Aptekar

Hadfield, “The Death of the Knight with the Scales,” 19-20. See also Elizabeth Fowler, “The
Failure of Moral Philosophy in the Work of Edmund Spenser,” Representations, no. 51 (1995): 47-76. She
discusses Artegall’s encounter with the Giant on pages 59-66 where she shows that his argument about the
heavens never changing contradicts what the narrator says in the proem, and although Artegall has a set of
“metaphorical” scales, she concludes that his “excessive reliance upon a kind of renegade jurisprudence
breaks the scales of justice themselves” (66).
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Aptekar, Icons of Justice, 33-34. Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice, 88-94, also explores
the scene where Artegall faces Pollente and Munera, who together are a formidable force of power and
wealth, but he sees in this scene (as in others in the first third of the book) an example of how Artegall’s
faults as a man lead him to fail as a justiciar. According to Dunseath, in dealing with both opponents
Artegall commits grave errors: with Pollente, he allows his wrath to interfere with the execution of justice,
and, according to “Cicero’s De Officiis, a popular book in sixteenth century England,” punishment should
be dealt without anger, “it bee wished, that such as governe the common weale be lyke the lawes: which be
moved to ponish offenders not upon any wrath, but upon equitie” (90). Even though he is aware of
Munera’s crimes, Artegall allows himself to feel pity for her, a vice that will cause him to fall into
Radigund’s hands later. Were it not for Talus acting in his role as the “hand” of Justice, Munera might not
have been punished, which is another distinction between this episode and Radigund’s since in the latter,
Artegall stays Talus’s hand from acting.
46

35

claims “that Artegall commands the just monarch’s two executive instruments, power and
law, and that in corresponding manner he himself embodies the power and law of a
higher authority.”47 Her survey of these two instruments becomes particularly interesting
when she begins to explore Artegall’s link with the law.
Artegall’s link to the law becomes more apparent when we explore Talus as a
symbol of the law. Aptekar refers to classic mythology as Spenser’s source for Talus. She
writes, “What Astraea is said to have left to men when she went from the earth at the
beginning of the iron age was a ‘testamentum’ of laws. Spenser’s Astraea leaves Talus.
Again Talus is very clearly derived from that law-keeping brazen man, Talos of Crete,”
who is associated with “the rigorous execution of the laws of Crete” and is “said to be
brazen because he carries the tables of law engraved on a brazen tablet.”48 Aptekar
furthers her argument of the link between Talus and the law by reviewing Spenser’s
description of Talus alongside what he says of the law in A View. Spenser says of Talus
that he is “‘Immoveable, resistlesse, without end.’ And ‘the lawes,’ Spenser declares in
the View, ‘oughte to be like stonye tables playne stedfaste and unmoveable.’” This
analysis of Talus as the law allows Aptekar to argue that, for Spenser, power and law are
related in function and, in this way, Talus represents the “rigorous law which the
sovereign decrees” as well as “the sovereign’s power to enforce and maintain the law.”49
Here, she adopts Bodin’s ideas to support her assertions by referring to his writings.
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Aptekar, Icons of Justice, 39.
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Aptekar, Icons of Justice, 52. See also John Erskine Hankins, Source and Meaning in Spenser's
Allegory: A Study of The Faerie Queene (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 171-74; and Fletcher, The
Prophetic Moment, 137-46.
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Aptekar, Icons of Justice, 53.
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According to Bodin, “It is clear that the principal mark of sovereign majesty and absolute
power is the right to impose laws generally on all subjects regardless of their consent,”
and that “law is nothing else than the command of the sovereign in the exercise of his
sovereign power.”50 Aptekar concludes this line of thought by suggesting the possibility
that like Bodin, Spenser regarded law as an expression of the sovereign’s legitimate
power. In which case, I would argue that as an expression of the sovereign’s legitimate
power and the instrument of sovereign justice, Artegall does not need the consent of
those he judges (though there are occasions when he is asked to serve as a judge), and
whatever his decision, he has the power to enforce it.
Another episode that serves to exemplify Artegall’s ability to judge according to
the laws is the one with the two rival brothers, Amidas and Bracidas. In this episode, the
brothers are fighting over property “delivered” by the sea. Phillips sees the episode as
another example of Artegall exercising “letter-of-the-law justice” while Dunseath
believes Artegall is here given a chance to demonstrate his skills as a judge of equity, and
the episode directly connects to the debate between Artegall and the Giant where
Artegall’s rebuttal to the Giant’s claim for reform was that “whatever was washed away
at one place was brought ‘with the tide unto another’ (V.ii.39).”51 The various

Aptekar, Icons of Justice, 53-54. In The Prophetic Moment, Fletcher also refers to Bodin’s
influence on Spenser, particularly on 146-79.
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Phillips, “Renaissance Concepts of Justice,” 109, and Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice,
125. Zurcher, Spenser's Legal Language, 144-45 supports the idea of Artegall acting as a judge of equity,
but not Dunseath’s reasoning as he says that although the concept of alluvion (“Roman law whereby the
soil deposited on a bank by the action of a river or watercourse is deemed the property of the owner of the
bank,” 144) was accepted by civil doctors, it was not part of English common law. He claims the reason
Artegall is here acting equitably is because he acts against the legal statute in favor of a common law
maxim (“equall right in equall things doth stand,” 145). He further claims that by the time the episode with
the brothers ends, “Artegall has encountered and negotiated claims based on each of St. German’s
fundamental bases of the common law: natural or rational law, divine law, general customs, legal maxims,
particular customs, and statute law” (145).
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interpretations of some of these episodes stem from the various understandings of the
concept of equity as it relates to justice, which is either based on a classic or on a modern
concept. Yet, equity was evolving in England during Spenser’s time, and it is this
evolution that Spenser characterizes and hopes to influence with his epic. The system of
English common law had taken many centuries to become established throughout the
kingdom, but it had finally succeeded in creating a coherent legal system. There were still
shortcomings in the system, however, and new courts of equity established in the Tudor
period were an attempt at remedying these shortcomings, but there remained the problem
of interpretation. In the following section, I explore how Artegall’s misinterpretation of
mercy and equity lead him to fall prey to Radigund’s guile.

Artegall’s Interpretive Error
The principal theme of Book V is justice and its relation to law, equity, and
mercy. As indicated in the examples of the previous section, a number of scholars have
noted the link as well as indicated the importance of the episode with Radigund as central
to that theme.52 However, Artegall’s legal errors in his interaction with Radigund have
not been widely discussed, which is why it is important to first understand ideas about
law, equity, and mercy as well as how concepts of legitimate authority and its source
were shifting during Spenser’s life.

52
For example, Aptekar sees the episode with Radigund as a turning point for Artegall but focuses
on the idea of guile. Icons of Justice, 119-23. See also Anderson, “Nor Man It Is,” 69, where she says that
Artegall goes through a change in Canto V during his encounter with Radigund. Andrew Majeske, “Equity
in Book V of Spenser's The Faerie Queene,” Law and Literature 18, no. 1 (2006): 69-99 sees the passage
in Isis Church in Canto V as the center of the Book of Justice (93 note 1).
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As Artegall approaches the Amazons, we should remember that, according to
Dunseath, his main flaws are concupiscence, wrath, and pride.53 He compares the
Amazons to “tyrants, mercilesse the more” (V.iv.23). They overcome Sir Terpine and try
to advance on Artegall himself, but he withdraws and sends Talus to help the knight
because he does not want to raise his hand against “womankinde.” Artegall criticizes Sir
Terpine for allowing himself to be mastered by women, even though Artegall himself has
often succumbed to them in one way or another. Furthermore, as Sir Terpine relates his
plight, he exposes the dangers Artegall is about to face against Radigund, relating that she
subdues her opponents by “force or guile” (V.iv.31, emphasis added). Yet, the warning
falls on deaf ears. Even as Sir Terpine explains the terms of “her proud obseruanuce,”
which Hamilton defines as rule (V.iv.32), Artegall allows himself to fall into Radigund’s
traps.
Radigund’s wrath is ignited after she sees Sir Terpine set free from her “direful
doome,” and after taking the field, she soon wins the victory against him. However,
Artegall sees Sir Terpine’s distress and intervenes. Radigund cannot win against the
knight, even with the help of her fellow Amazons, and decides to retreat into the city,
while Artegall sets up camp in front of the city gate. Unable to defeat Artegall using
force, Radigund resorts to guile and succeeds in subduing our hero. She decides to
propose “that to morrow I with him wil fight, / And try in equall field, whether hath
greater might” (V.iv.48). The last sentence’s use of the word “try” carries the double
meaning of a trial by arms (which was an accepted legal remedy in some cases) as well as
a legal trial, especially as we read the next stanza:
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But these conditions doe to him propound,
That if I vanquishe him, he shall obay
My law, and euer to my lore be bound,
And so will I, if me he vanquish may;
What euer he shall like to doe or say:
Goe streight, and take with thee, to witnesse it,
Six of thy fellowes of the best array,
And beare with you both wine and iuncates fit,
And bid him eate, henceforth he oft shall hungry sit. (V.iv.49)
Radigund has essentially proposed terms to Artegall as in a contract. More importantly,
with the words she uses to set up the contract, we can see that it is aimed at Artegall as
the Knight of Justice, specifically in his role as a judge of equity. First, she wants the trial
to take place in an “equall field” and then she tells Clarin to take “Six of thy fellowes” “to
witnesse” Artegall’s agreement to the contract. According to Baker, the common law
“provides for damages to compensate for breach of contract, but to compel the specific
performance of a contract in the future recourse must be had to equity.” He further relates
that “By 1500 the chancellor had assumed a general jurisdiction in contract, and it was
said that ‘a man shall have remedy in the Chancery for covenants made without specialty
if the party have sufficient witnesses to prove the covenants.’”54 By setting up her
conditions in such way, Radigund is making certain that the contract she proposes has
bearing in the court of equity, which is technically Artegall’s “field.” It is as if she is
trying to substitute trial by combat (force) for some other kind of judicial process.
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Artegall is an envoy of Faerie Land’s central government (the Faerie Queene),
and as such his legal bearing supersedes that of Radigund, who is a local ruler (Artegall
only leaves Faerie Land later when he crosses the sea to Irena’s land), so Radigund’s
terms are very disturbing as she seeks to supplant his authority. She proposes that if she
wins, he will obey her law and forever to her “lore be bound.” Artegall is careless in his
dealings with Radigund’s envoy, Clarin, and hastily agrees to comply to the terms.
However, by agreeing to obey Radigund’s lore, which is a tyrant’s lore and not conducive
to justice, Artegall has to give up the “righteous lore” he learned under Astraea’s tutelage,
as he cannot be bound to competing teachings or rules. Here is Artegall’s greatest error,
because he has allowed his law to be placed on a par with Radigund’s. As Zurcher
succinctly notes, “In agreeing to abide by Radigund’s ‘conditions’, Artegall has
surrendered the fundamental basis of his equitable power, its authority to overrule other
legal systems.”55 Equity, as previously noted, is bound to the common law, but it is there
to serve as a remedy where the law fails. Artegall was taught by Astraea to “weigh both
right and wrong/ In equall ballance” along with “equitie to measure out along, /
According to the line of conscience” (V.i.7, emphasis added), and thus to be able to judge
equitably in the same way as the chancellor in Chancery court. Moreover, if we compare
Astraea’s righteous lore, which is supposed to govern men in true justice, to the law, then
we can deduce that just as equity should be bound to the law, so Artegall is bound to
Astraea’s lore and cannot (or should not) accept Radigund’s terms.56
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Zurcher, Spenser’s Legal Language, 146.
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Lockey, “Equitie to Measure,” 52-70, also discusses Artegall’s interpretive error and says an
important aspect of his encounter with Radigund is that “Radigund’s formulation orients her struggle with
Artegall as one between two competing regimes of law, a gynocentric legal regime and a patriarchal one.
But Artegall seems to misunderstand his role as the more limited one of taking revenge for the personal
affront made to fellow knight.” Thus, Artegall fails to realize that the “conflict with the polity of Radegone
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The reader knows when it comes time for Artegall’s battle with Radigund that he
has not succeeded in tempering his character, and he indeed falls just as he had in his
fight with Britomart in Book IV. At first, he defends himself and pursues Radigund until
he gains the advantage over her and cuts off half of her shield. This act only serves to
enrage her, and she stabs him on the thigh, but he finally succeeds in disarming her and,
as she falls down, her helmet falls off her face and her beauty is revealed, which causes
Artegall’s “fall.” Yet unlike his fight with Britomart where his “fall” was involuntary,
here he submits willingly: “his sharpe sword he threw from him apart, / Cursing his hand
that had that visage mard” (V.v.13.3-4). Dunseath reminds us that “Although Terpine
tells him that Radigund subdues her opponents ‘by force or guile,’ Artegall nevertheless
consents to meet on her terms, conditions under which he could not possibly win.”57
When Artegall drops his sword, Zurcher says he is mistaking “pitying mercy (Seneca’s
misericordia) for equity,”58 which is a grave error because pity is the opposite of mercy.
Mercy, Seneca states, is “leniency on the part of a superior towards an inferior in

occurs within an ‘international’ sphere of action, where conflicts cease to be over personal honor and
revenge and are rather about competing systems of law” (56).
Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice, 132-33. Artegall finds he cannot kill Radigund due to
her great beauty, which for him is “A miracle of natures goodly grace” (V.v.12), and the same thing
happened to him when he fought Britomart, although her beauty was stronger since it conquered his
weapons themselves. After Artegall shears away Britomart’s vizor and discovers her beauty, Spenser
informs the reader that Artegall drops his sword, but in this case, the text (IV.vi.21) is not clear about what
happened; we are left without knowing if it was Artegall’s hand, the sword itself, or both that felt pity for
Britomart’s divine beauty. However, it is clear that there is an important difference between this case and
Artegall’s willful abandonment of his sword in the battle with Radigund. Furthermore, Britomart’s
behavior reflects Artegall’s. Once she realizes she has been fighting Artegall, she also drops her weapon,
and, although “she arm’d her tongue, and thought at him to scold;” she also lacks the will, and we are told,
“her tongue not to her will obayed / But brought forth speeches myld, when she would have missayd”
(IV.vi.27). Hence, Britomart’s reaction to Artegall dropping his sword serves as another way this episode
contrasts with the Radigund episode, where we see Radigund use her advantage to manipulate Artegall into
submission.
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imposing punishments” and “something which ‘stops short of what could be deservedly
imposed,’” but it involves “self-control by the mind.” Pity, on the other hand, “is a
mental failing;” it is “The fault of a petty mind succumbing to the sight of evils that affect
others” and it “looks at the plight, not the cause of it. Mercy joins in with reason.”59
Because mercy is also an attribute of the sovereign, Zurcher claims its goal “is not justice
but peace and security for the ruler and society.”60 The ruler and society Artegall should
be defending is the Faerie Queene and the knights of the Maidenhead (exemplified by Sir
Terpine). Therefore, when he spares Radigund’s life, he is acting contrary to mercy’s
goal and to the queen’s peace.61 He is also essentially acting against justice.
Artegall consents to submit to Radigund and only by Britomart saving him, a
force external to his bond, is he able to keep his promise while being set free. Aptekar
argues that Artegall is using guile (appearing to be willing to break his word to Radigund
when telling Clarinda that he would be happy if she set him free) in this episode.
According to Aptekar, there are “two traditions which justify Artegall’s apparent
willingness to break his word. According to Cicero, it is not necessary for a man to keep
a promise that has been extorted by superior force or through deceit. According to Bodin,
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Lucius Annaeus Seneca, John M. Cooper, and J. F. Procopé, Moral and Political Essays,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 160-61.

Zurcher, Spenser’s Legal Language, 129. Seneca says that mercy serves to enhance “not only a
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Baker explains the concept of the king’s peace as it had its beginnings in England. Early in the
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an important aspect of royal government...Failure of justice elsewhere provided the basis for a nascent
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jurisdiction over crime. The king was also a feudal lord, and like other lords was expected to do justice to
his tenants.” An Introduction to English Legal History, 8-9.
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it is against natural law to subjugate a man to a woman, and any contract to this effect
must necessarily be invalid.” Aptekar argues that the episode is “merely a matter for
romance.”62 However, what she fails to consider is that later in De officiis, Cicero
specifically addresses oaths sworn between enemies, such as that between Artegall and
Radigund, claiming that these are as binding as treaties. “For swearing to what is false is
not necessarily perjury,” Cicero remarks, “but to take an oath ‘upon your conscience,’ as
it is expressed in our legal formulas, and then fail to perform it, that is perjury.”63 By
giving his word to Radigund that he will remain her prisoner, the possibility of escaping
is taken away from Artegall and the only thing left to him is to be rescued. However, he
has also prevented Talus from acting, which is only natural since the iron man is in fact
an extension of Artegall as the hand of justice. That means he must be rescued by
Britomart, who must also go through her own trials before she can be more closely
identified with him and his work. Hence the importance of Britomart’s stay at Isis Church
where she has a vision of Artegall in his true light and discovers her own role. She will
share in Artegall’s work as “That part of Justice, which is Equity” (V.vii.3.4) and help
bring about “universall peace.”
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Marcus Tullius Cicero, and Walter Miller. De Officiis. With an English Translation by Walter
Miller. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1928), III:107-08, emphasis added. Sir Thomas Elyot, and
Foster Watson, The Boke Named the Governour (London: J.M. Dent & Co, 1907) also argues the
importance of justice between enemies and says that fides, i.e., faith or fidelity, is the foundation of justice,
209-11. With Elyot’s claims about trust and good faith in mind, Fletcher claims Artegall’s entrapment by
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Before rescuing Artegall, Britomart goes to the Isis Church because in “the
antique world,” justice was identified with Osiris, who was the “iustest man aliue,” and
his wife, Isis, in her person “did shade / That part of Iustice, which is Equity” (V.vii.2-3),
information that is important to understanding the role Britomart will play in the poem
after her visit. While at the temple, Britomart dreams of the goddess Isis subduing the
crocodile, a symbol of Osiris, which represents the relation between justice and equity.
After she awakes, the priest explains that the crocodile represents Artegall, whose
judgments need to be tempered with mercy or equity, which becomes Britomart’s role.
Of the significance of the crocodile as an icon, Aptekar writes that “it is an emblem of the
proper submitting, as Spenser clearly declares, of the god to the goddess, of one aspect of
justice to another, of rigor to clemency, and of the law to equity (cf. vii.3,23),” but there
is also another aspect of the icon, “which suggests the essentially evil character of the
justice which the first portion of the Book V presents as so nobly Jovial. Though the
crocodile be one way a god, the other he’s a serpent. In dominating him, the goddess
suppresses ‘both forged guile, and open force,’ and also restrains his ‘cruell doomes’
(vii.23).”64 Although Aptekar is clearly referring to Artegall as the crocodile who uses
force and guile, these are also Radigund’s weapons of choice. In addition, Radigund
frames her challenge in a legal manner, which allows her to remain within the realm of
absolute law.
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Aptekar, Icons of Justice, 96. Aptekar appears to be convinced that Artegall’s force must be
counterbalanced by Britomart’s equity. Other scholars see the episode in Isis Church as Spenser turning to
a feminine (more flexible and antiquated) interpretation of equity, for example, Majeske, “Equity in Book
V,” 69-99; Miller, “Gender, Justice, and the Gods,” 28-30; and O’Connell, Mirror and Veil, 144-47.
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When Radigund is faced with Britomart’s challenge, she again tries to impose
conditions, but Britmart “sternly frownd / For high disdaine of such indignity” because
“For her no other terms should euer tie / Then what prescribed were by lawes of
cheualrie” (V.vii.28). The laws of chivalry, Hamilton explains in the note, “do not impose
preset conditions but leave the victor free to offer mercy.” Because of her experience at
Isis Church, Britomart knows that mercy, which is identified with Isis’s equity, can
subdue the absolute law, and so she also has the power to subdue Radigund. The way she
responds to Radigund’s attempt to impose conditions is how Artegall should have
responded.
Some critics, Phillips among them, when discussing the “crueltie of womenkynd”
identify Britomart as the exception, as Spenser’s way of accommodating the rule of
Elizabeth.65 However, it is Britomart’s identification with equity that really serves to set
her apart as the exception. As Aristotle and others have noted, equity applies when the
law is not enough, when using the rule would cause an injustice, that is, when a particular
case is exceptional. As the “new” knight of equity, Britomart is at once able to suspend
the law while also maintaining it.
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A number of critics have explored the historical aspects of the encounter between Britomart and
Radigund. For example, René Graziani, “Elizabeth at Isis Church.” PMLA 79, no. 4 (1964): 376-89, reads
the duel between Britomart and Radigund as the resolution of the conflict between Elizabeth and Mary
Stuart and argues that “One important reason for locating the experience in Isis Church was to show that
Elizabeth’s final decision about Mary was made under divine inspiration from the very fount of clemency”
and that “Isis Church is Parliament” (377, emphasis in original). Graziani also connects the crocodile to
Elizabeth’s excessive pity for Mary (383) and Dolon’s plot against Britomart with L’Aubespine’s plot to
murder Elizabeth in Dec 1586/Jan 1587 (388-89). Also, Jones, A Spencer Handbook, 261-62 argues that
Cantos VI and VII deal with the Catholic danger in England, comparing Dolon with Philip and the
Britomart-Radigund duel with the conflict between Elizabeth and Mary Stuart. Knight, “The Narrative
Unity of Book V,” 284 claims Radigund’s execution equals the elimination of Elizabeth’s pity for Mary
Stuart. Majeske, “Equity in Book V,” argues the episode in Isis Church is concerned with the succession
issue and is trying to persuade Elizabeth to settle the succession on James.

46

Artegall needs to be rescued by Britomart because of his mistakes, and he is left
without his sword since Radigund had broken it in half. As he leaves Britomart, Spenser
informs us “Ne wight but onely Talus with him went, / The true guide of his way and
vertuous gouernment” (V.viii.3), which appears to refer back to the idea of Talus being
“testamentum of laws” and would mean that the laws should serve as a guide to justice,
but we hear nothing of his sword. Another sign he may still not have Chrysaor is that
when he strikes down one of the knights chasing the Damzell Samient, he does so with
“his speare” (V.viii.7), which is the last time we hear of Artegall striking someone down
until his encounter with Grantorto.66
I want to propose that because the sword is a powerful symbol of his status as the
Knight of Justice, the “refashioning” of Chrysaor begins with Britomart’s rescue.
Britomart’s association with Isis is important here because like Isis, who reassembles
Osiris, Britomart must now do something similar for Artegall. According to Plutarch’s
Isis and Osiris, after Osiris is dismembered, Isis searches for his body parts and
reassembles them into his form, only missing the male member, which she makes a
replica of to take its place.67 Britomart, after finding Artegall in a deplorable state,
“reassembles” him in “armors bright,” “In which when she him anew had clad, / She was
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Like many other critics, Boklund-Logopoulou sees what happens in Canto XII as a reflection of
Spenser’s ideas about Ireland. Once Artegall defeats Grantorto, who “carries a poleaxe, an Irish weapon,”
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common-weale,’ sending Talus ‘to search out those, that vsed to rob and steale, Or did rebel gainst lawfull
gouerment; On whom he did inflict most grieuous punishment’ (xii.26), precisely the project Spenser
proposes, even the exact terminology that he uses, in A View.” He is not, however, able to finish the project
as he is recalled to Faerie Court, which leads Boklund-Logopoulou to conclude that “Elizabeth’s policy in
Ireland was much too hesitant and vacillating for Spenser’s taste.” Boklund-Logopoulou, “Law, Justice,
and Poetry in Faerie Land,”40-41.
67

“P7 Isis and Osiris.” Plutarch, Isis and Osiris (Part 1 of 5). Accessed June 22, 2017.

47

reuiu’d, and ioyd much in his semblance glad” (V.vii.41). Britomart has started the work
of putting Artegall back together, but unlike Isis, she cannot finish it; it is a job that
Artegall will have to finish himself.
The broken sword is a symbol of his broken understanding of justice, so only
when Artegall is made whole through his understanding of all the facets of justice (and
has internalized them) and is ready to complete his mission, will the sword also be made
whole again. As is a symbol of legitimate authority akin to the great seal, Artegall will
only be able to yield the sword again once he perfects his understanding of justice. He
loses the sword through his mistakes in dealing with Radigund, but it is under her
dominion that Artegall finally begins a journey of self-awareness that leads to wisdom.
As Dunseath argues, “When he has Artegall declare that he will remain true to himself
even if his present state ‘should for ever last,’ Spenser further exhibits the degree of his
humility and the measure of his hope. For all intents and purposes, Artegall has redeemed
his past failings.”68 Additionally, just as Artegall gains wisdom through humility, so does
Britomart, who is shown to feel great humility upon entering Isis Church. Britomart
becomes identified with equity after the episode in Isis Church, which is only necessary
because of Artegall’s blunder with Radigund. Once he submits his law to Radigund’s
contract and is captured, he must be rescued because only equity can save him from the
harsh execution of the law once he has agreed to be “bound” to Radigund’s “lore.”
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Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice, 139. Anderson, “Nor Man It Is,” claims it is love that
saves him as he remains faithful to Britomart and her love for him leads to her rescuing him. She
extrapolates, “In Artegall’s waiting for Britomart, we can also see Justice’s waiting for Mercy; and fallen
man’s, for Love” (69 note 19).
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The Beginning and the End of Justice
Artegall’s education in justice under Astraea has been the source of some
discussion among critics. Recently, Judith Owens proposed the idea that Artegall is, in
effect, Astraea’s ward. By examining their relationship through the lenses of wardship,
Owens argues that “In Book V, Spenser imagines a version of wardship that both corrects
contemporary abuses regarding its mandate to furnish education and recreates ancient
military wardship by joining ‘right’ to ‘might.’ Thus envisioned, wardship serves, rather
than subverts, the interests of a just commonwealth.”69 Owens marks the difference
between Astraea and the common ways that were used to procure a ward in the sixteenth
century. Astraea’s mild manner (she uses “gifts and speaches milde,” V.i.6.4) of gaining
possession of Artegall, Owens writes, “represent a corrective to the notorious abuse of
that system,” and unlike “unscrupulous guardians who squeeze or extort all they can from
their wards, Astraea leaves to her ward a legacy, Talus.”70 Owens further claims that
Astraea’s intentions to educate Artegall are very different from what one would find in
the Court of Wards during that period. Owens’s focus on the “theoretical” side of
Artegall’s education contrasts with Judith Anderson’s view, which claims that from the
beginning, the knight’s strong suit is force, not authority. Anderson also claims that
Artegall’s tutelage among the beasts leaves a permanent mark on him.71 To Anderson,

Judith Owens, “Warding off Injustice in Book Five of The Faerie Queene” in Taking Exception
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what she perceives as Artegall’s lack of authority leave him only with violence as a way
to deal justice when implicit or explicit contractual relations between men and women
have been violated. As I have related in my discussion of Chrysaor, I disagree with
Anderson’s assessment that Artegall lacks authority.
Artegall differs from the other knights in the poem in two other significant ways.
First, Spenser says he will deal with private virtues, but justice is a “social virtue,” one
that is “external to the just or virtuous man,” which is contrary to the virtues in the first
half of the poem.72 Second, he is the only knight who is mentioned (in II.ix.6) and
appears in the poem before his quest. Artegall makes an appearance as an idealized form
in Britomart’s mirror early in Book III (ii.24-25). The vision is described as one that
changes from reflection to transparency. As she looks at her own self, the image changes
to show her Artegall. She sees, “His manly face, that did his foes agrize / And frends to
termes of gentle truce entize” and also notes his “Heroicke grace, and honorable gest.” A
complete description of Artegall’s armour follows, and we find that he wears:
Achilles armes, which Arthogall did win
And on his shield enueloped seuenfold
He bore a crowned litle Ermilin,

Anderson, “Nor Man It Is,” 65. Anderson draws on Aquinas’s definition of justice as
“distinguished among the virtues by the fact that it governs relations among men,” and Aristotle’s “justice,
alone of the virtues, is thought to be ‘another’s good,’ because it is related to our neighbour; for it does
what is advantageous to another” to show that with the exception of courtesy, “justice is without question
the most socially oriented of the moral virtues.” It is not surprising that courtesy along with justice is a
social virtue. As Fowler indicates, courtesy has a relation to justice as “an English word for the anglicized
Latin comity, the principle upon which conflicts of law are decided” (51). She also discusses the legal
meaning behind friendship (the virtue Spenser explores in Book IV), which she says is also drawn from a
category in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics and covers a wider range of social bonds than today becoming
the basis of political structures. “The Failure of Moral Philosophy,” 47-76.
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That deckt the azure field with her fayre pouldred skin. (III.ii.25; emphasis in
original)
The last details about his shield are very important because, as Hamilton reminds us in
the note, the crowned ermine was associated with British royalty, especially with
Elizabeth, and the azure is associated with heavenly justice.
In her mirror, Britomart sees Artegall as the knight he will become, not as the
wrathful and proud knight that he is when we first meet him in Book V. According to
Dunseath, “The apparent dichotomy between the idealized portrayal of Artegall and his
actual appearance in Faery Land poses an essential crux in the reading of The Faerie
Queene,” and the lack of a generally accepted interpretation of this dichotomy “has led to
the hypothesis that Spenser must have changed his mind between the writing of Book
Three and Book Four and, more recently, to various archetypal readings.” Of the first
possibility, Dunseath says it is “impossible of proof, slights Spenser’s poetic integrity,
and questions his grand design,” and of the archetypal readings, he claims it has the
“unintended effect of flattening the character just when the poet is giving it point.”73 In
view of Spenser’s theme of reflection and representation, the mirror can be seen as a
symbol for the allegory of the poem.
The mirror also serves to call our attention to how Spenser presents the Books,
with one half of each book “reflecting” its other half; thus, I would like to suggest a third
possible interpretation: that what Spenser is portraying when Britomart sees Artegall’s
73
Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice, 28. This variation in spelling occurs at different times
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lond” (I.i.3); he also uses another variation at times for a “Faire knight” (I.i.27). Later, there is also a
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image in the mirror is how we perceive justice itself.74 That is to say, the image of
Artegall is idealized because what Britomart is looking at is not real, it is only a
reflection, which is similar to our view of justice. In other words, justice is not a code of
actual laws, but rather an idealized version of what such a code would produce; however,
once a legal code is exercised in the real world, it becomes flawed because it cannot
encompass every circumstance, and, according to early modern legal theory, it requires
mercy and equity in order for it to overcome its flaws. Thus, it is only when Artegall has
internalized the lessons of equity and mercy that he becomes a successful justicier,
gradually embodying the image of him Britomart sees in the mirror.
Like the other knights in the previous books, Artegall has to be perfected in his
virtue before he can accomplish his mission. However, when Judith Anderson compares
him to the other knights, she complains that the basic problem with Book V is that
“justice is the most inclusive and exalted moral virtue in The Faerie Queene; the Book of
Justice is the most comprehensive Book, drawing together the central symbols and
concerns of earlier Books; yet Artegall, ‘the Champion of true Iustice,’ seems the most
disappointing and ineffectual hero in the entire poem.” Artegall’s experiences in this
Book, Anderson claims, reflect Spenser’s decision to build historical and symbolic poles
into the Book: “He [Artegall] has always a choice of being Justice, a virtue and an
abstraction, and being a Knight, a virtuous man and a human being.”75 These symbolic
poles are problematic to Anderson because, while Artegall must internalize all virtues, in
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order for him to enact justice he must also remain objective and not become emotionally
involved.
Unlike Anderson, Owens does not see Artegall’s need to remain impartial as
completely problematic. She takes up the question of Artegall’s “detachment” and
develops her ideas of the Knight of Justice by discussing the role the ironman Talus—
who is robotic, but also the only help Artegall needs—plays in his life.76 She further
distinguishes Artegall’s upbringing by comparing it to Arthur’s, whose “wardship is
infused with sentiment,” and argues that “Arthur’s particular cluster of virtues—honour,
grace, magnificence—demand considerable emotional investment, whether they are
privately or publicly exerted, whereas Artegall’s virtue of justice, even when it includes
equity, must remain emotionally indifferent.”77 We hear in Owens’s words an echo of
what Spenser says of Mercilla, who deals in “Justice with indifferent grace” (V.ix.36),
and provides a chief example of ideal justice in the Book.
That Spenser felt the need for justice to be “impartial” should not be surprising
considering his own experience in the Irish courts. Hadfield clarifies Spenser’s link to the
law by pointing to the fact that Spenser acted as a magistrate in a variety of courts in
Ireland, including the Irish Chancery Court, which was a court of “equity, a principle that
features centrally in Spenser’s writing about law.” He also discusses Spenser’s own legal
problems, specifically his legal case with Lord Maurice Roche of Fermoy over the estate
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of Kilcolman in north Cork. According to Hadfield, “the English plan was to spread
English law to Ireland, but this had the unfortunate consequence of ensuring that Irish
courts were filled with the dispossessed Irish providing evidence of prior claims which
preceded and undermined those of the colonists, and which had to be honored.” Spenser
was unsettled by these proceedings “and, in A View of the Present State of Ireland, he
complains bitterly of the problem of receiving justice in Irish common law courts which
were, he thought, packed with Irish juries uninterested in the impartial administration of
justice.”78 After such an experience, Spenser could attest to the need for impartiality in a
justiciar, which he granted Artegall, to the chagrin of critics like Anderson.
It is nearly impossible to discuss justice in Book V without dealing with the
question of Ireland, especially since a number of critics have made the connection
between Lady Irena and Ireland and have concluded that Spenser is writing in favor of a
violent solution to suppress the Irish rebels. Boklund-Logopoulou, for example, says that
the most disturbing parts of the poem, as it relates to Ireland, are the ones that are less
obvious to the reader. Her claim is that when Artegall is given the task by the Faerie
Queene (i.e., Elizabeth) “to rescue fair Irena and restore her to her true heritage…In spite
of her name, Irena is not exactly an allegorical representation of Ireland. She represents
rather the Elizabethan claim to Ireland, her ‘heritage’ (i:3), that is threatened by
Grantorto,” who is a combination of all the threats to English rule in Ireland, “a villain
with a Spanish name who is armed like an Irish soldier.”79 Similarly, in the note
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regarding Eirena’s name in the poem, Hamilton writes that it is the Gaelic name for
Ireland, and that “Since Gk είρήνη signifies ‘peace’, it represents a peaceful Ireland
paying homage to the English Queen, as ‘myld Eirene’ attends Mercilla at ix 32.6”
(V.i.4.note). In both of these cases, we see Ireland’s signification dependent on its
relation to England.
Dunseath is more optimistic about the meaning of Eirena’s name. Like Hamilton,
he traces the etymology of Eirena’s name to its Greek roots, είρήνη, and claims that
Artegall’s mission is to restore peace to earth. Dunseath builds his argument by first
going back to the Proem and noting that while Astraea resided among men in the Golden
Age, there was universal peace; then, turning to scripture he notes that, “the work of
justice shall be peace, even the worke of justice and quietnesse, and assurance for ever”
(Isa. 32.17; Geneva version), and he further notes a number of sources that discuss the
link between justice and peace that would have been familiar to Spenser, among whom
are Calvin, Jerome, Aquinas, and Erasmus.80 After providing evidence of the link
between peace and justice in texts Spenser would have known, Dunseath concludes that,
“In Book Five the overall pattern of Artegall’s quest closely approximates the traditional
ends of justice since he functions primarily as a peacemaker. His attempts to establish
concord, by restoring order, satisfying claims, and defending the weak are substantiated

Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice, 63. He also draws attention to a very popular legal
handbook written by William Lambarde and entitled Eirenarcha, which was “a practical treatise of duties
and privileges of the justices of the peace” and “went through seven editions in Spenser’s lifetime” (63) as
well as an anonymous poem that specifically link peace with justice. The poem, A pretye complaynt of
peace, describes Dame Peace’s wanderings around Europe in search of a suitable climate, which she does
not find. She finally sails to England where she finds “Justyce, befriends Weathe, and lives happily ever
after” (64). Fletcher claims Book V does not predict but does prophesy a final peace. The Prophetic
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in every episode. His quest for Irena is metaphorically and actually a quest for peace.”81
Dunseath’s view of Book V is, overall, a positive one and serves as contrast with most of
what has been written about the book, especially as regards these ideas of justice and
peace. However, I would hesitate to disregard what has been written about Spenser and
Ireland in Book V in favor of a view that appears to be overly “optimistic,” especially
after reviewing the judgments (and violence) enacted in the first few cantos of the Book.
Artegall’s major quest is to free Irena. All this time, he has been wandering
around getting involved in adventures that have led him away from his quest and his duty
towards Irena. Once he finally arrives to restore Irena to her right, she is in a perilous
situation and may die. Artegall has gone through a great change since his encounter with
Radigund. He has learned temperance and humility, qualities he lacked in the first half of
the book, and he has learned the difference between mercy and pity. He has become
“perfected” in his virtue and is finally fulfilling his obligation.
These are important points because true Justice can only exist once it has been
interiorized. Anderson explains that, “Though Artegall leaves the inner world after
Radegone, it is in an interior sense still with him. If he crosses over from a person to a
Principle, the fact remains that his principle has itself become interiorized, indeed,
personalized.” She continues, “Artegall’s dilemma relates to a tension between the
concerns of Artegall himself and those of Justice as such.” The reason for this is that
“justice must be interiorized if it is to become Christian. Before being just in the City, we
must be just in our own eyes in order to be just in the eyes of God...[and] the personal

Dunseath, Spenser’s Allegory of Justice, 65. Also, Margarita C. Stocker, “Astraea” in The
Spenser Encyclopedia, 72, concludes “At one level of the allegory, then, the restoration of ‘Irena’ is the
restoration of peace (Gr eirēnē) by the implementation of justice (through Artegall).”
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virtues enable the virtuous man to keep the passions ‘in a just mean in relation to
himself.’”82 Although Spenser does not inform us of the sword’s refashioning, it
reappears with Artegall’s need to defeat Grantorto as Artegall is finally ready to uphold
God’s justice once again. In Book V, Artegall uses Chrysaor only against tyrants,
Pollente, Radigund, and Grantorto. Aristotle writes that “Justice is the good of others,”
but tyrants have their own interests in mind.83 As Artegall is finally a new man and a new
knight with greater understanding of his role and responsibilities, the symbolic authority
of divine and sovereign justice is also restored to him.
In Book V, we follow Artegall while he fights against anyone who disrupts or
abuses the natural order. Pollente and Munera, for example, respectively represent lordly,
unaccountable aristocratic power and injustice perpetrated by the wealthy. However, of
the abuses he fights, the worst is tyranny, or Grantorto, which combines the rest, and the
second worst is distortion of the chivalric ethic by Radigund. Both types recur throughout
the entire poem, so Artegall must squarely face and defeat them in Book V. The second
half of Book V of The Faerie Queene seems to be a “repetition” of the events in the first
half, but now Artegall acts as a “true” justiciar exercising justice, equity, and mercy as he
has finally learned it, not allowing his faults to cloud his judgment. He is now the
reflection in Britomart’s mirror, and the two parts of the Book are like the mirror, one
real and one perfect. The problem, as Hamilton sees it, is that “the theme of justice
commits the poet to the fallen world” because “Justice treats most directly the iron world
of what must be, rather than that ideal world of what should be,” which would be part of
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the ideal of the Golden Age.84 Artegall has become idealized, which is one reason the
Blatant Beast (who represents calumny) attacks him at the end. Justice in the fallen world
can never be perfect: it is only in the Golden Age that we have perfect justice and thus
Artegall’s job can never be completed or properly rewarded.
By claiming “originative status” an author claims authority.85 In Spenser’s case,
he claims such authority, but also subjects himself to another’s authority: that of the
monarch. As other critics have noted, it is possible that Book V is Spenser’s appeal to
Elizabeth to interfere in Ireland, but I disagree in the form of interference for which he is
asking. It is not violence he wants, but a reform of the justice system. In the Irena
episode, Artegall actually stays Talus’s hands against the peasants and then sets out to
reform the laws, but his mission is cut short. Part of the problem with Ireland appears to
be the lack of impartiality on the part of the justice system and a lack of recourse for
those affected by the “broken” system. If Elizabeth uses royal prerogative in Ireland and
reinforces legal reasonings based on equity, she will be showing herself to be a more just
and merciful sovereign because mercy, in this case, would apply to the English colonists
as well as the natives. Therefore, understanding the mistakes Artegall makes in dealing
with Radigund helps us understand what Spenser is trying to convey. For justice to work,
laws must be balanced with equity and mercy, but they must also be imbued with
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and delimit the interpretive of that elite community of readers by whom he himself is authorized to write.”
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authority. Without the sovereign’s authority to enforce the legal rulings, justice can never
be achieved.
In the next chapter, we will see that Spenser’s advice was not followed and many
of the problems in Ireland creep up in Henry V, making it one of only a handful of times
that Shakespeare directly refers to contemporary issues. In Henry V, we see a king who is
more than willing to use royal prerogative in his judgments, which appear to work out for
him and for England. However, his disregard for the rule of law serves to subvert it and
sets the stage for the wars that follow his reign. Once again, it would do well for the
sovereigns to mind Spenser’s advice that, while equity and mercy are necessary for the
correct exercise of justice, they must both be guided by the law.
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Chapter 2: Performing Justice
The last year of the sixteenth century was an eventful one for Shakespeare as well
as for England. For Shakespeare, it was the year the Globe was built and had its first
performances; it was the year his only son, Hamnet, died; and it was one of his most
creatively productive years, with three new plays completed and Hamlet started. For
England, the year began with the loss of its great poet, Edmund Spenser, and terrible
events seemed to accumulate as the year continued. It was the year of Tyrone’s Irish
rebellion and of the Earl of Essex’s failed attempt to suppress it. It was also a year of
great anxieties caused by the “Invisible Armada,” which was how the English people
referred to the constant threat of a new Spanish Armada invasion that never materialized.
It should not be surprising then, to see some of these events reflected in Shakespeare’s
plays.
The ongoing troubles with Irish rebels, which is an important event behind Book
V of Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, is also significantly portrayed in Shakespeare’s
Henry V. That play was, to a great extent, based on an earlier one entitled The Famous
Victories of Henry the Fifth. However, as James Shapiro notes, “Ireland, which never
intruded in The Famous Victories, haunts Shakespeare’s play and, as much as anything
else, defines what is new in Shakespeare’s version, while also suggesting what his own
preoccupations were at this time.”1 In his version, Shakespeare clearly alludes to the Irish
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James Shapiro, A Year in the Life of William Shakespeare, 1599 (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 2005), 88. The Famous Victories of Henry the Fifth had been around at least since the mid1580s and is one of the sources for Shakespeare’s own plays that feature Harry (85-88).
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crisis in ways that his audience would have readily recognized, especially in those scenes
dealing with the terrible conditions of the men conscripted to the war effort. The Chorus
uses these allusions to make equivocal claims to the audience that contrast with the action
of the play itself.2 The play also alludes directly to Essex and his efforts against the Irish
rebels (5.0.22-34). The allusion proves problematic as it compares Harry to Caesar, an
idea that spills over to Essex. Thus, the lines, “As in good time he may—from Ireland
coming, / Bringing rebellion broached on his sword” (5.0.31-32) would carry a double
meaning of quashing the rebellion in Ireland and/or bringing rebellion to England, as
Essex later did.3
All of the plays Shakespeare wrote in 1599 involve political succession and
usurpation in some way: in Julius Caesar, the title character is murdered because the
conspirators believe he wants to usurp their power; in As You Like It, Rosalind finds
herself in the forest of Arden because her uncle usurped her father’s rightful rule; in
Hamlet, the Danish prince finds his position usurped by his uncle after his father’s death;
and, most importantly for me, in Henry V, Harry finds himself having to establish his
authority as legitimate because of how his father unlawfully “met the crown.” Whether or
not Shakespeare made a conscious decision to treat the issue of political legitimacy
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Shapiro says it would have been easier for Elizabethan audiences to determine the truth between
the competing versions presented in Henry V because they “knew what could, and what could not, be said
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because of what was happening with the Earl of Essex we do not know. Still, he did turn
to that issue repeatedly in that fateful year.
Legitimacy is an important aspect of justice. Without a source of legitimate
authority, the exercise of power can be said to be invalid, so legitimacy is a necessary
condition for the effective use of state power. One source of legitimate authority is the
law, but, during Shakespeare’s life, another contentious source of authority was the royal
prerogative. An exceptional source of power, royal prerogative grew in significance
during the Tudor period. It was used for benevolent purposes, such as creating the Courts
of Equity, as well as deleterious ones, to authorize torture, for example. Even though
royal prerogative was not considered an illegitimate source of power at that time, it was
extralegal because it moved beyond the law (outside) while still belonging to it (inside).
Quoting from Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology, Giorgio Agamben explains this
inside/outside dichotomy as the paradox of sovereignty: “the sovereign stands outside the
juridical order and, nevertheless, belongs to it.” Agamben then formulates the paradox as
“the law is outside itself.”4 The fact that sovereignty exists on the threshold, inside and
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Agamben, Homo Sacer, 15. An aspect of the sovereign paradox is that it allows us to compare it
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Early Modern English Literature (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), “Chapter 1: Dimensions of State
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outside the juridical order, is necessary for the creation of the exception, which, in this
case, might also be termed, royal prerogative.5
The law was ambiguous about the exercise and limits of the royal prerogative, but
it is clear that it moves beyond legal rules. By definition, prerogative decisions were left
up to the sovereign, but there is also a sense that certain decisions went too far. Because
of these almost “illegal” characteristics, it may be easier for us to associate the use of
royal prerogative with Macbeth, a king who is not bound to the laws; however, I want to
argue here that the same can be said of Harry. Instead of following the law, Harry
repeatedly chooses to exercise royal prerogative in Henry V, and while his actions as king
work out fortuitously for him (and perhaps for England), they are, in themselves,
extralegal because they spring from a terrain outside of or on the threshold of the law.
The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I briefly explore the
mechanisms Harry uses to establish his authority as legitimate, while the second section
deals with specific scenes from the play that call on Harry to carry out justice. Each scene
sheds light on how Harry uses royal prerogative along with performance to achieve his
version of justice, a vision of justice that does not seem to be strictly contained within the
bounds of the law. Finally, the last section looks towards the future with the epilogue of
the play and the anxieties over Elizabeth’s succession. These anxieties were partly caused
by her refusal to name a successor, but also because of her ruling style, which included
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While Agamben discusses the difficulty of defining the state of exception (State of Exception;
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the expansion of prerogative powers and left the way open for the abuse of power we
later witness with the Stuart kings.

Establishing Legitimate Authority
The question of legitimacy is central to Shakespeare’s second tetralogy and seems
especially significant for Harry in Henry V.6 As the first-born son of the previous king in
a country where sovereignty was determined by heredity and primogeniture, there should
not have been any doubt as to Harry’s rightful claim to the throne of England.7 However,
because of the way his father ascended the throne, things were not so simple. In an act
that seemed to many like unlawful usurpation, his father had taken the crown from
Richard II. Because of this, a faction existed who believed there were others with
stronger hereditary claims to the crown than Harry. Furthermore, the beginning of the
play sees Harry claiming rights to the throne of France through the female line, which, as
the play suggests, does not provide a universally accepted means of inheritance, but is
also used as an argument in favor of rival claims in England.8
Shakespeare wrote his two tetralogies “out of order.” The first tetralogy consists of the three
Henry VI plays along with Richard III, which were written in the first half of the 1590s. The second
tetralogy consists of Richard II, the two parts of Henry IV, and Henry V; although these plays depict earlier
historical events, they were written in the second half of the 1590s.
6

Roy Strong explains that “deliberate changes” were made to the coronation ceremony in 1399
“to enhance the usurper Henry IV.” One of the changes involved reducing the “ritual of the recognitio, the
last lingering trace of elective monarchy, to a mere formality” and Henry V was presented as “by ryght and
dyscent of heritage.” Coronation: A History of Kingship and the British Monarchy (London: Harpercollins
Publishers, 2005), 166-69.
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Harry questions the Archbishop of Canterbury about his right to the throne of France through the
female line, which the French say he has no right to claim because of Salic law. The Archbishop, however,
informs Harry that Salic law does not apply, especially since many of the French kings could only claim
sovereignty through the female line. Yet, Harry’s claim to the French throne through the female line is
problematic because of the English noble faction who believed that others had a more direct hereditary
claim to the English throne through the female line. John of Gaunt, Harry’s grandfather, was Edward III’s
third son. Edward III’s second son, Lionel of Antwerp, “left an only child, Philippa, who married the Earl
of March, in whose heirs was the right to the succession.” The fourth son of Edward III, “Edmund of
Langley, who was created duke of York (1385), founded the Yorkist line, and was father of two sons,
Edward, second duke, who was slain at Agincourt, and Richard, earl of Cambridge, who by marrying the
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During Henry IV’s reign, the king found himself constantly fighting against
factions that did not view his authority as legitimate. Harry fought in some of the battles
and understood the problem caused by a divided nation, which is why it becomes
important for him to establish his authority as the legitimate sovereign in Henry V. Since
he understands that for some of the nobles his father’s kingship was questionable, we find
Harry calling on a wide series of mechanisms, such as blood, ritual, force, and
performance to establish and legitimate his authority instead of relying on heredity alone.
In his influential article, “Rabbits, Ducks, and Henry V,” Norman Rabkin explores
ideas about sovereignty and Harry’s dual nature. He claims the views that see the play as
either “the story of an ideal monarch” or “the story of a ruthless hypocritical ruler” are
reductive since neither one fully encompasses Shakespeare’s intention within the play.
Rabkin argues that Henry V is, in fact, a problem play, and that it is supposed to leave us
conflicted. I agree with these assertions, but not for the reason Rabkin provides. “The
clash between the two possible views of the world of Henry V,” says Rabkin, “suggests a
spiritual struggle in Shakespeare that he would spend the rest of his career working
through.”9 While Rabkin’s assessment of Shakespeare’s spiritual struggle is compelling, I
suspect Henry V is also Shakespeare’s vehicle for showing the possible ways in which

granddaughter and eventual heiress of Lionel’s daughter, Philippa, brought the right to the succession into
the house of York” (Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “House of Plantagenet,” accessed March 24, 2018,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/house-of-Plantagenet.). Note that both Harry and the Tudors were
descendants of John of Gaunt, the head of the House of Lancaster, while Essex was a descendant of
Richard, Earl of Cambridge, one of the men accused of treason in one of the scenes I discuss later.
9
Norman Rabkin, “Rabbits, Ducks, and Henry V,” Shakespeare Quarterly 28, no. 3:296. For other
views on Harry’s duality see, Peter Lake, How Shakespeare Put Politics on the Stage: Power and
Succession in the History Plays (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 371 and Katharine Eisaman
Maus, introduction to Henry V, by William Shakespeare, The Norton Shakespeare, 1472.
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sovereignty legitimates itself and how a sovereign can become an effective ruler and
“effectively” exercise justice in ways that are not altogether legitimate.10
Shakespeare’s discussion of sovereign legitimacy and effectiveness was
especially pertinent given the advanced age of Queen Elizabeth, her own struggles to
legitimate her often contested reign, and the imminent approach of a new line of
succession.11
At the end of 2 Henry IV, we see King Henry IV tell Harry:
God knows, my son,
By what bypaths and indirect crook’d ways
I met this crown; and I myself know well
How troublesome it set upon my head.
To thee it shall descend with better quiet,
Better opinion, better confirmation;
For all the soil of the achievement goes
With me into the earth. (4.3.312-18)
In directly inheriting the crown, Harry’s claim to the throne will be stronger and will not
be questioned as Henry’s was, or at least that is what Henry believes. Inheritance, of
course, is one of the mechanisms by which sovereignty legitimates itself. Nonetheless,
Henry IV’s word choices provide greater insight into what he actually means. When
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The word “effectively” is key here. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) lists several
definitions for it, most of which are pertinent in this case, but the one I am most interested in is: 2b. “By a
direct exercise of power or choice.” OED Online, “effectively, (adv.),” accessed April 13, 2018,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/59675?redirectedFrom=effectively.
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Henry speaks of “bypaths and indirect crook’d ways,” he is not simply referring to the
fact that the inheritance was not in a direct or straight line, but also that it was obtained in
a dishonest way. He deceives even himself as he says he “met this crown” as if he had
happened on it by chance, almost as if the crown had been left on the road and he simply
picked it up. He realizes that civil unrest was caused by this “meeting,” but because
Harry is legitimately inheriting the crown from his father, his reign will be “quiet,” that
is, the civil unrest will cease, and the “opinion” or judgment will be to “confirm” his
status as legitimate king. Henry further says the “soil” will go with him, which has a
literal as well as figurative meaning. The “soil” or earth will cover his body when he dies
and he will take the “soil,” that is, the stain or sin of what he did away with him. This
particular use of “soil” is possibly related to the idea of original sin, but Henry claims his
sins will not pass on to his son (it may also refer to the phrase, “earthe to earthe, ashes to
ashes, dust to dust” from the 1559 burial service in the Book of Common Prayer).12 In the
end, Henry’s main meaning is clear: he, not his son, was the sinful usurper of Richard’s
throne, a sin, he believed, was not passed on to Harry. The idea that Harry can inherit the
crown without inheriting the sin is supported by the theory of the king’s two bodies since
it is the body politic that survives death.
The theory of the king’s two bodies had been around long before Elizabeth, but
her lawyers “popularized” it to undermine protests over her gender. During her accession
speech, we already hear her speak of “the king’s two bodies.” According to the theory,
once she became queen, her whole being changed: her “body natural” was merged into
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Oxford University Press, 2011), 172.
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the immortal “body politic,” “I am but one body naturally considered,” Elizabeth
declared, “though by [God’s] permission a body politic to govern.” Although her natural
body was subject to the passage of time, disease, and death, the body politic is eternal and
perfect.13 In the ‘The Crown as Fiction’ section of The King’s Two Bodies, Ernst
Kantorowicz shows that the law of inheritance is one that goes back to the Roman
emperors. Using Justinian’s Institutes, medieval glossators commented that “Father and
son are one according to the fiction of Law.” The fiction of law guarantees the continuity
of predecessor and successor and helps explain the continuity of temporal authority as
“successor and predecessor appeared as the same person with regard to the personified
office or dignity.”14 Even though Henry IV’s authority was not necessarily authentic in
terms of inheritance, Harry’s ascent is secure because he is the legitimate successor to the
reigning monarch. Furthermore, the king possesses a “superbody,” so he is both father
and son to himself; the “king” never dies, he is constantly “reborn” into the next king.15
Therefore, when Harry pleads, just before the fateful battle of Agincourt,
Not today, O Lord,
O not today, think not upon the fault
My father made in compassing the crown.
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Elizabeth I, Elizabeth I: Collected Works, ed. Leah S. Marcus, Janel M. Mueller, and Mary Beth
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I Richard’s body have interred new (Henry V, 4.1.274-77),
he is not only referring to Richard’s natural body which he had re-interred in Westminster
Abbey, Harry is also talking about Richard’s soul and body politic which now reside
within him.
Another mode through which Harry asserts his legitimacy as king is through his
bloodline. Harry’s claim to the French crown through the female line goes back to
Edward III’s claim of the French throne through his mother, Isabella. We learn of the
claim in the first scenes of the play during Harry’s exchange with the Bishops, which is
staged in such a way as to provide Harry with an authority that, at the very least, is
contestable.
Henry V begins with the conversation between the Archbishop of Canterbury and
the Bishop of Ely as they discuss a bill in Parliament that would strip the Church of half
its lands. They mention the fact that the civil unrest during Henry IV’s reign caused the
bill to be forgotten, but it is once again being “urged by the Commons.” Their hope is
that the new king, who is a “a true lover of the holy Church,” will not allow the bill to
pass. Canterbury then tells Ely that he has offered “to give a greater sum” than the clergy
has ever offered to help finance Harry’s war with France (before the war has been
declared). Harry knows about the lands and the bill, so when he asks the Archbishop of
Canterbury, “May I with right and conscience make this claim [to the throne of France]?”
(1.2.96), he knows the Archbishop is going to assent. Harry and the Bishops are in
collusion: he wants the war with France in order to unite his people against a common
enemy, and he understands—as does the audience—that the clergy want the war because
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it will divert attention from the legislation in Parliament dealing with church property.16
Still, both parties know they cannot discuss these motives in public, so, instead, they
stage a performance in front of others to make the war appear to be not only necessary,
but almost divinely ordained.17 Harry says to the Archbishop:
And God forbid, my dear and faithful lord,
That you should fashion, wrest, or bow your reading,
Or nicely charge your understanding soul
With opening titles miscreate, whose right
Suits not in native colours with the truth;
For God doth know how many now in health
Shall drop their blood in approbation
Of what your reverence shall incite us to.
Therefore take heed how you impawn our person,
………………………………………………….
Under this conjuration, speak, my lord,
For we will hear, note, and believe in heart
That what you speak is in your conscience washed

John D. Cox says that “the alienation of church lands was central to Elizabethan royal
supremacy” and argues for a reading of this scene in light of Elizabethan church politics. He further claims
that it was the “assertion of royal prerogative” that produced the type of deal seen here between Harry and
the Archbishop, and “inevitably their outcomes favored the crown.” Shakespeare and the Dramaturgy of
Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 107-108.
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As pure as sin with baptism (1.2.13-32).
Harry’s conjuring of God to serve as witness in his discussion with the Archbishop places
the exchange in the realm of oaths where God is called upon to serve as a witness. His
performance in front of the lords present at court also allows him to present himself as a
merciful king, one who is concerned for the wellbeing of his subjects as he calls attention
to their spilt blood if England goes to war with France. He tells the Archbishop not to
bend (“fashion, wrest, or bow”) his interpretation because doing so will burden the
Archbishop's soul since he will be responsible for “inciting” a war where many will lose
their lives. Yet, the decision to go to war is Harry’s; it is part of the powers he holds as
the king, part of his royal prerogative. Still, in speaking with the Archbishop as he does,
and repeatedly calling on God, allows Harry to envelop the war not only with legality,
but also with religious righteousness. Later, when Harry gets into an argument with
Williams about the king’s responsibility for the souls of his soldiers, it is hard not to think
back to this exchange and Harry’s final lines to the Archbishop about a “conscience
washed” of sins. He tells Williams that it is each man’s duty, not the king’s, to make sure
his conscience is washed of sin before embarking on a dubious enterprise (war) that may
soon make him directly accountable to God.
Ultimately the Archbishop declares in Harry’s favor and tells him to, “Look back
into your mighty ancestors” and “invoke his [great-grandsire’s] warlike spirit, / And your
great-uncle’s, Edward the Black Prince” (1.2.102-05). Bishop Ely adds his voice to the
Archbishop’s and says, “The blood and courage that renowned them / Runs in your
veins” (1.2.117-119). Harry’s claim is supported both by his direct inheritance of the
crown from his father and by his royal lineage as a whole. Additionally, the bishops
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claim Harry is not only the Black Prince’s and Edward III’s heir in blood, he is also their
heir in spirit, something later echoed by King Charles of France when he says that Harry
is “bred out of that bloody strain / That haunted us in our familiar paths” (2.4.51-52) in
reference to how the Black Prince shamed the French in the battle of Crecy. Of course,
Shakespeare puts these words in the King’s mouth to foreshadow their even greater
defeat at Agincourt.
Force, which I will also explore further in the next section in its relation to justice,
is another mechanism Harry uses to legitimate sovereignty. Harry’s use of force and
bloodline to claim legitimacy are interconnected, proposes Barbara Hodgdon: “Through
bloodshed, it ratifies Henry V’s dynastic line and proves his descent from his lion-hearted
ancestor, Edward, the Black Prince.18 I agree with her assessment, but along with the use
of actual force, Harry also uses the threat of it to dominate his opponents. After the battle
at Harfleur has been won, he calls to the Governor and men of the town and threatens the
people with an incredibly descriptive warning of the violence they face. He tells them to
“Take pity of your town and of your people / Whiles yet my soldiers are in my
command,” because if they do not, then they will see:
The blind and bloody soldier with foul hand
Defile the locks of your shrill-shrieking daughters;
Your fathers taken by the silver beards,
And their most reverend heads dash'd to the walls;

18
Barbara Hodgdon, The End Crowns All: Closure and Contradiction in Shakespeare’s History
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 188. Leonard Tennenhouse also argues that Harry acquires
authority through “the effective exercise of force” as well as “through the metaphysics of blood which he
embodies. Power on Display: The Politics of Shakespeare's Genres (New York: Methuen, 1986), 93.
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Your naked infants spitted upon pikes.” (3.3.104-20)
Harry’s speech is striking for multiple reasons. Although not perfect, up to this point in
the play, we have been told that Harry is a good “Christian” king and has been shown to
shun his dubious past. Yet, the violence promised in this particular speech breaks the
mirage of the perfect “Christian” king. It is an extremely cruel form of violence aimed at
the weakest in society: women, the elderly, and children. It is up to the men of Harfleur to
make the right decision and open the gates, since if they refuse and Harry’s soldiers
breach the gates, then they will be responsible for whatever atrocities Harry’s men
commit.19 Nevertheless, Harry’s threats are only effective in stopping more violence from
happening because the people have already experienced real violence. Harry has already
shown them that besides being a great king, he is a great soldier, which he says is “A
name that in my thoughts becomes me best” (3.3.83). Although Harry might claim that
being a “soldier” is his primary identity, here he is, above all else, a sovereign who is able
to decide when to use force and when to use language.
Harry’s true reason for declaring war with France is to unite Britain, but we are
nonetheless left with mixed feelings about his actions.20 Once the Archbishop decides the

Lake calls attention to Harry’s continuous attempts to skirt responsibility for the atrocities of
war by constantly shifting it to others (for example, the men of Harfleur and the Archbishop). How
Shakespeare Put Politics on the Stage, 359-366. See also Berger, Harrying, Chapter 13: “Harry’s
Question.”
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John S. Mebane argues that even though Harry’s “felt need to unify Britain and forestall civil
war” is a noble motive, “the dramatic form and artistic strategies of Shakespeare’s history plays—
especially Henry V—undercut the ideology of ‘just war’ by emphasizing the fear that all warfare is
damnable.” “‘Impious War’: Religion and the Ideology of Warfare in Henry V,” Studies in Philology 104,
no. 2 (2007): 258, 252. Mebane mentions the Judeo-Christian concept of “just war” in his engagement with
other critics but does not refer to Thomas Aquinas’s conditions. Aquinas claims that there are three
requirements for a war to be considered just. The first is the “authority of the sovereign,” which Harry has;
the second is a “just cause,” that is, one that “avenges wrongs” or “restore[s] what it [the enemy] has
seized,” which Harry claims is what he is doing in re-asserting his right to the French throne; and the last
item necessary for a just war is “the right intention of those waging war,” they must wish to promote the
good, and that is what Harry wants for his kingdom. He wants a united Britain and the only way he sees to
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claim in Harry’s favor, then it is a matter of following the law. Harry claims what is
“rightfully” his, but in declaring a war with France, he creates a state of emergency,
which leads to a state of exception, and the scenes I examine below unfold within this
context. In the state of exception, the law suspends itself, and, as the sovereign, Harry is
the one who decides on the exception. Under these circumstances, he can interpret the
law as well as create new laws without the need for parliamentary review.21 Even as
Harry tries to legitimate his rule through political theology (e.g., “by God’s help”
1.2.222; “this lies all within the will of God” 1.2.289; Let us deliver / Our puissance into
the hand of God” 2.2.185-86), he acts in ways that are ultimately extralegal because, as
enactments of royal prerogative, they fall outside the scope of law.22 He relies on a state
of exception to govern.

attain his goal is to follow his father’s advice and find a common enemy abroad (“Be it thy course to busy
giddy minds / With foreign quarrels, that action hence borne out / May waste the memory of the former
days,” 2 Henry IV, 4.3:341-43). Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae. 40.1. See David Scott
Kastan, Shakespeare after Theory (New York: Routledge, 1999), 129-32 for the importance of an
“imaginary unity” under Elizabeth.
This is not to say that the sovereign did not create laws under “normal” circumstances in
England. On the contrary, “According to parliamentary custom, the laws it enacted did not come into force
and ‘life’ until they were orally endorsed at the close of Parliament by the monarch, who was styled lex
animata, ‘a living law,’ or anima legis, ‘the soul of law’” (Elizabeth I, Collected Works, 330 note 6). What
I refer to in Harry’s case, is the enforcement or creation of law outside the “normal” parliamentary or
judiciary procedure that is made possible by the state of exception. As Agamben explains, the state of
exception “is founded on the essential fiction according to which anomie (in the form of auctoritas, living
law, or force of law) is still related to the juridical order and the power to suspend the norm has an
immediate hold on life.” State of Exception, 86. Although the state of exception may be a modern concept,
it should not surprise us to see Shakespeare making use of it because, according to Grant Williams,
“Playhouses existed in a place of liminality or rather a state of exception” and “Shakespeare’s continued
engagement with the law… betrays a strong anti-jurisprudential stance” (11-15). “Law and the Production
of Literature: An Introductory Perspective,” in Taking Exception to the Law: Materializing Injustice in
Early Modern English Literature, ed. Donald Beecher, Travis Decook, Andrew Wallace, and Grant
Williams (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 3-43.
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The next section explores scenes where Harry is called to administer justice and
the role royal prerogative plays in his “performance.” The first scene (2.2) sees three
traitors exposed and Harry tricking them into condemning themselves, while the second
scene (3.6) relates to Harry’s condemnation of Bardolph—one of his companions from
his Eastcheap days, but also a notorious drunkard—for stealing. The last scene (Act 4)
involves the soldier Williams, his insults, and the possibility of capital punishment. These
scenes are especially illustrative of Harry’s modes of justice—the law, equity, and
mercy—with royal prerogative serving as the means for his version of justice in each of
these scenes. Although his choice to exercise prerogative powers in these instances shows
a king who is not bound to the laws, because of his skillful performance, he is able to
make himself appear to be following the law.

Interpreting the Law and Royal Prerogative
Rabkin summarizes the main theme of the tetralogy by asking, “can the
manipulative qualities that guarantee political success be combined in one man with the
spiritual qualities that make one fully open and responsive to life and therefore fully
human? Or, to put it more accurately, can political resourcefulness be combined with
qualities more like those of an audience as it sees itself?”23 Harry seems to be the answer
to these questions as he certainly has political astuteness and appears to have spiritual
qualities. Yet, the idea that he is more like the audience is deceptive at best. In his
soliloquy after speaking to Williams and the other soldiers, he certainly claims the only
difference between him and other men is ceremony: “And what have kings that privates
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have not too, / Save ceremony, save general ceremony?” (4.1.220-21). However, the right
to violence Harry exercises is his alone. Harry uses the power he has—and which no one
else has—to start a war with France that he hopes will unite England; the war is thus a
matter of policy or a political maneuver for “the good” of the commonwealth, but one not
justified by external attack.24 The war is also the stage for his exercise of justice through
the use of royal prerogative, which turn his decisions into exceptional cases that are not
entirely legal and leave no guidelines (do not set legal precedent) for the future.
It is not in the scope of this chapter to explore Harry’s transformation from Hal to
Henry V, but it is important to mention how much time Shakespeare spends developing
this one character. Harry is first introduced in a discussion between Henry IV and Henry
Percy at the end of Richard II. Then, a great deal of Henry IV parts 1 and 2 is spent in
disclosing Harry's education and his background among the common people before he
becomes the future great king of Henry V.25 Throughout the Henry IV plays one of Hal’s
constant companion is Falstaff, whose penchant for acting leads him to “stage” great
performances. He understands that when playing a role, it is important that the audience
be convinced of the action. Therefore, when he claims to have killed Hotspur (1 Henry
IV, 5.4), Falstaff first stabs the dead man again and then carries him along to tell his

The idea of a united Britain is clearly displayed in the characters’ nationalities. Harry is able to
unite in his army an Irishman, Captain MacMorris; an Englishman, Captain Gower; a Scot, Captain Jamy;
and a Welshman, Captain Fluellen.
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Rabkin briefly mentions “the innumerable cross-references and links and parallels among the
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version of the story; he knows the value of “props” and “character development.” Harry
learns and profits from these lessons, and his capable performances in Henry V allow him
to remain largely outside the law even as he is in fact inside of it.
In dealing with the traitors in act II, scene 2, Harry shows more astuteness than
Artegall in Book V of The Faerie Queene had shown in knowing the difference between
mercy and pity when he meets Radigund in battle.26 When Harry condemns the traitors
for their crime and refuses their pleas for mercy, he is in fact being merciful to his people,
something he makes clear in his sentencing. Still, Harry does not simply condemn them;
he first plays a trick on them that leads the traitors to essentially exclude mercy for
themselves. When the scene opens, we are informed by the Dukes of Exeter and
Gloucester that the men who are about to enter the stage with the king are traitors and
that “The King hath note of all that they intend, / By interception which they dream not
of.” They have committed one of the highest forms of treason, they have “for a foreign
purse so sell / His sovereign’s life to death and treachery” (2.2.6-11).27
Before playing his trick on the traitors, Harry gives them a hint early on that they
will not live to see his victories when he says he will not carry a heart that is “not in a fair
consent with ours” nor leave a heart behind that does not “wish / Success and conquest to
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As explained in the previous chapter, Artegall fails to recognize the difference between mercy
and pity in his encounter with Radigund. He should be defending the ruler, the Faerie Queene, and the
knights of the Maidenhead (exemplified by Sir Terpine). When he spares Radigund’s life, he is acting
contrary to mercy’s goal.
Baker explains that treason is the most serious offence in English law, and “The Treason Act of
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attend on us” (20-24). The traitors’ reply is full of flattery, but Harry changes the subject
and decides to pardon a man who had been imprisoned for “railing” against him. This is
Harry’s trap for the traitors as they set on trying to convince him not to pardon the man.
He should be made an example, they argue, and if Harry wishes to show mercy, then he
should allow the man to live “After the taste of much correction” (39-50).28 When Harry
asks, “how shall we stretch our eye / When capital crimes, chewed, swallowed, and
digested, / Appear before us?” (54-56), we know he is anticipating what is about to
happen with them. His digestive metaphor here also sets the stage for his speech to them
after their treason is made public, as he compares their “revolt” with “another fall of
man,” which was caused by Adam’s ingestion of the forbidden fruit.
Harry plays a final trick on them using a prop: he hands them their condemnation
letters instead of the commission they believe they are receiving. They confess their
faults and appeal to Harry for mercy, but Harry says they have “suppressed and killed”
the mercy that was once quick in him. In his speech, he first accuses each of them
individually, speaking of his love and all the privileges he had granted them, and then he
proceeds to accuse them collectively. Harry’s performance is such that by the end of it
the traitors have confessed and condemned themselves and “repent [their] faults more
than [their] deaths” (156). It is important that Harry shows evidence of their treason, so
when he says, “Their faults are open” (139), it emphasizes the fact that their crimes have
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been confirmed through evidence and confession in front of witnesses, which create the
appearance that a sort of trial has just taken place. Furthermore, when he sentences them,
he explains he is not after satisfaction for what they intended against him personally, but
for the damage they would have caused to his people. He lists the crimes they would have
committed if they had been permitted to follow through with their plan and says they
would have sold:
[The king’s] princes and his peers to servitude
His subjects to oppression and contempt,
And his whole kingdom into desolation.
Touching on our person seek we not revenge,
But we our kingdom’s safety must so tender. (167-71)
This could be seen as an example of Harry acting as an ideal sovereign. It is similar to
what happened with Mercilla in Book V of The Faerie Queene, where she knew the
difference between feeling pity for Duessa and being merciful to her people, and it is
possibly inspired by the same event (Mary Stuart’s trial and condemnation). However,
there is an essential difference in the episodes: in The Faerie Queene, an actual trial that
follows legal custom takes place, whereas in Henry V, no formal trial ever happens (this
is the case with all the other episodes I explore). Instead, Harry uses royal prerogative to
condemn the traitors, but creates the “appearance” of a trial by using legal language to
call attention to the evidence against them, their confession, and the witnesses.
In her speech to Parliament about Mary Stuart, Elizabeth discusses the importance
of proceeding not simply in accordance with the law, but also in a way that avoids the
appearance of impropriety; she claims, “for we princes, I tell you, are set on stages in the
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sight and view of all the world duly observed. The eyes of many behold our actions; a
spot is soon spied on our garments, a blemish quickly noted in our doings. It behooveth
us therefore to be careful that our proceedings be just and honourable.”29 According to
Tennenhouse, the monarch “displayed his power by incorporating political elements—
people, land, dialects—within the body politic. So too, the power of the monarch
achieved legitimacy as recalcitrant cultural materials were taken up and hierarchized
within the official rituals of state… Thus a monarch’s ability to convert carnivalesque
activity into banqueting and procession was the sign of his entitlement to political
power.”30 Harry understands his position and, like Elizabeth, knows that he is “set on
stages” and the value of ceremony. He uses this to his advantage as language and
performance become mechanisms other than pure force to assert his authority.
One aspect about the events in this scene that Shakespeare almost entirely
neglects (on purpose or otherwise) is the right to the throne of England. When the Earl of
Cambridge speaks for the last time, he informs Harry that the “gold of France did not
seduce” him; rather, it was a means to “effect what [Richard] intended.” What Richard
wanted was to place Edmund Mortimer, his brother-in-law who arguably had a better
claim than Harry, on the English throne. Not surprisingly, there were those who claimed
Mary Stuart had a better claim to the English throne than Elizabeth, since Elizabeth had
at one time been bastardized and twice been removed from the line of succession. This
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may be one reason Shakespeare decided not to dwell too long on the question of direct
lineage and shows Harry using other means to establish his legitimacy.31
Harry knows that power and authority are intertwined with performance, and he
makes this idea perfectly clear when he argues that the only thing that separates a king
from a commoner is ceremony. He knows that language and performance, when used
correctly, can be just as powerful as actuality or external force.32 Being able to make the
distinction between rhetorical and actual force is one of the reasons he becomes a more
effective king than his father or Richard II (their rhetoric is more self-indulgent and selfpitying, which is particularly evident in Richard’s abdication and death scenes and
Henry’s “Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown” speech). In Henry V, Harry is
constantly performing because it is part of his role as a sovereign. It is one of the ways he
attains legitimacy, and it is no different in his demonstrations of justice. Anytime we
witness Harry acting the role of sovereign in deciding the law, he is in effect performing
in the sense of “enacting.” Here I am using “performance” to mean acting in the theatrical
sense and in the sense of performative utterance as defined by John L. Austin. Austin

Edmund Mortimer, the Fifth Earl of March, was a direct descendant of Edward III’s second son,
Lionel of Antwerp; see note 8 above. It is important to note that Edmund died before he could have any
children, so the right of succession passed to his sister’s children, that is, Richard of Cambridge’s children.
Shapiro comments on the lineage when discussing Essex’s ancestry, which his supporters claimed was
through the line of “Thomas Woodstock, the youngest son of King Edward III, and also from Richard Earl
of Cambridge, and that ‘hereupon he had better title to the scepter of England than any of the competitors’
hoping to succeed Elizabeth.” A Year in the Life, 90.
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explains that a performative utterance “looks like a statement and grammatically” is
“classed as a statement,” but when someone makes an utterance that we consider
performative, that person is “doing something, rather than merely saying something.” In
Harry’s case, because he is the sovereign and his word conveys authority, his utterances
are often “doing” something, with one example being his enacting of a new law when
speaking of Bardolph’s punishment.33
In Act 3, Shakespeare provides the audience with the scene of Bardolph’s
condemnation as well as the threat of further violence becoming real. The violence Harry
promises against the people of Harfleur is avoided, but then finally enacted against one of
his own soldiers, Bardolph. By “letting” Bardolph die rather than pardoning him, Harry is
acting out his role as sovereign with the right to punish without mercy. He is also acting
as the lawmaker by creating a new law once he gives the command for all such offenders
against the state or church to be condemned, so he is also demonstrating his ability to
justly rule France without making exceptions for English friends or acquaintances.
After Harfleur has surrendered to Harry and his troops, Bardolph’s old friend
Pistol asks Fluellen for a favor because Bardolph has been accused of stealing a pax from
a church and is set to hang for it (3.6.34-44), even though flogging or imprisonment were
more common punishments for stealing than hanging at the time. A pax, as the editors of
the Norton Shakespeare explain, is a “small tablet with a crucifix stamped on it.” It was a

John Austin, “Performative Utterances,” in Philosophy of Language: The Big Questions, ed.
Andrea Nye (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 127, emphasis in original. Austin gives various
examples of these types of utterances in everyday life, including the “I do” of marriage ceremonies, which
serves to legally bind a couple in marriage. Shapiro discusses the legal difference in Shakespeare’s time
between saying “I do” and the less binding “I will” in the marriage ceremony. A Year in the Life, 213. See
also John Kerrigan, “Oaths, Threats and Henry V,” The Review of English Studies 63, no. 261 (2012): 551–
71.
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sacred object in the Catholic church, kissed by the priest during mass, a custom
“associated with the kiss of peace,” a practice that was abandoned after the
Reformation.34 Pax is also the Latin word for peace, so what Bardolph is in fact being
accused of stealing is the king’s peace.35 With the surrender of the town, its people
become Harry’s charges, and it is important for him to exercise justice in a swift and
equitable manner, especially since the war is ongoing.
We know that Bardolph was one of Harry’s companions in his Eastcheap days,
but Harry does not acknowledge knowing him. When Fluellen is giving Harry a report of
the men lost in battle, he tells Harry, “for my part I think the Duke hath lost never a man,
but one that is like to be executed for robbing a church, one Bardolph, if your majesty
know the man” (91-93; emphasis added). As the sovereign, Harry has power over life and
death. Referring to Michel Foucault's exploration of sovereignty, Agamben explains that
“In its traditional form, which is that of territorial sovereignty, power defines itself
essentially as the right over life and death,” and says it is an asymmetrical right, which is
why “Foucault characterizes sovereignty through the formula to make die and to let live.”
Agamben then moves to the modern state and its biopolitics and claims the formula can

OED Online, “pax, n.1 (and int.),” accessed March 27, 2019,
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now be expressed as “to make live and to let die.”36 Although Harry’s power is that of a
traditional sovereign, in the case of Bardolph, his exercise of power is complex because
he could exercise the prerogative of mercy and change the sentence to fit the crime. It is
not necessary that he pardon Bardolph, which could be construed as favoritism or biased
by the French, but he could reassert his own role as the sovereign/judge and change
Bardolph’s punishment to flogging. Instead, he refuses to acknowledge the man, and thus
refuses to interfere with the Duke’s condemnation; he “lets” Bardolph die. Harry then
reinforces the traditional idea of sovereignty when he decrees a new law that includes
“making” Bardolph and all like him die without ever mentioning the man’s name or their
familiarity with each other:
We would have all such offenders so cut off, and we here give express charge that
in our marches through the country there be nothing compelled from the villages,
nothing taken but paid for, none of the French upbraided or abused in disdainful
language. For when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is
the soonest winner. (98-103)
Here, Harry exercises royal prerogative and creates a law outside the “normal”
parliamentary procedure. In creating this new law, he also shows the newly conquered
French that he will exercise his power as sovereign equitably since he will not give
preference to the English soldiers. Once again, however, Harry’s rabbit-duck nature
shows itself when he says in the last line that being gentle is the best “play” as he will
garner more favor that way. Harry’s showing justice to the French people is one more
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piece in his plan for conquest. Like Elizabeth, he knows that appearing to be just can be
as important as actually being just.
Harry’s understanding of the importance of appearances was cultivated while he
was a young man hanging around with commoners. He is able to understand and speak to
the common people in their own language, which is discussed multiple times in the
previous two plays (1 Henry IV, 1.2.173-95 and 2.5.4-29; 2 Henry IV, 4.3.67-78). From
his time with Falstaff and the Eastcheap crew, he develops a great sense of performance
and control of language, which he shows off at different times in the play but never more
eloquently than during his St. Crispin's day speech. The speech emphasizes Harry’s
rhetorical power as well as his penchant for performance, which is even more powerful
because it is literally set on a stage.
As a genre, a play is typically written to be performed in front of an audience, and
we know that Henry V was “sundry times played” by Shakespeare’s company before it
was first published in 1600; it is likely that some of these performances took place in The
Globe, although Shapiro argues that its first performance was at The Curtain.37
Regardless of the stage, the directions in the beginning of the scene inform us that all the
host are present alongside the nobles Gloucester, Exeter, Salisbury, Warwick, and
Erpingham. Thus, when Harry looks out at the audience, they take on the role of the
common soldier, “the host” that is supposedly present, with Harry and the nobles still set
above them. The whole thing becomes metatheatrical with the actor in the role of Harry
aware of performing the part of a king who is constantly playing a part and the audience
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participating in the deception, or as James L. Calderwood says, “To play the king is to
play the actor, for the king must have many roles in his repertoire.”38
Harry is speaking to the common soldier as well as to the lords, and he must bring
everyone into the fold, which he does sublimely well. Harry starts the speech by calling
on honor and contrasting it with gold. He tells Warwick he cares not for any material
gains, “But if it be a sin to covet honour / I am the most offending soul alive” (Henry V,
4.3.28-29).39 It would be easy to discount what Harry says as pure rhetoric because he is
in France fighting for the French crown; yet, we know he went to war primarily as a way
of uniting the British nation. As Harry continues the speech, he invokes Saint Crispin’s
name repeatedly and uses prolepsis to invoke a glorious future for those present in the
camp. He also calls on the names of the lords present and uses kinship terms to connect to
them, after which he extends the sense of kinship to all the men in the camp, and, as
Vickie Sullivan reminds us, in rendering those under his command in his likeness, “then
his speech renders the English into the most offending souls alive.”40 Harry announces:
This story shall the good man teach his son,
And Crispin Crispian shall ne’er go by
From this day to the ending of the world

Calderwood, “Henry V: English, Rhetoric, and Theater,” 27. See also Bradin Cormack, A Power
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244.
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But we in it shall be remembered,
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers.
For he today that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition. (4.3.56-64)41
By calling all the soldiers his brothers, he offers them the illusion of greatness. When else
would a common soldier be the brother of a king? By conjuring the image of spilled
blood mingled together, Harry further feeds that illusion (this illusion of blood and
kinship is one Harry uses again later when discussing the fact that he is Welsh with
Fluellen). Although the soldiers might be deluded by Harry’s speech and performance,
our illusion, as readers or audience, is soon shattered. Just a few scenes after the St.
Crispin’s day speech, Harry asks for the number of English dead. Once he receives the
report, he reads the names of the aristocrats aloud and then says, “None else of name, and
of all other men, / But five-and-twenty” (4.8.99-100). As Claire McEarchern says, “this
enumeration of the dead reinscribes social divisions, the link between blood and
power.”42 The idea of brotherhood is effectively gone when Harry decides the common
men, the ones who would be “gentled” by shedding blood alongside him, are “nameless.”
In excluding the names of the common soldiers from the ones he reads aloud (even

Note the similar tone and idea of spilt blood between Harry’s speech and Elizabeth’s 1588
Armada speech to the troops at Tilbury, where she tells them she is “resolved in the midst and heat of the
battle to live and die amongst you all, to lay down for my God and for my kingdom and for my people mine
honor and my blood even in the dust” (Elizabeth I, Collected Works, 396).
41
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Claire McEachern, “Henry V and the Paradox of the Body Politic,” Shakespeare Quarterly 45.1
(1994): 45. Berger calls attention to the “odd overtones” of the speech “because it echoes themes”
discussed with the soldiers the previous night. Harrying, 193-94. See also Hodgdon, The End Crowns All,
187-94.
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though there are only 25 of them to read), Harry strips these soldiers not only of their
identity, but also of their chance at historical/literary immortality as the story will
supposedly be retold in future years. Once again, we see a disconnect between Harry’s
words and his actions.
Finally, the last scene involves Williams with his gage and the idea of royal
prerogative to achieve justice through equity. On the eve of the battle of Agincourt, while
wearing another man’s cloak, Harry meets a group of three soldiers, John Bates,
Alexander Court, and Michael Williams.43 While they discuss the upcoming battle and
their chances, Harry claims the king “is but a man, as I am”—which is the absolute truth
since he is one and the same—and that what separates the king from a commoner is
ceremony. He speaks of the king’s just and honorable cause, and Bates and Williams
propose the king is responsible for his soldiers’ souls. Bates begins by saying that, as the
king’s subjects, “If his cause be wrong, our obedience to the king wipes the crime of it
out of us” (4.1.125-27), and Williams continues, “But if the cause be not good, the King
himself hath a heavy reckoning to make” (128-29). Harry is enraged at the suggestion
that he is responsible, not only for the natural lives of his soldiers, but also for their
everlasting life. The idea of one person being responsible for someone else’s actions is
exactly what he accuses Canterbury of doing in the beginning of the play, of “inciting”
Harry to go to war. However, in his discussion with soldiers, he argues against this
suggestion by comparing the king to a father or master who cannot be held responsible
for the sins of his children or servants. Williams continues to dispute Harry’s arguments,

See Anne Barton, “The King Disguised: The Two Bodies of Henry V,” in William
Shakespeare's Henry V, ed. Harold Bloom, 5-20 for a discussion of the folk motifs in this scene.
43
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including his claim that the king will not be ransomed; they exchange gloves and propose
to meet again after the battle to settle their score, and Williams says that he will “take
thee a box on the ear” (200).44
After the battle in 4.7, Williams goes looking for the man with whom he
exchanged gloves. Harry, now dressed as himself, questions Williams about the glove on
his cap, and decides to play another trick on the soldier by giving the glove to Fluellen to
wear on his cap. He tells Fluellen that whoever challenges him is an enemy, and
Williams, upon seeing his glove on Fluellen’s cap, strikes him as promised, which leads
Fluellen to declare him a traitor. As the argument between Williams and Fluellen
escalates, Harry reveals that in fact, “’Twas I indeed thou promised’st to strike” (4.8.38).
In the introduction to the play, Katharine Eisaman Maus claims Williams is technically
guilty of mutiny because he strikes Fluellen; however, Williams’s crime is much worse.
His crime is treason since the man Williams had threatened was the king himself, and
Fluellen offers the appropriate punishment for such a crime: “let his neck answer for it, if
there is any martial law in the world” (40-41).45 When Harry asks what satisfaction
Williams can make for his “abuse,” Williams must argue the threat was Harry’s own
fault, and he begs for mercy: “Your majesty came not like yourself. You appeared to me
but as a common man. Witness the night, your garments, your lowliness. And what your

Katherine B. Attié makes the connection between this scene and Harry’s exchange with the
Chief Justice in 2 Henry IV. “‘Gently to hear, kindly to judge’: Minds at Work in Henry V,” in Shakespeare
and Judgment, ed. Kevin Curran (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 93-114. Hodgdon, on the
hand, makes the connection with Duke Vincentio in Measure for Measure, “especially as both rulers use
subjects’ bodies in order to legitimate their own power.” The End Crowns All, 189.
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Eisaman Maus, introduction to Henry V, 1477. As previously mentioned, it was considered
treason to threaten the king, even if only verbally, and Shakespeare would probably have been aware of
people punished for speaking against the Queen during his time. See Shapiro, A Year in the Life, 124 for
examples of criminal convictions related to this law in 1599.
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highness suffered under that shape, I beseech you take it for your own fault, and not
mine, for had you been as I took you for, I made not offence. Therefore I beseech your
highness pardon me” (46-51). Williams’s use of “witness” is a call for Harry to
remember those things, but also, he is calling them to serve as witnesses in the case; those
items are the evidence of his innocence as in a trial (again, there is the appearance of a
trial without one ever actually taking place). He courageously lays the blame on Harry
since it would not have been a crime for him to challenge a common man as he believed
he was doing. His argument is that, in this case, intent is more important than fact.
Although he threatened the king with a “box on the ear,” he did not intend to do so. As he
tells Harry, “All offences, my lord, come from the heart. Never came any from mine that
might offend your majesty” (43-44). The man he threatened, he believed, was a soldier
like himself.
While both Bardolph and Williams could be perceived as threats to order, Harry
decides the threat presented by Bardolph’s actions is a real one and must have
consequences if he wants to secure order for himself, his soldiers, and the people of
France. At the same time, Harry decides to listen to Williams’ pleas for pardon since, as
Williams explains, Harry appeared not like himself, “but as a common man” and what he
“suffered under that shape,” Williams claims, was Harry’s own fault. Harry takes his
initially playful performance too far and Williams finds himself accused of treason. As
sovereign, Harry decides on the exception and enacts mercy by suspending Williams’s
punishment. Instead of following the letter of the law, Harry understands the case is
exceptional and uses equity to give Williams dispensation from the harshness of the law,
because as Shuger tells us, “the king has a duty to provide justice even, if it need be,
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against the law.”46 Equity serves as a corrective or supplement to the common law and is
used to adjudicate exceptional cases, which is the case of Williams. Being able to
recognize the difference between these two cases as well as the difference between
Williams and the traitors in Act 2 is what allows Harry to exercise justice in an equitable
way.
By the end of act 4, Harry has exercised his prerogative powers in diverse ways,
he has shown mercy for his people, he has created new laws, and he has taken the
particulars of a case into account and chosen mercy. He understands the power of
sovereignty and the power he yields through royal prerogative, but he also knows it is
important for the sovereign to appear to be bound to the laws of the kingdom. This
awareness allows Harry to make his extralegal decisions appear to be perfectly legal,
which in turn makes him a more effective king than Richard II or his father.47 However,
because his effectiveness depends on his use of royal prerogative and ability to perform,
it does not provide a strategy that can be easily followed by a successor.

The Question of Succession
By the end of Henry V, Harry has proved himself an able king to his subjects. He
has also proved he knows how and when to use different mechanisms to administer
justice for the English and the conquered French. While act 5 turns the play into a
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Debora Kuller Shuger, Political Theologies in Shakespeare’s England, 76, emphasis in original.
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Lake contends Harry “represents a personified resolution of all the (political, ideological and
structural) contradictions and constraints currently afflicting the late Elizabethan state.” This is made
possible, he says, because Harry combines “the energies and capacities of all three of his progenitors or
alter egos:” Henry IV, Hotspur, and Falstaff. How Shakespeare Put Politics on the Stage, 381-82.
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comedy with the king’s attempts at wooing Katherine, the play actually ends in tragedy
as the chorus reminds the audience of what happened after Harry’s great victories.
The epilogue of the play begins in a humorous way saying that Shakespeare, with
his “rough and all-unable pen,” has kept some important people confined in his room,
“Mangling by starts the full course of their glory.” Then, it turns to glorifying Harry, who
lived a short life, but accomplished greatness with his sword, “By which the world's best
garden he achieved, / And of it left his son imperial lord.” France is the garden, and with
its conquest, Harry left his son an English empire, something Henry VIII had craved and
Elizabeth I began establishing with the British colony settlement in Virginia, the East
India Company, and Ireland, the original testing ground for colonization in the Americas.
However, as the chorus reminds the audience, their stage had previously shown the
disaster Harry’s son’s reign had been:
Henry the Sixth, in infant bands crown'd King
Of France and England, did this king succeed;
Whose state so many had the managing,
That they lost France and made his England bleed. (7-12)
Henry VI was crowned king of England and France when he was only an infant, and the
mismanagement of the kingdoms by those ruling in his place led to the loss of France and
a civil war in England. We see the uneasiness of the country over the idea of succession
reflected in the chorus’s words. In 1599, Elizabeth still refused to name a successor, even
though there were multiple contenders for the English crown, including Essex and James
VI of Scotland. The fear was that if a successor was not named before her death, some of
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the same civil unrest that England experienced during the reign of Henry VI would
happen again.
Knowing the history of past turmoil, it is not hard to understand the anxiety over
the succession, especially since James had just published (1598) his work on absolutism,
The Trew Law of Free Monarchies. James VI’s ideas about the law would later lead to a
direct conflict with Sir Edward Coke, who believed the law was above everyone,
including the king. Richard Helgerson writes that Sir Edward Coke praised Queen
Elizabeth in the second volume of his Reports, “Bless God for Queen Elizabeth,… whose
charge to her justices… is that for no commandment under the great or privy seal, writs
or letters, common right be disturbed or delayed and, if any such commandment (upon
true surmises) should come, that the justices of her laws should not therefore cease to do
right in any point.”48 Elizabeth may not have been as law-abiding as Coke implies, but
she knew how important it was to appear to be so.
With Elizabeth’s refusal to name a successor, some of her advisers began to
suggest that the next monarch should be elected. They were “worried enough about the
possibility of a Catholic succession,” Shapiro explains, “to fall back upon quasirepublican positions to ensure Protestant rule.” He posits that “Elizabeth had to be
offended by what their argument implied: that the people and not just their monarch had a
say in such matters.” Thomas Wilson’s unpublished manuscript on “The State of
England” written in 1600 is one example of the effects of such arguments. According to
Shapiro, “Wilson writes that an English monarch ‘had no authority to make laws nor to
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dispose of the crown; that must be done by general consent of all in Parliament. Yea, the
king’s eldest son, though the kingdom be hereditary, shall not be crowned without the
consent of the Parliament after the death of his father.’” However, he also says that
Wilson’s manuscript was never intended for print, “Wilson could not bring himself to
come out and say that it was her subjects, not Elizabeth herself, who would confirm her
successor.” Wilson knew what had happened to others who had made a similar
suggestion and did not wish to endure the same fate.49
The anxiety over succession that is so clearly apparent in the epilogue of Henry V
is a reflection of Shakespeare’s concern for contemporary (Elizabethan) problems. We
tend to view Shakespeare as timeless because of how well his plays still reflect our own
problems and anxieties, or, as Harold Bloom claims, “because he invented us.”50 This is
not to say that Shakespeare was writing for an unknown audience. On the contrary, he
had a very particular audience in mind when he wrote, mainly Londoners, and we have
examples of changes he made to his plays to fit the needs of specific audiences,
especially the Queen.51 The English people knew the Queen’s health was failing, and it is
possible that Henry V serves the purpose of “speaking” to multiple audiences, including
the Queen and the possible future king James. The epilogue could serve as a reminder to
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Elizabeth of the turmoil caused by an “unplanned” succession, and it could also be a way
to appeal to James to be attentive to his “performance.”52 Shakespeare spent the rest of
1599 writing plays that, like Henry V, explore the themes of legitimacy, succession,
usurpation, and performance—themes he revisited several times over the next few years.
By the time he wrote Macbeth in 1606, these themes, along with the play’s notorious
equivocal language, become prominent aspects of the play.
Shakespeare’s Harry is able to bring the kingdom together in ways that neither his
father nor Richard II could. One reason for his success is that he can distinguish when to
use swords and when to use words. He understands the power of performance and
although he dismisses ceremony, he knows the importance of it to kingship. More
importantly, Harry is aware of the power he holds through the royal prerogative and has
no qualms about using it when he deems it necessary. Although the episode with
Williams is one where prerogative offers a more just conclusion with the use of equity,
and his actions have the intended consequence of ending the civil unrest that had started
in England under Richard II, Harry’s use of prerogative is particularly disturbing because
of his willingness to subvert the law. In the end, his actions serve to weaken the legal
structure in England and help set the stage for future turmoil. Even with all of this,
however, Harry is able to remain “the mirror of all Christian kings” (2.0.6) because he
recognizes the importance of “appearing” just. Performance as legitimizing would have
appealed to Shakespeare as a playwright, and it would have appealed to the English
52
Ian Ward argues “James was a strikingly inept performer, and one who was not particularly
concerned about presenting an idealised portrayal of court life, writing explicit love-letters to male
courtiers, pinching their bottoms in front of visiting dignitaries, and urinating where he sat. In contrast, his
predecessor was one of the most theatrically conscious of magistrates.” Shakespeare and the Legal
Imagination, 200. According to an entry in the Revels Accounts, Henry V was performed before King
James in 1605 as part of the court's Christmas celebrations.
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people who had grown accustomed to Elizabeth’s performances, with her many
processions and visitations. Like her, Harry finds a way to become an effective king by
using language and performance to reinforce his authority and administer justice. As
Kastan suggests, “Hal knows that the crown is always illegitimate, that is, always an
effect of social relations and not their cause, and therefore it must (and can) endlessly be
legitimated by the improvisations of each wearer. Legitimacy is something forged, no
less by kings in Westminster than by Falstaff in the Boar’s Head.”53 Although Harry
banishes Falstaff from his presence, the old knight never actually leaves him. Just as
Harry had re-interred Richard’s body, so has Falstaff also become part of the king’s
superbody.
It is the theatrical skills that Harry learned from the old knight that allow him to
become an effective sovereign. In learning how to perform, he also learns how to
effectively seem as if he is under the law even when he is in fact on the threshold. He
understands the need for the exception but ensures that even when he acts outside the law
he still appears to be within it. This allows him to administer justice in a way that
arguably makes him the most successful of Shakespeare's monarchs. The problem is that
once Harry dies there is no one else that can perform as well as he can. In a far more
perverse or inverse sense, Macbeth’s performances with the witches he meets on his soon
derailed path to victory commit him to escalating injustices that ultimately make him the
“super” anti-king.
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Chapter 3: Royal Prerogative and Tyranny
Seven years passed between Shakespeare’s writing of Henry V and Macbeth, but
we can see many of the same themes still preoccupy him, including ideas about
usurpation, legitimacy, and succession. The importance of “performance” is also still on
his mind, as it would always be for this playwright and performer. However, by the time
Shakespeare sat down to write Macbeth, there was a new monarch on the English
throne—James VI of Scotland ascended the English throne after Elizabeth’s death in
1603—and the Gunpowder Plot with its aftermath had gripped his imagination.
The Gunpowder Plot was a Catholic plan to blow up the House of Lords during
the opening ceremony of Parliament when all its members as well as the King and his
family would have been present. The plot was foiled, and the fifth of November became a
national holiday of thanksgiving first celebrated in 1606.1 In the days and weeks that
followed the plot, the search for and apprehension of the conspirators led to the discovery
of A Treatise of Equivocation. The book had been written by a Jesuit priest, Father Henry
Garnet, and it instructed the Catholic recusants on four ways of equivocating, including
what would later be known as “mental reservation,” which is the type of equivocation
that prevails in Macbeth.

For information about the plot and its connection to Macbeth see Arthur N. Stunz, “The Date of
Macbeth,” ELH 9, no. 2 (1942): 95–105. Frank L. Huntley, “Macbeth and the Background of Jesuitical
Equivocation,” PMLA, 79 (1964): 390-400. A. E. Malloch, and Frank L. Huntley, “Some Notes on
Equivocation,” PMLA 81, no. 1 (1966): 145-46; Steven Mullaney, “Lying Like Truth: Riddle,
Representation and Treason in Renaissance England,” ELH 47, no. 1 (1980): 32-47; and James Shapiro,
The Year of Lear: Shakespeare in 1606 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), chapters 5 through 9. The
Plot had such an effect on the psyche of the English people that it is still celebrated today.
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Mental reservation involves deceiving through using half-truths, that is, disclosing
only part of the truth with the intent to deceive the listener. For example, when the
witches tell Macbeth that “none of a woman born / Shall harm Macbeth” (4.1.96-97),
they are technically telling the truth since Macduff “was from his mother’s womb /
Untimely ripped” (5.10.15-16), and so they are easily able to deceive Macbeth with their
half-truth.2 The witches are not concerned with their immortal souls and their intention is
to wreak havoc, so deception is not a problem for them; however, for the Catholic
recusants, sinning was still problematic, which is why mental reservation was so
effective. The treatise explains that speaking in these half-truths is not a sin because God
knows our thoughts, so it is just a matter of “saying” the truth in one’s head to avoid the
sin of lying. Most Protestants were outraged to discover that the Catholic clergy therefore
approved of lying even in treasonable cases.3
There is no recorded performance of Macbeth before 1611, and the play did not
appear in print until the publication of the First Folio in 1623. However, there is general
consensus among scholars about its writing and first performance in court in 1606.4 One
reason for this consensus is that, as in Henry V, current events make their way into the
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play, most explicitly with the scene in which James appears in the line of kings whom
Banquo will father, the assassination of two Scottish kings, and the Porter of Macbeth’s
castle comment about equivocators. It is also because of its topicality that Macbeth can
help us unlock how ideas about legitimacy and justice were shifting under the new
monarch. No longer was a good king an able “performer,” one who could act outside the
law but still appear to be within it. James favored broader prerogative powers and did not
himself feel the need for any pretenses because, even though he took the English
coronation oath, he had made it clear in his book, The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, that
he believed the king was above the law, which is how we see Macbeth act throughout the
play.5
Macbeth becomes a Scottish sovereign by committing a heinous crime. He kills
the anointed king in cold blood in a very cowardly way, at night when old King Duncan
is sleeping, while also breaking sacred and legal customs related to fealty and
hospitality.6 Because Duncan’s sons flee the scene in fear of unjust accusation and
possible death, Macbeth is invested with legally legitimate power. However, we see that
true justice is not possible because he acts wholly outside the law and refuses legal due
process to anyone he imagines may threaten his power. We thus see in Macbeth a legally
legitimate sovereign who decides to act outside the law, and because of his choice, justice
is supplanted by secret, and sometimes not-so-secret, violence.
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If in Henry V, Shakespeare dramatizes how a consequentialist ethics can
dangerously make royal prerogative seem benign (or even positive), in Macbeth, the
playwright more radically shows that the prerogative itself, inevitably buoyed by a
solitary and error-prone imagination, is a root cause of social instability and even
injustice. In abusing it, Macbeth creates a state of emergency in Scotland where the rule
of law no longer suffices or is followed. In his hands, the royal prerogative becomes
another tool of oppression, and the play serves to underscore the lesson that, to achieve
justice, the sovereign must also be under the law. Shakespeare teaches us this lesson not
only by showing Macbeth's turn to a state of exception, but also by revealing a similarly
egregious fault in Macbeth's supposedly angelic predecessor.

Equivocation of Justice
As he had done previously when writing history plays, Shakespeare looked to
Holinshed’s Chronicles for inspiration when he decided to write about a Scottish king.7
True to form, however, he made significant changes to the story that differently color our
perception of Macbeth. One of the most significant changes is how Macbeth comes to
power. In the Chronicles, Duncan is described as a “soft and gentle” young king, and
Macbeth is the brave warrior who, before the murder, defeats rebels and restores “iustice
and law” to the kingdom. When Macbeth does finally go after the crown, he does so after
consulting other Thanes and he kills Duncan in battle, not in his bed. Furthermore, the
first ten years of Macbeth’s reign are dedicated to advancing justice for his people.

7
It is generally agreed that Shakespeare’s main source for the material in Macbeth is Holinshed’s
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California Press, 1987), 78-116.
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Holinshed lists a series of laws enacted by Macbeth and says, “These and the like
commendable lawes Makbeth caused to be put as then in vse, gouerning the realme for
the space of ten yeares in equall justice.”8 Yet, even in the Chronicles, there is little
question that Macbeth is a usurper. According to Stephen Greenblatt, “none of
Shakespeare’s plays, not even Macbeth, unequivocally endorses the view that every act
of usurpation is automatically evil, and none condemns as necessarily unethical the use of
violence to topple the established order.” He claims Shakespeare understood that violence
“was one of the principal mechanisms of regime change” and that “ruthlessness was
never strictly incompatible with legitimacy.”9 There is, however, a difference between a
usurper and a tyrant, and Holinshed says that Macbeth becomes a tyrant. Macbeth fears
he will be treated the same way he treated Duncan, and he wishes to maintain power for
himself and his own family line. Ruling solely for the sake of maintaining that power
with complete disregard for the rule of law is part of what turns Macbeth into a tyrant.
For the dramatic Macbeth one of the chief consequences of his actions is that, like
Shakespeare’s other historical usurpers, Henry IV and Richard III, he can no longer sleep.
Macbeth tells Lady Macbeth that, after the murder, he thought he “heard a voice cry
‘Sleep no more, / Macbeth does murder sleep’”; it appears that in murdering Duncan,
Macbeth also murdered his own slumber and will no longer experience the “innocent
sleep” that calms, mends, and serves as the “Chief nourisher in life’s feast” (2.2.33-37).10
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Raphael Holinshed, Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland, ed. Henry Ellis (New York:
AMS Press Inc., 1965), V:271, see also 265-66, 269, 277. Macbeth ruled Scotland from 1045 until he was
killed in 1057.
9

Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespeare’s Freedom (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010),

76-77.
Lady Macbeth references Macbeth’s sleeplessness later in 3.4.140; before the murder, it is
Banquo who has trouble sleeping because of “cursed thoughts” probably about the uncertain succession.
10

101

We could infer that without sleep to mend his mind, his actions indicate that he is slowly
losing his faculties and will eventually go completely insane. The exchange with Lady
Macbeth also contains a number of allusions to food (for instance, “second course,”
“nourisher,” “feast”), another physical necessity. Macbeth’s guilt threatens to encompass
him, and it is as if by following his ambition, he can no longer fulfill his other needs,
physical and mental. He cannot think on what he has done, and Lady Macbeth has to
return the daggers he used to the murder scene because he refuses to do so. He fears the
blood cannot be washed from his hand and that it will instead “The multitudinous seas
incarnadine, / Making the green one red” (2.2.60-61). He is appalled by the knocking at
the gates but also wishes the outsider-guest could “Wake Duncan with thy knocking”
(2.2.72). Because of Macbeth’s great imagination, his guilt continues to eat at him,
becoming even greater once he murders Banquo.
Harold Bloom argues that Macbeth “is a tragedy of the imagination,” and that
Macbeth himself is the most imaginative of Shakespeare’s protagonists.11 Bloom may be
right, especially if we consider the importance of imagination during that time. One of the
most striking facts about the Gunpowder plot is that nothing happened: no explosion
occurred, Parliament was not destroyed, and the King was not killed. And yet, these are
the horrors the people were asked to imagine in the official account and sermons
delivered in its aftermath. Imagination was crucial when relating the crime committed by
the conspirators because there were no bodies or rubble to show as evidence of the
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attempted crime. Shapiro likens the Gunpowder Plot to tragic Jacobean dramas because
“its impact and aftermath didn’t depend on actual violence but rather on making people
imagine an unforgettable tragedy,” but doing so essentially turned everyone into coconspirators as they imagined the death of the King.12 In an effort to politically profit
from the trauma, the King and his ministers were asking the people to commit treason by
telling them to reflect on these things and realize their horror. Thus, Macbeth’s guilty
imagination seems an appropriate response to the events occurring around Shakespeare,
and Bloom goes so far as to say that Shakespeare gave over “the passive element in his
own imagination” to Macbeth.13
The problem for Macbeth is that he fails to turn the things he imagines into a
successful performance of kingship; as Bloom argues, Macbeth is “‘the poor player,’ an
overanxious actor always missing his cues.”14 Comparing him with Harry in Henry V, we
note that one of the things that allows Harry to become a successful king is his ability to
perform. Like Shakespeare, Harry embodies the player and playwright all in one; he sets
up scenes for himself, and then acts them out to the best of his ability. Macbeth lacks that
knack. We see that he has a vivid imagination, but he cannot transform what he imagines
into a successful performance of anything but guilt. He acts in haste (Macbeth appears as
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Shapiro, The Year of Lear, 102, 121-33. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 52628. For details about the crime of treason see notes 27 and 28 in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
13

Bloom, The Invention of the Human, 534. According to Bloom, Shakespeare conferred his
intellect upon Hamlet and his wit upon Rosalind, but Macbeth is the most human of his characters, and
Macbeth falls victim to “a beyond [supernatural powers] that surmounts anything available to us” (534).
14
Bloom, The Invention of the Human, 532. The fact that Macbeth fails to successfully “perform”
the things he imagines is significant to the play’s lack of justice because imagination plays an important
role in justice. As Ian Ward explains, “the legitimacy of law, the extent to which we accept it as valid,
whether it be rational, providential or simply effective, rests, in the final analysis, in our collective and
individual political imagination.” Shakespeare and the Legal Imagination, 1.
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the antithesis of Hamlet, who endlessly thinks through every action), and because of his
injustices and morbid imagination, his performances become grotesque. He is haunted by
“ghosts” that only he can see, putting in question his own sanity and possible
“possession.” In the end, it is his great imagination of infernal contamination and bloodguilt combined with his weak performance that lead to his downfall.
The play starts with a brief discussion among the witches and then immediately
moves to the battlefield and a description of Macbeth as a great warrior and a man of
honor. Ross describes Macbeth’s fight against Norway and the “disloyal traitor,” the
Thane of Cawdor. He tells Duncan that Macbeth fought “Point against point, rebellious
arm ’gainst arm” (1.2.56). Macbeth has eliminated the threat brought on by a traitor and,
ironically, it is the traitor’s title that he earns. The rebellious arm is a fitting description of
Macbeth himself as treason enters his mind once he takes on the new “robes” of Thane of
Cawdor. Shakespeare emphasizes the repetitive, almost cyclical, nature of the play in the
next scene with the Weird Sisters’ dialogue, which is full of alliteration and repetition
(for example, “And munched, and munched, and munched,” “nine times nine,” “peak and
pine,” “tempest-tossed” 1.3.1-29). The idea of recurrence is so prevalent that the very
first line of the play already brings it into focus with the First Witch asking, “When shall
we three meet again?” (1.1.1; emphasis added). More to the point, as Macbeth
approaches, they chant while dancing in a ring:
The weird sisters hand in hand,
Posters of the sea and land,
Thus do go about, about,
Thrice to thine, and thrice to mine.
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And thrice again to make up nine.
Peace! The charm’s wound up. (1.3.30-35)
Their dancing in a circle and repeating words and sounds provide the playgoers an
audiovisual cue to the supernatural nature of the play, as if a conjuring was really
happening on stage. The symbolism continues as Macbeth enters with Banquo. He says,
“So foul and fair a day I have not seen” (1.3.36), which reflects the Weird Sisters’ own
words in the first scene—“Fair is foul, and foul is fair” (1.1.10)—as well as the
equivocation that runs throughout the play. This verbal link between Macbeth and the
witches reflects his “doubleness,” suggests Norbrook, and “is a manifestation of both
restlessness and duplicity,” and duplicity is a tool also used by equivocators.15
The witches are supernatural beings, who require imagination to be believed.
Macbeth easily falls into their linguistic trap because he does believe in their powers, and
he first imagines the death of the Scottish king just as soon as he receives the news that
he has indeed become the Thane of Cawdor as the Weird Sisters had prophesied:
My thought, whose murder yet is but fantastical,
Shakes so my single state of man that function
Is smothered in surmise, and nothing is
But what is not. (1.3.138-41)

Norbrook, “Macbeth and the Politics of Historiography,” 100. It is worth noting that the reversal
of the world reflected in the witches’ language is similar to that of the proem in Book V of The Faerie
Queene (“Right now is wrong, and wrong that was is right,” V.Proem.4) and to Satan’s soliloquy on Mount
Niphates in Paradise Lost (“yet all his good prov'd ill in me,” 4.48). In The Faerie Queene, the reversal
happens after justice in the form of Astraea has left the world, and Satan’s rhetoric is also meant to confuse
and reflect an absence of justice. I would suggest that the ambiguous language in all of these instances may
also relate to the ambiguous nature of the royal prerogative, with its resistance to being defined.
15
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Macbeth realizes that what he imagines is unnatural, almost literally blotting out his
former self, and it has the power to unhinge him if he acts on it, which he decides not to
do, letting fortune take its course while hoping that he might be named Duncan’s
successor. Unlike Shakespeare’s other usurpers, Henry IV and Richard III, who belong to
a tradition where hereditary rights and primogeniture rule, and who become kings by
inheriting the crown in a “crooked way,” Macbeth knows he has a good chance of being
rightfully “elected” to the crown.
Traditionally, Scottish succession did not follow a direct father-to-son inheritance
and instead favored the Irish system of “tanistry, by which the successor was chosen and
acknowledged in the lifetime of the reigning king.”16 Holinshed claims Macbeth and
Duncan are cousins and had essentially the same right to the throne because they belong
to the same royal line. Shakespeare hints at some of these things when he mentions the
kinship between the two men, but here again the Duncan he portrays differs greatly from
Holinshed’s. In Macbeth, Duncan appears as a wizened old king who is well-respected by
his thanes and shows much honor towards Macbeth; however, he chooses his son
Malcolm as his successor to the Scottish throne. And so, Macbeth finds himself acting
out the very idea he first imagined as unnatural. Encouraged by his equally imaginative
wife, he murders the king and, at first, manages to make the blame fall on the king’s
grooms. As a consequence, Duncan’s sons quickly recognize the danger of being
suspected of bribery (the grooms themselves would have no motive to murder a good

16
Marjorie O. Anderson, Kings and Kingship in Early Scotland (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic
Press, 1973), 149, 203. Also, Norbrook, “Macbeth and the Politics of Historiography,” 84-92, and Alex
Woolf, “Scotland” in A Companion to the Early Middle Ages: Britain and Ireland c. 500-c. 1100, ed.
Pauline Stafford (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 251-67. Holinshed claims that King Kenneth, who
ruled Scotland from 976 to 994, attempted to change the law so that his sons would inherit the crown, but
when he died, his sons were passed over. Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland, 246-47.
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king) and decide to flee Scotland. Macbeth is elected the new Scottish king by the nobles.
Because of the election, Macbeth’s authority is immediately legitimated. As we have
noted, the question of legitimacy is one that Shakespeare constantly addresses in his
plays. So we see Harry, for example, resorting to a variety of mechanisms to legitimate
himself instead of simply falling back on heredity and primogeniture. According to
English custom, he is technically a legitimate king because he is the first-born son of the
previous king; however, because his father had usurped the throne from Richard II, Harry
understands that some of the nobles question his claim to the throne, and in turn it
becomes important for him establish his own legitimacy through means other than
heredity and primogeniture.
Macbeth’s case differs from Harry’s because he is elected to the kingship. He
does not need to convince the nobles of his legitimate claim to the throne because they
are the ones who choose him according to the Scottish custom of tanistry, and he is
invested at Scone, again, according to custom. In discussing the difference among power,
legality, and moral legitimacy, Daniel Brudney makes clear that “Macbeth was installed
as king in the legally proper manner… Legally, he is the legitimate king; legally,
resistance to him is treason.”17 The problem, however, is twofold: the nobles do not know
the truth about Duncan’s murder; they do not know that Macbeth is in fact a usurper, but
Macbeth’s guilt allows his imagination to take over his faculties, thereby making them

17
Daniel Brudney, “Two Differences Between Law and Literature,” in Shakespeare and the Law:
A Conversation Among Disciplines and Professions, ed. Bradin Cormack, Martha C. Nussbaum, and
Richard Strier (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 22-23. Brudney proposes that an important
distinction for the play is the difference between “legally sanctioned power and morally legitimate political
authority” (24).
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suspect his implication in the crime (though some may have been suspicious from the
first).
After his election, Macbeth goes to Scone to be invested and take his coronation
oath. The moment is described only briefly in the play, but it carries great significance for
the rest of the action because the coronation oath is an essential aspect of sovereign
justice. It is during this ceremony that the king commits himself to obey the laws and do
justice towards his people. There is no record of the coronation oath the real Macbeth
would have taken.18 However, just as he refers to the coinage of his own age (1.2.62)
instead of one that would have been used during Macbeth’s lifetime, Shakespeare’s
knowledge of the oath probably came from one he was familiar with, which would have
been the coronation ceremony of King James.19
James’s coronation was the first time the oath was taken in English, and even if
Shakespeare did not witness the event, a number of detailed accounts of the ceremony
and the coronation sermons were published.20 In taking the oath, the king bound himself
to a fourfold promise 1) to “confirme to the people of England the lawes and Customes to
them granted by the Kinges of England your lawfull and Religiouse predecessors;” 2) to
“keepe the peace and godly agreement entirely (according to [his] power) both to god, the
holie Church, the Clergie, and the people;" 3) to “cause Lawe, iustice, and discretion in
mercye and truth to bee executed in all your iudgmentes;” and finally 4) to “hold and

18
Dr. Alex Woolf, email message, August 4, 2018. Records from Chronicle of the Kings of Alba
describe King Constantin taking an oath in the tenth century during his coronation and “swearing to uphold
the laws and rights of the church and the gospels.” Alex Woolf, “Scotland,” 254.
19

For the discussion about the coinage in Macbeth see Stephen Deng, Coinage and State
Formation, “Chapter 5: ‘Mysteries of State’: The Political Theology of Coinage in Macbeth,” 135-60.
20

Strong, Coronation, 237, 515.
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keepe the Lawes and rightfull Customes, which Comminaltie of your Kingdome haue,
and to defend and vphold them to the honor of god, so much as in you lye.”21 Yet, for an
oath to be binding, there has to be a strong social commitment to the literal and obvious
sense of language, but Macbeth has already betrayed any such commitment.
In Macbeth, language is always shifting, it is not dependable because of the way it
is being used by the characters in the play. Equivocation plays a major role in the play’s
essential lack of justice. Justice depends on an agreed upon meaning of language as laws,
contracts, and judgements exist in the linguistic realm. The sliding language of the play
takes its toll and the promises made are all broken, including Macbeth’s coronation oath.
He breaks his oath to uphold the law and do justice towards his people when he commits
injustices against his fellow noblemen. These injustices involve a violation of mercy and
truth as well as the holy laws that “honor . . . god.” Furthermore, by choosing to act
outside the rule of law, he creates a state of exception and constructs a situation where
legal justice becomes impossible in the realm, even for himself.

Royal Prerogative and Injustice
In a recent article, Thomas Poole examines a legal case concerning a challenge to
the United Kingdom government’s decision not to repatriate inhabitants of a group of
islands in the Indian Ocean, including Diego Garcia, which had been depopulated in 1965
in order to “make room for a US military base.”22 The royal prerogative was used to

21
J. Wickham Legg, ed., The Coronation Order of King James I (London: F. E. Robinson & Co.,
1902), 15-16. For the history of the English coronation oath see Strong, Coronation; H. G. Richardson,
“The English Coronation Oath,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 23 (1941): 129-58; Robert S.
Hoyt, “The Coronation Oath of 1308,” The English Historical Review 71, no. 280 (1956): 353-83.

Thomas Poole, “Judicial Review at the Margins: Law, Power, and Prerogative,” The University
of Toronto Law Journal 60, no. 1 (2010): 87. The case Poole examines is R. (Bancoult) v. Secretary of
22
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originally accomplish the depopulation and then again to deny the inhabitants the right to
repatriation, and Thomas Poole argues that this case “shows how prerogative is often
found at the furthest reaches of constitutional discourse.” He says that prerogative “is
perhaps the closest thing we have to Giorgio Agamben’s idea of a defining threshold or
limit concept, a zone of indistinction between the outside and inside, exclusion and
inclusion, where sovereign power and bare life threaten to elude that domain of politicojuridical representation.” Poole continues examining the case through the lens of
Agamben’s theories about the homo sacer—the man who could be killed but could not be
sacrificed—and says “the sovereign treated [the people involved in the case] as bodies
rather than subjects. (Worse still, by seeking to deny their existence in the late 1960s, it
tried to make them ghosts).”23 Poole only spends one paragraph discussing Agamben’s
theories and its relation to the prerogative, and although his concern is with a recent case,
it nonetheless offers a useful way to describe Macbeth’s actions in the play: he, too,
essentially considers his subjects as bodies, people who can be killed with no regard to
the law and who eventually do become actual ghosts.
Macbeth makes his transition to this line of action when, just before killing
Duncan and becoming king, he argues (with himself) against the deed. He realizes the

State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] UKHL 61 [Bancoult (no.2)], which had been
previously tried.
23
Thomas Poole, “Judicial Review at the Margins: Law, Power, and Prerogative,” 92-93. The
homo sacer is an obscure figure of Roman law who was stripped of legal status and abandoned by his
religious community after judgment; he could be killed because he existed outside the juridical order and
killing him was not a crime, but because he was outside the law, he could not be sacrificed. See Agamben,
Homo Sacer, 71-74. The idea that a sacrifice must be legal is one that Dante explores in relation to Christ in
Dante Alighieri, Monarchy, ed. Prue Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 58-62.
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assassination will not be the “be-all and the end-all” and fears the consequences he may
face:
But in these cases
We still have judgement here, that we but teach
Bloody instructions which, being taught, return
To plague th’inventor. This even-handed justice
Commends th’ingredience of our poisoned chalice
To our own lips. (1.7.7-12)
Macbeth fears that by committing regicide, he is creating a precedent for someone to act
in the same way towards him. His actions will teach others to resort to violence against
him, since he sees justice as equal and impartial. Furthermore, the “poisoned chalice”
appears as a perversion of Christian faith since the symbol of the chalice is associated
with the blood of Christ, which leads to redemption through the consumption of his
bodily sacrifice. In effect, then, “this even-handed justice” would see the scales of justice
balanced. The problem is that what balances them is the illegal act of murdering the legal
king. For Macbeth, justice is equal and impartial in its violence; it is a means of revenge,
and instead of divine mercy, justice returns to the Old Testament “an eye for an eye” type
of justice, not one that is based on the due process of law. Furthermore, the speech
foreshadows his fate and serves to reinforce the cyclical nature of the play.
The idea of unbalanced justice continues to be explored with the metaphor of the
scales of justice, which are specifically mentioned by the Porter going to answer the
knocking at the gates immediately after Duncan’s murder. Over the last century, the
Porter scene has been rescued from the margins where it was once placed, literally and
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figuratively, by early critics such as Pope and Coleridge, and its significance to our
understanding of the events inside the castle has been brought to light. John B. Harcourt’s
analysis of the sinners mentioned by the Porter—the “farmer that hanged himself on
th’expectation of plenty,” the “equivocator that could swear in both the scales against
either scale,” and the “tailor come hither for stealing out of a French hose” (2.3.1-14)—
explores their link to Macbeth’s own crimes. Those include treason, regicide, and seizing
the “crown and royal robes that were not his by right,” all of which illuminate the
importance of the Porter’s words. Moreover, as Michael J. B. Allen notes, the Porter’s
exchange with Macduff relates to Macbeth’s lack of sons and Banquo’s subsequent
murder.24 Critics generally agree that the scene is reminiscent of the Harrowing of Hell,
with Macduff as the Christ-figure, and that a sense of the supernatural is created by the
Porter. Harcourt also mentions the possibility of a link between hell and Inverness Castle,
when the Porter says “But this place is too cold for hell” (2.3.15-16), suggesting Dante’s
lowest circle of hell, where the worst traitors are located, with Satan trapped in the frozen
lake at its bottom.25 With such allusions now applying to the situation on earth, it is not
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John B. Harcourt, “‘I Pray You, Remember the Porter,’” Shakespeare Quarterly 12, no. 4
(1961): 394; Michael J. B. Allen, “Macbeth's Genial Porter,” English Literary Renaissance 4, no. 3 (1974):
326-36. See also Glynne Wickham, “Hell-Castle and Its Door-Keeper,” Shakespeare Survey 19, no. 1966
(1966): 68-74; Frederic B. Tromly, “Macbeth and His Porter,” Shakespeare Quarterly 26, no. 2 (1975):
151-56; Kurt Schreyer, “‘Here's a Knocking Indeed!’: Macbeth and the Harrowing of Hell,” The Upstart
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Harcourt, “‘I Pray You, Remember the Porter,’” 397. Harcourt does not develop the link
between Inverness and Dante’s Inferno, but knowing the location of the Inferno and Purgatorio, we can
speculate about a possible geographic link. The Inferno is in the Northern hemisphere with Lucifer at the
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surprising to see the scales of justice portrayed as being out of balance, their meaning
once again perverted (Shakespeare makes a special point of this issue in 2.3.15-18).
Before the Porter decides to open the gates, he imagines that he is the Porter of
hell welcoming these sinners, and the second sinner he imagines coming through the gate
is the equivocator: “Knock, knock! Who's there, in th’other devil's name? Faith, here's an
equivocator, that could swear in both the scales against either scale, who committed
treason enough for God's sake, yet could not equivocate to heaven. O, come in,
equivocator” (2.3.15-18). While Father Garnet’s theory of mental reservation claimed
one could simply tell the truth in his or her own mind to be absolved of sin, the Porter
denies this and reminds us of the consequences of lying. He says that God does not
accept lies and explains the equivocator is going to hell for perjury.26 Perjury may not
appear to be as great a crime as the others until we consider the importance of language
itself and oath-taking in particular to the proper function of the legal system. The
equivocator’s lies make the scales of justice useless in weighing right and wrong.
Achieving justice is considerably more difficult because it is harder to judge the rightness
of a case when people’s words can no longer be trusted. People may not feel as bound to
their oaths as they once were, which means truth has become elusive. Of course, the
greatest example of this in the play is Macbeth himself, who first breaks his oath of
allegiance to his king and then his oath of coronation to his people.27

Baker informs us that in the seventeenth century, perjury fell under a “large field of jurisdiction”
of Star Chamber that “was the alleged perversion of justice.” An Introduction to English Legal History,
118.
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In The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, King James states that “The Princes duetie to his Subiects
is… openly confessed by all good Princes, according to their oath in their Coronation” (64), but he also
says that the king’s oath is to God, and an unjust prince is still a prince and only God can serve as judge
over him (71-82). James VI and I, Political Writings. For more about the importance of the oath see,
Jonathan Michael Gray, “Vows, Oaths, and the Propagation of a Subversive Discourse,” The Sixteenth
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Macbeth’s next act of violence after Duncan’s murder comes when he decides to
kill the blood-smeared grooms before they can be questioned about the murder. When
Macduff questions his actions, he explains that the haste of his “violent love / Outran the
pauser, reason” (2.3.107-08). Although his actions were planned, his response rings of
truth because it touches on his haste to take action in righteous anger at their disloyalty.
In addition, it shares similarities with the Earl of Gowrie’s Conspiracy of 1600, which
involved a supposed attempt on King James’s life and ended with the conspirators
immediately slain, leaving James as “the sole surviving witness to what had happened.”
Even the official version has inconsistencies, as James owed the Gowries a great deal of
money, so “It certainly looked suspicious that the alleged perpetrators had been killed and
not taken prisoner and interrogated,” states Shapiro, who also says “The Scottish clergy
had an especially hard time swallowing this incredible story,” but most eventually
acceded to James’s version of the events.28 Macbeth’s actions against the grooms
similarly prevents the right course of action from taking place and continues his pattern
of choosing violence over justice.
Similar to the real Macbeth of Holinshed’s Chronicles, his next violent act comes
after he is already king and is caused by his anxiety over Banquo’s future, foretold by the
Weird Sisters, as the father of kings. Here once again, Macbeth lets his imagination

Century Journal 41, no. 3 (2010): 731-56; Giorgio Agamben, The Sacrament of Language: An
Archaeology of the Oath (Homo Sacer II, 3), trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2011).
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Lord God (London: Valentine Sims dwelling on Adling hill at the signe of the white Swanne, 1603, 1603),
Early English Books Online. 13 September 2018; Stanley J. Kozikowski, “The Gowrie Conspiracy Against
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dictate his actions. Although he fears Banquo suspects his involvement in Duncan’s
murder, which Banquo does, Macbeth’s greatest fear is that the witches’ prophecies about
his own lack of successor will continue to prove themselves true. If that happens,
everything he did—murdering Duncan, putting “rancours in the vessel of [his] peace,”
and giving “his eternal jewel” to the “common enemy of man”—will be pointless
because “Upon [his] head they placed a fruitless crown, / And put a barren sceptre in
[his] grip” (3.1.62-71), since Banquo’s seed will be kings (once again Macbeth’s
references relate to nourishment and reproduction or lack thereof). He decides that the
only way to deal with the threat is to have Banquo and his son, Fleance, killed. However,
the speech is deceiving (possibly even to himself) because his interest lies not in retaining
the crown for his potential or future offspring (he has none at present), but in selfpreservation and keeping the crown for himself. He had already made clear that he fears
Banquo (3.1.50-58), and we later learn that he fears Fleance will seek revenge in the
future (“The worm that’s fled / Hath nature that in time will venom breed,” 3.4.28-29).
Killing Banquo and Fleance is a precaution; it is a way to ensure he can safely reign.
Macbeth finds two men who are willing to assassinate Banquo and Fleance,
convincing them of some wrongdoing against them committed by Banquo (3.1.77-84).
He goads them into affirming Banquo is their enemy and tells them Banquo is also his
enemy. He then says:
and though I could
With barefaced power sweep him from my sight
And bid my will avouch it, yet I must not,
For certain friends that are both his and mine,
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Whose loves I may not drop, but wail his fall
Who I myself struck down. And thence it is,
That I to your assistance do make love,
Masking the business from the common eye
For sundry weighty reasons. (3.1.119-27)
Macbeth chooses to eliminate Banquo under the cover of darkness with hired murderers
while affirming to them that he has power to do so legally, saying that he chooses
deception because he does not want to upset friends he has in common with Banquo. But
the truth is Macbeth knows that Banquo has not broken any laws and that rumors are
already circulating about his own possible involvement in Duncan’s murder. He also
realizes that to bring Banquo to trial could also bring the witches’ prophecies about
himself to light, so his only recourse for dealing with opposition is secret violence.
His choice to kill Banquo differs from his previous murders, not only because he
does not wield the knife himself, but also because he now commissions a “statesponsored” assassination.29 When he speaks to the murderers, he is speaking as the King,
not as a common man, and he has power over the lives of his people. Although there
were arguments over the extent of powers a king could exercise using royal prerogative
when Shakespeare wrote the play, it was always difficult to determine its limits. King
James argued that kings have powers similar to God’s: “they make and vnmake their
subiects: they haue power of raising, and casting downe: of life, and of death: Iudges ouer

29
State-sponsored assassination is still used by authoritarian regimes to deal with dissenting
views. Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, is an example of a leader suspected to have used state-sponsored
assassination as a means to quiet dissent numerous times. Jeff Stein, “Vladimir Putin’s Deadly War Against
Dissent,” Newsweek Magazine, February 9, 2017, https://www.newsweek.com/vladimir-putin-deadly-waragainst-dissent-554410.
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all their subiects and in all causes, and yet accomptable to none but God onely.”30
Macbeth is not directly concerned with God’s judgement because he has already come to
terms with the fact that he forfeited his soul to the devil, but he wants to maintain the
appearance of innocence even though he still has to deal with his own guilty conscience.
After Macbeth discharges the murderers, he encounters Lady Macbeth and relates
his concerns over their position. His speech is once again full of references to his unmet
physical and mental needs. He tells her they must take action against Banquo:
Ere we will eat our meal in fear, and sleep
In the affliction of these terrible dreams
That shake us nightly. (3.2.19-21)
As he continues telling her of “the torture of the mind to lie / In restless ecstasy” (3.2.2324), he says it would be better to be dead along with Duncan than to suffer this anguish.
Macbeth is aware that his actions against Banquo are a great breach of trust both with
him and his other subjects (murderers included), and so he asks the night with its
“bloody” and “invisible hands” to “Cancel and tear to pieces that great bond / Which
keeps me pale” (3.2.49-51). Greenblatt annotates “that great bond” as “Banquo’s lease on
life,” but it could also refer to Macbeth’s bond of friendship with Banquo. Additionally, a
bond is also a “deed containing an acknowledgment that a sum of money was owed by
the ‘obligor’ to the ‘obligee’;’’ it is a physical piece of paper that can be torn to pieces.31
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In this sense the bond is also a form of credit, distinct from the material money it
represents, so it is relevant to the legal fiction that is part of kingship and serves to recall
Macbeth’s obligation as the sovereign to do justice towards his people, the latter of
which, here, can be torn up.
An important turning point in the play happens in 3.4 when we most clearly see
Macbeth greatly disturbed by his actions with the visit from Banquo’s ghost. At the
beginning of the scene, Macbeth learns from the murderers that Fleance escaped with his
life. He then realizes that he will not have peace so long as Fleance is alive and compares
the boy to a serpent “that in time will venom breed” (3.4.29). Once he joins the party at
his royal feast, he is shocked by a visit from Banquo’s ghost. Macbeth is the only one to
see the accusing ghost, but the feast has to be cancelled because of his erratic behavior.
Now, his secret actions not only prevent him from satisfying his physical necessities, but
they also start affecting others in the realm as we learn from the Lord speaking with
Lennox, who says Macduff has gone to England to seek help so that:
we may again
Give to our tables meat, sleep to our nights,
Free from feasts and banquets bloody knives,
Do faithful homage, and receive free honours,
All which we pine for now. (3.6.33-37).
By the end of the scene, Macbeth once again shows why he is “the poor player” through
his intentions to visit the Weird Sisters and his decision to act before thinking: “Strange
things I have in head that will to hand, / Which must be acted ere they may be scanned”
(3.4.138-39). Here he deceives himself into thinking that by not considering the
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consequences he can escape them, just as he deceives himself that the Sisters will tell him
the truth even after he informs Lennox that any who trust them are “damned” (4.1.155).
It is Macbeth’s last encounter with the witches that causes his most grotesque
performance and most striking choice against mercy and equity. The Sisters pronounce
their prophecies and tell him to “beware Macduff.” Subsequently, Macduff disobeys his
orders to appear in court and flees to England instead, and so Macbeth decides to take
revenge against Macduff’s family:
The castle of Macduff I will surprise,
Seize upon Fife, give to th’edge o’th’ sword
His wife, his babes, and all unfortunate souls
That trace him in his line. No boasting like a fool;
This deed I’ll do before this purpose cool. (4.1.166-70)
Macbeth does not give any consideration to legal action; one body replaces another, his
wife and very young son for Macduff himself.32 As king, Macbeth could use the law to
punish Macduff by charging him with treason and confiscating his property, as Harry
does with the traitors in Henry V (Harry does condemn the traitors to death after a
makeshift trial, but their families are not physically harmed). Macbeth’s behavior also
stands in stark contrast with Harry’s because Harry exercises his prerogative in a way that
appears to follow the law. Macbeth, however, is only concerned with keeping his power

It is as if Macbeth has decided to interpret the doctrine of the “unity of a person” literally. The
doctrine is a legal fiction that states that in the eyes of the law, husband and wife are one person, with the
husband serving as the head; however, as Baker clarifies, “it was not universally applicable: for instance
the wife was not executed for her husband’s crimes, or made answerable for his debts.” Baker, An
Introduction to English Legal History, 484. For more details on women’s legal status after marriage see B.
J. Sokol and Mary Sokol, “The Effects of Marriage on Legal Status,” chap. 7 in Shakespeare, Law, and
Marriage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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and gives no thought to lawful (or even the appearance of lawful) behavior. Revenge and
self-preservation are again involved in his actions as he himself, in Shakespeare’s
version, has no living children.
Macbeth’s concern with only his own position is why the word “tyrant” appears
in Macbeth a total of fifteen times, more than in any other of Shakespeare’s plays.33 Mary
Nyquist explains that the word is often used “by the tyrant’s political enemies” and “It
charges a ruler with obtaining power unconstitutionally or with ruling in defiance of laws
and customs over citizens who are thereby metaphorically enslaved by his behavior.”34
Tyranny is a word that perfectly describes Macbeth’s type of sovereignty and injustice as
he uses his power to bypass the law. When Macduff’s wife calls her husband a traitor and
says that a traitor is anyone who “swears and lies” (4.2.47), she is in fact describing
Macbeth. He is oppressive and cruel towards his people, and in his actions against
Macduff’s family, as in his other murders, he is the one who commits treason by breaking
his oath to do justice towards them. However, in another sense Lady Macduff’s words
also apply to her husband, who “swore” to “love her, comforte her, honour her, and kepe
her” in part by protecting her, a vow now proved a lie by his flight.35 In that important
sense, Macbeth not only treats his subjects unjustly but encourages them to do the same
to others, including their wives and children. His tyranny thereby takes on the broader
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aspect of a social disease making his subjects become mere bodies or ghosts no more
fully human than himself.
Macbeth’s extreme and continuingly cowardly violence in this case has further
consequences for him as Malcolm later urges Macduff to seek revenge instead of legal
remedy. When Macduff meets Malcolm in England, they first lament the state Scotland
finds itself in due to the “tyrant’s grasp” (4.3.37), and then Malcolm decides to test
Macduff’s integrity by lying and proclaiming he has more vices than Macbeth. His
behavior, he tells Macduff, will make “black Macbeth… seem as pure as snow” (4.3.5354). Once he is finally convinced of Macduff’s loyalty, however, he “unspeaks” his
detractions of himself, which leaves Macduff disconcerted. Steven Mullaney argues that
once Malcolm “lies about his own character and tarnishes his reputation,” the mask of
misrule cannot be easily removed, for “once on his face, it leaves a lasting impression.”
Barbara Riebling, on the other hand, argues that Malcolm’s behavior is Machiavellian yet
necessary to restore order; Malcolm, she says, “learned to ‘rule’ by breaking the rules of
Christian conduct.”36 While it may be true that Malcolm is acting as a fox in this case, I
find problematic that he never chooses the law as one of his options. When his father is
murdered, he immediately decides to flee; instead of looking for the culprits and finding a
way to bring them to justice, he opts for self-preservation. When he learns of what
happened to Macduff’s family, he urges Macduff to seek revenge; there is never a
mention of capturing Macbeth and having a trial or any legal remedy, only violence will
do. Of course, this could also be interpreted as the case for a “just war.” According to

Mullaney, “Lying Like Truth,” 42. Barbara Riebling, “Virtue's Sacrifice: A Machiavellian
Reading of Macbeth.” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 31, no. 2 (1991): 277. See also John Uhr,
“Investigating Public Integrity in Macbeth.” Public Integrity 17, no. 3 (2015): 279-290.
36
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Thomas Aquinas there are three conditions for a war to be considered just: the “authority
of the sovereign”; a “just cause,” that is, one that “avenges wrongs” or “restore[s] what it
[the enemy] has seized”’ and the “the right intention of those waging war.” Although
Malcolm is not technically the sovereign, he could claim that status because Macbeth
usurped his right, and thus he has the authority if not the title. Still, the fact is that he does
not urge Macduff to seek justice; he urges revenge instead.37 This aspect of the plot begs
the question of what sort of king Malcolm will become and how the cycle of violence
will play out.
Greenblatt warns that “the forces of renewed order, Malcolm and Macduff, are
themselves strangely unstable.”38 Yet, the audience generally accepts this situation since
in the meantime, Macbeth fully takes on the role of the traitor, the Thane of Cawdor,
whose robe he inherits. First, he saves the kingdom by killing the traitor and then he kills
the king, so now Macduff will kill the king to save the kingdom from a traitor. It is
possible that, as with other matters in the play, the cycle will continue, and Malcolm’s
reign will be filled with unrest just like his father’s and Macbeth’s. Historically, however,
we know that Macduff, the rightful Earl of Fife, did not follow Macbeth’s path in taking
the crown for himself. This may have been because of the role played by the earl of Fife
in the coronation of Scottish kings.
Certain functions and privileges were given to the earls as compensation for
exclusion from kingship itself. According to Archibald Duncan:
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The earls of Fife played the leading part in placing the king upon his throne in the
thirteenth and twelfth centuries. As early as 1095, the earls’ family was known as
Macduff and the members of it… were clearly close to the royal line in a special
sense; to this may be attributed the unique position of the earl of Fife at a later
date as ‘chief of the law of clan Macduff’, enjoying privileges of exemption from
blood-feud and possibly of sanctuary.”39
Elsewhere, the historian Duncan informs us that in 1315, it was confirmed by Robert I
“that this [Fife] earldom must remain separate and distinct—i.e., could not escheat or
forfeit to the crown—because ‘kings of Scotland must be made by a definite earl of
Fife’.”40 Although these privileges came about decades and even centuries after Macbeth
actually lived, Shakespeare’s source is Holinshed, who attributes them to the earls of Fife
much earlier than the historical record. Holinshed presents them as being granted to
Macduff by Malcolm during his own coronation.41 In the play, when Macbeth is
crowned, Macduff says he will not attend the coronation in Scone (2.437-38). As
previously discussed, Shakespeare makes many changes to Holinshed’s version of the
story, so it is possible that by having Macduff deliberately choose not to attend the
coronation, Shakespeare denies Macbeth complete legitimacy from the first. Even though
Macbeth has been elected by the nobles, without Macduff there to “make” him a king, he
is technically a usurper.
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Macbeth’s usurpation of justice in Scotland means that he is also denied any sort
of legal recourse. Unlike Duessa in The Faerie Queene (a representation of Mary Queen
of Scots) who deserves a trial even after being accused of “Murder, Sedition,
Incontinence, Adulterie, and Impietie” (V.ix.48), Macbeth will have no trial; he will only
have the verdict of the sword because he has no legal “punisher” aside from Macduff,
who seems divinely appointed to carry out “justice.” Macduff says that justice cannot be
achieved with words, only with the sword (5.10.7-9), perhaps because language has
shown itself to be so problematic in the play or perhaps because at this time, there is no
way to subject a king to criminal prosecution.42 As with Mercilla’s judgment of Duessa
and Harry’s judgment of the traitors, Macbeth’s execution could be an example of mercy
towards the people of Scotland, but this is uncertain since there is not even a makeshift
trial to accompany his punishment.43 Thus, just as violence has been Macbeth’s only
recourse, now it is the only recourse left against him. There is no legal recourse for his
victims, so he too will have none.
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James claims the king is “to be iudged onely by GOD, whom to onely hee must giue count of
his iudgement,” and because of this, a king cannot be tried in a human court (James VI and I, Political
Writings, 72). One of Mary Stuart’s objections when she was accused of plotting against Elizabeth’s life
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Ruling by Example
To many critics the rise of Macbeth seems to be coterminous with the end of
justice in Scotland, but that is not so.44 What we actually see is Duncan providing
Macbeth with an example of bad judgment in regnal power from the start; by naming
Malcolm his successor instead of Macbeth, Duncan shows he is willing to break legal
custom. According to the system of tanistry, the kingship should have gone to another
near kin of the king, not his son.45 Duncan’s actions set a precedent that authorizes the
rapid movement from thought to deed in Macbeth, so sovereign justice is thereby
undermined from the very beginning of the play.
We tend to associate Macbeth’s butchery with his desire for power; however, as
Marilyn French clarifies, Macbeth “is no more a butcher at the end than he is at the
beginning. Macbeth lives in a culture that values butchery. Throughout the play manhood
is equated with the ability to kill. Power is the highest value in Scotland, and in Scottish
culture, power is military prowess.”46 He would have thus been a natural choice as
Duncan’s successor because of their close kinship and his performance in battle.
Macbeth’s military prowess is uncontested in the play. As Duncan watches from the
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sidelines along with his son Malcolm, who had to be freed from captivity by another
warrior, Macbeth has routed two hostile armies and slain one of the traitors. He is the
reason there is a country left to govern, and Duncan seems to understand this when
Macbeth arrives at camp. He tells Macbeth:
Would thou hadst less deserved,
That the proportion both of thanks and payment
Might have been mine. Only I have left to say,
‘More is thy due than more than all can pay.’ (1.4.18-21)
Because of their kinship, customs regarding succession, and Duncan’s own words, it is
only natural for Macbeth to expect to be named Duncan’s successor. According to
Riebling’s Machiavellian reading of Macbeth, good warriors make effective kings, and
“Machiavelli advises that every prince should be his own general.” She further notes that
Duncan cannot maintain his power by relying on Macbeth to fight his battles.47 And yet,
knowing that Macbeth is his best warrior, Duncan names his young, inexperienced son as
his successor.
We know Duncan is not a great judge of character. When referring to the original
Thane of Cawdor after he has already committed treason, Duncan says the man “was a
gentleman on whom I built / An absolute trust” (1.4.12-13), which, at the very least,
makes us question his ability to choose an adequate successor. John Uhr succinctly
presents the problem: “if Duncan’s weakness as a ruler is part of Scotland’s governance
problem, then we might well have reservations about placing ruling power in hands
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nominated by one of such limited capacity.”48 Duncan uses prerogative to bypass custom
and name Malcolm instead of Macbeth to be his successor, and he essentially creates a
state of exception, where the law has suspended itself, from the very beginning of the
play. Everything that follows simply reinforces the state of exception, with each new king
supplanting the law with royal prerogative even further. It seems that the greatest danger
to the wellbeing of the Scottish people is its sovereigns’ use of prerogative powers
instead of abiding by the laws and customs of the land.
There is much in Macbeth to suggest that it may have been written to flatter King
James: his image appears in the line of kings, the Scottish theme, and the nod towards his
interest for the supernatural. However, there is also an argument to be made that the play
is meant as a cautionary tale to James to pay attention to how he conducts himself. James
believed in the divine right of kings; he thought the king was a sacred figure and that
regicide was close to the ultimate crime.49 Macbeth portrays not one, but two regicides,
both caused by kings using royal prerogative in ways that negate justice and legal
custom. Consequently, the play could also be a warning to James to obey his coronation
oath and the English laws. Additionally, when laws are broken, the presumed criminals
should be judged in a court of law, not killed without a trial, as in the Gower incident.
James should also be careful with his use of royal prerogative; otherwise he may find
himself in a situation similar to Macbeth’s, with an uprising against a tyrant.
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King James did not heed the warnings in Macbeth. Instead, he continued
expanding his exercise of royal prerogative, eventually leading him to interfere in
common law proceedings and to remove Sir Edward Coke from the privy council and as
Chief Justice for refusing to obey him. Coke had earlier praised Elizabeth I in the second
volume of his Reports for never interfering with the law, but “King James,” Richard
Helgerson tells us, “failed to exercise the same restraint.”50 Coke claimed the law was
absolute, while James claimed it was the king. Coke managed to regain royal favor later
both with James and Charles I, but always managed to lose it again by taking a stand
against the king’s use of prerogative. Helgerson relates that in the 1628 Parliament, Coke
took part in promoting the Petition of Right, which I discuss in the next chapter, claiming
that “It is a maxim, the common law hath admeasured the king’s prerogative, that in no
case it can prejudice the inheritance of the subjects. It is against the law that men should
be committed and no cause shown… Yet it is not I, Edward Coke, that speaks it but the
records that speak it.”51 For Coke, English common law was the supreme tool of justice
and could not be superseded by royal prerogative.
The turmoil leading up to the Civil War was years in the future when Shakespeare
wrote Macbeth; however, there is no denying how prescient the warnings in the play
seem to be. Macbeth uses royal prerogative to maintain power and breaks his coronation
oath when he commits injustices against his people. Later, Milton would level the charge
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of oath-breaker on James’s son, Charles I, writing in his political tracts that Charles had
broken his coronation oath to his people and comparing him to Shakespeare’s Macbeth.52
It is also a broken oath that causes the fall in Paradise Lost, when Adam breaks his
pledge of obedience to God. However, unlike Duncan and Macbeth, God refuses to create
a state of exception, and instead, He follows the law and provides justice for the human
couple through mercy. Yet Milton ultimately came to believe that no human being could
successfully follow God’s example, not even a fairly elected monarch, so that by the time
he composed The Readie and Easie Way in 1660, he signaled the system’s inevitable end
by calling for abolishing monarchy in favor of a republican mode of government. The
Restoration of Charles II immediately ended that hope, which would remain unfulfilled
for roughly another 200 years (when it was resurrected in the American colonies), but
what he and his countrymen learned from Shakespeare’s political histories and tragedies
set the stage for the arrival of the first English constitutional monarchy in 1688, only a
little over 70 years after Macbeth’s first performance.
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Chapter 4: Justice, Liberty, and the Rule of Law
It is possible that John Milton never saw Macbeth performed on stage, especially
since the Puritans closed the theaters at the beginning of the Civil War in 1642.
Nevertheless, he knew the text well, and he refers to or quotes directly from it a number
of times in his writings. He feared that the misuse of power he read about in The Tragedie
of Macbeth was becoming the norm in England under the Stuart Kings. The rule of law
was no longer supreme, and Milton found himself writing against the use of prerogative
powers and in favor of regicide. In his regicide tracts, he uses the tragedy to insult the
Presbyterians and links Charles I to Macbeth when complaining of the king’s behavior. It
is, however, in the character of Satan in Paradise Lost that we see Macbeth’s greatest
influence on Milton.1
John Milton originally conceived the story of the Fall as a five-act drama entitled
Adam Unparadiz’d in the 1640s. Around the same time, his plans for an epic revolved
around ancient Britain. He had considered writing about King Arthur but changed the
focus to other kings of Britain when he began to doubt the historical veracity of Arthur’s
existence. Eventually, he decided to switch his focus again and started writing an epic
about the Fall instead of the founding of an empire. John Aubrey claims Milton started
working on Paradise Lost two years before the Restoration, but we cannot be certain of
the dates. We do know, however, that some of what he had written for his drama survives
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in the poem because his nephew, Edward Phillips, recalls that “in the fourth book of the
poem there are six verses, which several years before the poem was begun, were shown
to me and some others, as designed for the very beginning of the said tragedy.”2 Milton’s
choice to make his drama into an epic is striking because of how he uses and subverts the
traditional aspects of the genre.
The traditional epic subject was heroism and warfare, and it had long been
associated with monarchy and empire, something that was problematic for the republican
Milton. Accordingly, just as he had intended to reform the church and state, with
Paradise Lost, Milton sets out to reform the genre. There is no denying that Milton uses
many of the standard practices of the epic genre: the poem begins in medias res, it
includes the catalogues of warriors, uses extended similes, and recounts significant
episodes of a war; however, as David Scott Kastan succinctly explains, “it is the early
scenes of Satan that most comfortably satisfy the expectations of epic.”3 In Milton’s epic,
the heroism, warfare, and royalism of the traditional epic become perverted qualities
under Satan’s dominion.
Most critics nowadays have accepted that Milton’s choice to write an epic did not
mean he had retreated from politics to a “paradise within.”4 One of the critics to have
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successfully argued for a reading of Paradise Lost that serves to reinforce Milton’s own
political vision is David Norbrook. He identifies Lucan’s Pharsalia, the epic poem that
celebrates the resistance of the Roman republicans against Caesar, as the tradition Milton
follows. Norbrook explains how the Pharsalia “undermines imperial mythology,” and he
discusses the “notoriously problematic” question of the epic hero in both the Pharsalia
and Paradise Lost.5 Instead of the twelve-book format of Virgil and Tasso, Milton chose
the ten-book format of the Pharsalia for his original publication of Paradise Lost in
1667. More importantly, Milton’s use of blank verse instead of rhyme is one of the most
obvious ways he deviates from the other epics of his time and reasserts his own
republican ideals. At that time, rhyme was generally associated with the monarchy and
courtly writings, so Milton’s choice to recover the heroic poem from “the troublesome
and modern bondage of rhyme” is as much a political choice as an aesthetic one.6
According to Steven N. Zwicker, it is “an act of moral and political reclamation” of
liberty from the bondage of Stuart tyranny; Paradise Lost, Zwicker tells us, “is a
countermeasure to the restoration of kingship.”7
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I want to argue with Norbrook and Zwicker that Paradise Lost can and should be
read politically, especially if we take Milton’s own writings as a guide to the epic. Milton
spent his life trying to influence policy with his words, from fighting against print
censorship to advocating for no-fault divorces and the right to be ruled by laws instead of
by an individual. I want to argue that he continues his fight for justice and liberty in
Paradise Lost and propose that the epic is another means by which Milton tries to convey
his political thoughts and influence policy.
While many of Milton’s works give us great insight into his political thought, The
Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, written during Charles I’s trial and published after his
execution, is the most important for my purposes. In The Tenure, Milton defends the
people’s right to take action against a tyrant, argues against absolute sovereignty, and
reinforces the idea of a social contract between the sovereign and the people. More
importantly, Milton emphasizes the supremacy of justice and the law—even over the
monarch—when he argues in favor of putting the king on trial and asserts that “Justice is
the onely true sovran and supreme Majesty upon earth.”8 Justice and liberty are central
concepts in Milton's political writing, and his experience with the Stuarts’ extralegal form
of government (king above parliament and the law) compels him to give justice and legal
terms a prominent place in his epic, which coheres with the poem’s main theme of God's
justice and men's free will. This remains true even though governments appear very late
in Paradise Lost, that is, not until Books 11 and 12.
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In this chapter, I examine Paradise Lost along with Milton’s writings in The
Tenure and other prose works to argue that the poem is Milton’s way to continue his fight
against the use of prerogative powers and in favor of the rule of law. He uses contractual
language to describe the legal bond between God and Adam and to emphasize the
importance of justice and liberty, and we can venture that Milton was using the language
of the law to weave a very intricate message about fidelity to the law. In Milton’s
conception, by placing himself under the law, God serves as the ultimate example of a
just sovereign.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section reviews the contract
between Adam and God in Book 8, and I discuss why Milton chooses to frame it using
legal and economic terms. In the second and third sections, I explore the Son’s
intervention on behalf of the human race in Book 3. The Son is God’s accommodated
image, a more creaturely version of himself, which is an important concept to help
understand sovereignty and justice in Paradise Lost. Milton also uses legal language to
emphasize the importance of justice to the good of the commonwealth, which leads to my
discussion of the tyranny of man and his governments in Book 12, and the reason people
should not be ruled by a monarch who is not bound to the laws.

“The Rigid Interdiction” and the Possibility of Dissent
As previously mentioned, Paradise Lost follows the standard practice of classical
epics by beginning in medias res. Thus, we only hear of Adam’s conversation with God
in Book 8 when Adam relates his story to Raphael, who has already witnessed God
pronounce the doom of man and the Son’s intervention on behalf of the human race in
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Book 3. The importance of the episode cannot be overstated since this is when Adam
learns of the prohibition and reiterates his freedom to choose.
In Book 5, God sends Raphael to warn Adam and Eve of the enemy who has
recently escaped from hell and has been caught disturbing Eve’s sleep. “To render Man
inexcusable” (The Argument). God asks Raphael to remind Adam that “Happiness in his
pow’r left free to will, / Left to his free will, his will though free / Yet mutable.” God’s
insistence that Adam has a choice is essential to justice because, as I will later argue,
Milton’s vision of justice can only exist alongside liberty. In his instructions, God also
wants Raphael to inform Adam of the enemy’s fall from heaven and his plans to cause
the “fall of others,” not by violence, “But by deceit and lies” (224-44).9
Raphael promptly obeys God’s command and is welcomed as a guest by Adam
and Eve. In warning them of the danger posed by the enemy, he uses similar words to
those of God. He tells Adam:
That thou art happy owe to God.
That thou continuest such owe to thyself,
That is, to thy obedience: therein stand!
This was the caution giv’n thee. Be advised!
God made thee perfect, not immutable,
And good He made thee. But to persevere
He left it in thy pow’r, ordained thy will
By nature free, not overruled by fate

Note the similarity in the description of Satan’s tactics to Radigund’s conquest of her opponents
by “force or guile” (FQ, V.iv.31).
9
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Inextricable or strict necessity. (PL, 5.520-28)
What Raphael relates to Adam with these words, Adam already knows. Raphael is simply
reminding Adam of his own freedom to choose obedience. Nothing compels Adam to
stand; he is free, and therein lies the danger. God knows that Adam will fall, but He also
knows that the fall is not “fated.” Adam must choose to fall. He wants Adam to be
reminded of his own responsibility and be fully warned of the danger the enemy poses.
Freedom to choose to love and serve God is where Raphael begins his tale of the
enemy. He explains:
Myself and all th’ angelic host that stand
In sight of God enthroned our happy state
Hold as you yours while our obedience holds,
On other surety none. (5.535-38)
The angels are each responsible for their own happiness; nothing and no one else stands
for them as guarantee or assurance.10 Since there are no other assurances for the angels,
the consequence of the rebels’ actions is that “some are fall’n, to disobedience fall’n /
And so from Heav’n to deepest Hell” (5.541-42). Similar to men, the angels have a
choice and are given an opportunity to repent and return to the light of God when Abdiel
speaks against Satan’s plans. It is only after Satan has rebuffed Abdiel’s pleas to obey the
law of God and seek pardon that he is cursed, and the fall of the rebellious angels is
certain: “O alienate from God! O spirit accurst, / Forsaken of all good! I see thy fall /
Determined and thy hapless crew involved,” declares Abdiel (5.877-79). In Satan’s

10

This idea of surety is important because in Book 3 we see the Son stand as surety for mankind. I
will discuss the dialogue between the Son and God and the modified contract in the third section. Briefly,
the Son offers himself on behalf of mankind, so that our souls may not be condemned to eternal damnation.
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soliloquy on Mount Niphates, we witness him finally come to terms with the full
meaning of Abdiel’s words:
But other pow’rs as great
Fell not but stand unshaken from within
Or from without to all temptations armed.
Hadst thou the same free will and pow’r to stand?
Thou hadst….
Nay cursed be thou since against His thy will
Chose freely what it now so justly rues. (4.63-72; emphasis added)
Satan’s soliloquy is one of the most poignant moments in the epic. It is both
heartbreaking and enlightening since, for the first time, we hear the truth from Satan’s
own mouth. He finally admits that, unlike what he has said to his troops before, God is
not a tyrant. In fact, Satan claims that God deserved better from him and that being in His
service was not hard. He now finds himself in a miserable condition and it is all his own
doing. He chose to fall.11
After Raphael relates the story of the war in heaven and the fall of the disobedient
angels, Adam asks him to stay a while longer so that Adam may relate his own story.12

Paul Stevens shows that the rebel angels suffer a fate similar to the bishops in Milton’s 1642
pamphlet An Apology. “Intolerance and the Virtues of Sacred Vehemence,” in Milton and Toleration, ed.
Sharon Achinstein and Elizabeth Sauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 245. Elsewhere, Stevens
explores neo-Roman justice and the topic of eternal gratitude, which Satan sees as unjust dependence on his
Creator. This “endless gratitude” leads him to despair—since he refuses to accept that “a grateful mind / By
owing owes not, but still pays, at once / Indebted and discharged” (PL, 4.55-57)—and creates problems for
Milton’s biblical understanding of grace. “Obnoxious Satan: Milton, Neo-Roman Justice, and the Burden
of Grace,” in Taking Exception to the Law: Materializing Injustice in Early Modern English Literature, ed.
Donald Beecher, et. al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 281-302, especially 288-94.
11

12

Raphael is curious to hear the story because he did not witness the creation. He, along with a
legion, had been sent to guard the gates of hell so that no enemy or spy came through to disrupt God’s
work, “Lest He incensed at such eruption bold / Destruction with Creation might have mixed.” As Raphael
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Adam begins by telling of his amazement at waking up and seeing the world around him.
He immediately recognizes that he must have been created “by some great Maker, then, /
in Goodness and in pow’r preeminent” (8.278-79), and he wishes to know and worship
his creator.13 God comes to him in a dream and, as Adam falls to his feet in adoration,
God tells him that He is the creator whom Adam seeks. He gives Adam Paradise and
reveals:
This Paradise I give thee, count it thine
To Till and keep, and of the Fruit to eate:
Of every tree that in the garden grows
Eat freely with glad heart: fear here no dearth!
But of the tree whose operation brings
Knowledge of good and ill (which I have set
The pledge of thy obedience and thy faith
Amid the garden by the Tree of Life)
Remember what I warn thee: shun to taste
And shun the bitter consequence! For know,
The day thou eat’st thereof, my sole command
Transgressed, inevitably thou shalt die,
From that day mortal and this happy state
Shalt lose, expelled from hence into a world
continues, we learn that God does not in fact need the angels’ help to complete his work. Instead, the
excursion serves to test their “prompt obedience” (PL, 5.234-40).
Contrast with Satan who claims to be “self-begot, self-raised / By our own quick’ning power”
(PL, 5.860-61). Abdiel had earlier argued the angels had been created by the Son (5.833-45), and in his
soliloquy on Mount Niphates, Satan finally admits to having been created (4.43-45).
13
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Of woe and sorrow.” (8.319-33; emphasis added)
These words are the basis of the contract between Adam and God. Although the
contractual language is not as clearly identified here as it is in the exchange between God
and the Son in Book 3, it nevertheless creates an obligation between God and Adam. The
key to understanding Adam’s debt here lies in the word “pledge.” One of its definitions in
the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) is, “Something deposited as security for the
fulfilment of a contract, the payment of a debt, or as a guarantee of good faith, etc., and
liable to forfeiture in case of failure.”14 With the word “pledge,” God is essentially
informing Adam that the two of them are now contractually obligated.
We tend to think of this biblical episode as a commandment, and it may be
tempting to disregard it as a contract since one party essentially dictates the terms to the
other party. However, Milton is following contract law conventions that had been in
place long before he wrote his epic. Legal contracts have their origin in economics, and
for medieval common lawyers, “the word ‘contract’ possessed a more confined meaning
for them that it now does,” informs John H. Baker. He further explains that a contract
“denoted a transaction, such as a sale or loan, which transferred property or generated a
debt; it did not mean a mere consensual agreement, an exchange of promises.”15
However, even if we consider the bargain between God and Adam as a covenant instead
of a contract, Adam’s obedience is a necessary aspect of the promise because of the
doctrine of consideration.

14
OED Online, “pledge, (n.)” accessed March 23, 2018,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/145633?rskey=WfWcSI&result=1. Incidentally, the OED lists Milton’s
lines quoted above as one of the examples for this particular usage of “pledge.”
15

Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 317.
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According to the doctrine of consideration a promise is only binding if something
is promised or given in exchange; Baker explains that “Consideration had to be of some
value, though the court would not investigate adequacy: ‘a penny or a jug of beer is as
much obliging in a promise as £100’.”16 In Wayward Contracts, Victoria Kahn discusses
the contracting subject during the seventeenth century and says that the traditional
narrative sees two distinct forms, the religious notion of covenant and the secular notion
of contract: “In the first case, contracts were governed by the divine and natural law that
promises must be kept; in the second case, contracts were to be kept if there had been
some exchange of ‘consideration’ or benefit.” Milton, she says, would have been
representative of the first and Hobbes of second form; however, this is an
oversimplification of their positions because, “In the mid-seventeenth century,” she
argues, “Milton and Hobbes looked more alike than they do now… Like Hobbes, Milton
was interested in presenting his readers with a dramatically compelling fiction of the state
of nature; a vivid narrative of the psychology of obligation; and a forceful illustration of
the power of language to bring obligations into existence ex nihilo.”17 It is this language
of obligation we see reflected in Paradise Lost as well as a contract with a promise that
must be kept and an exchange of consideration.
When God gives Adam Paradise, he has essentially transferred property, which
generates a debt; the payment God asks in return is Adam’s obedience. God has given

16

Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 340.

17
Kahn, Wayward Contracts, 7. It can also be argued that Adam’s “promise to pay” God with
obedience is implied. According to the theory of implied contracts, if debt can be proved, the words “I
promise to pay” need not be said in order for a contract to exist. See Baker, An Introduction to English
Legal History, 357-59, 367-75; and David Harris Sacks, “The Promise and the Contract in Early Modern
England: Slade’s Case in Perspective,” in Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe, ed. Victoria Ann
Kahn and Lorna Hutson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 28-53.

140

Adam life and Paradise, and he may continue to enjoy both so long as he obeys the one
command not to eat the forbidden fruit. The guarantee of good faith here is Adam’s
immortality, which he will lose if he eats the fruit. What is most important in the contract
between them is that Adam is free to choose whether or not to keep it, something he
acknowledges in his tale to Raphael: “Sternly He pronounced / The rigid interdiction
which resounds / Yet dreadful in mine ear, though in my choice / Not to incur” (PL,
8.332-36; emphasis added). It is this freedom to choose that is so important to Milton and
that we see him discuss in his prose works. For Milton, consent cannot exist without the
right of dissent. Although Adam commits a grave error when he eats the forbidden fruit,
it is his choice to do so. He is always free.
In The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth, Milton claims
that it was the king who first broke the “covnant” with the people and a return to the
monarchy would be a return to “bondage” and the “thraldom of Kingship” (CPW, 7.40911, 422). Milton placed great importance on liberty, and one of the things that must exist
for liberty to exist is that the people must be ruled by laws instead of being ruled by a
person (for example, a monarch and his extralegal prerogatives or desires). This is the
difference he sees in a monarchy versus a republic and why parliament, as a
representation of the people’s wishes, was important to him. Quentin Skinner explains:
The crucial constitutional implication is that you can never hope to live as a free
person under a monarchy. All kings enjoy discretionary and hence arbitrary
power; but to live under the arbitrary power of anyone else is to live in
dependence on their will, and thus in the condition of a slave. You cannot hope to
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live as a free person except in a self-governing republic in which you are ruled
solely by laws to which you have given your active consent.18
Knowing this allows us to better understand Milton’s contempt for Charles I, who had
attempted to exercise personal rule instead of a parliamentary government and created a
state of exception during his reign.19 It is a reflection of this idea of being ruled by laws
instead of “mere” men and not being subject to arbitrary powers that we see in Paradise
Lost when God refuses to change the laws in order to save Adam. However, before
discussing the relation between the legality of Paradise Lost and Milton’s political ideals
for England, I must address the fact that God’s sovereignty is divine and not human.

Milton’s Accommodation of Divine Sovereignty
Thanks to the discovery of Christian Doctrine, we are able to look to Milton’s
own words for his theory of divine accommodation. In the section entitled “Of God,”
Milton describes our limited ability to know and understand God: “We know God, in so
far as we are permitted to know him, from either his nature or his efficiency,” which he
further explains, “When we talk about knowing God, it must be understood in terms of
man’s limited powers of comprehension. God as he really is, is far beyond man’s

Quentin Skinner, “What does it mean to be a free person?” London Review of Books 30 no. 10,
(2008): 16-18. See also Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998) where he explores the neo-roman theory of civil liberty in the seventeenth century. In the
second chapter, he spends some time discussing the difference between a free and an enslaved state and
later describes how Milton and other authors used these ideas and saw their enslavement reflected in
Charles I’s rule.
18

19
A state of exception occurs when the law suspends itself. Agamben discusses the difficulty in
defining the state of exception and says it “constitutes a ‘point of imbalance between public law and
political fact’ (Saint Bonnet 2001, 28) that is situated—like civil war, insurrection and resistance—in an
‘ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the political’ (Fontana 1999,
16)... the state of exception appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal form” (1). He later states
that a dictatorship “is essentially a ‘state of exception’” (32). State of Exception.
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imagination, let alone his understanding… God has revealed only so much of himself as
our minds can conceive and the weakness of our nature can bear” (CPW, 6:133). As
Milton continues, he claims we should avoid anthropopathy (that is, attributing human
emotions to God), and should instead rely on God’s description of himself in scripture
(6:134). For example, he says, “If Jehovah repented that he had created man, Gen. vi. 6,
and repented because of their groanings, Judges ii. 18, let us believe that he did repent”
(6:134, emphasis in original). As a consequence of Milton’s words, we know we should
not attribute human qualities to God because He himself gives us enough information in
scripture. Yet, there is the problem of language. Although we cannot attribute human
qualities to the divine entity, we must use human language and knowledge to convey our
understanding of Him. Thus, the above passage “translated” for our understanding would
mean that God regretted the consequences of His decision because after men rebelled, He
could not care for them as He had before.
C. A. Patrides calls attention to the fact that Milton considers the problem of
language directly in Paradise Lost when Raphael has to relate the war in heaven to
Adam. Patrides explains that “since the ‘process of speech’ cannot be avoided, he
resolves to tell of things invisible to mortal sight in such a manner ‘as earthly notion can
receave’ [7.177-79]. His method was to adopt what has been happily described as an
‘extended metaphor,’ which begins with the explicit statement that:”20
what surmounts the reach
Of human sense I shall delineate so

C. A. Patrides, “Paradise Lost and the Theory of Accommodation,” Texas Studies in Literature
and Language 5, no. 1 (1963): 59.
20
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By lik’ning spiritual to corporeal forms
As may express them best. (PL, 5.571-74)
Raphael immediately informs Adam that understanding differs between them, and
because of it, Raphael must make use of earthly forms that are approximate in meaning to
the original materials or events in heaven. It is not possible for Raphael to give an “exact”
account because even language has to be “adjusted:”
For who though with the tongue
Of angels can relate or to what things
Liken on Earth conspicuous that may lift
Human imagination to such heighth
Of godlike pow’r! (6.297-301; emphasis added)
And as Raphael ends his tale, he once again calls our attention to the fact that some
adjustments were made in order for Adam to be able to understand what happened in
heaven:
Thus measuring things in Heav’n by things on Earth,
At thy request, and that thou may’st beware
By what is past to thee I have revealed
What might have else to human race been hid. (6.893-896)
According to Patrides, Raphael’s method would have been easily recognized by most
seventeenth-century readers “as an interesting application of the ‘theory of
accommodation.’”21 Thus, in Paradise Lost, not only do we have an accommodated
image of God in the Son, but language is also accommodated for our benefit.

21

Patrides, “Paradise Lost and the Theory of Accommodation,” 59.
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In response to critics of Milton’s God, Michael Lieb proposes that the theory of
accommodation Milton presents in Christian Doctrine also serves the purpose of
allowing Milton to portray God in its most dramatic form in Book 3 of Paradise Lost.22
First, Lieb presents Milton’s own assertions in The Reason of Church Government of his
inclination “to view the events in Scripture in dramatic terms.” Then, he remarks that
Milton “enthusiastically endorsed a reading of Scripture consistent with the practice of
conceiving the biblical text as the highest form of drama, one comparable even to the
‘Dramatick constitutions’ of Sophocles and Euripides.”23 Viewing the dialogue between
God and the Son as characters in a drama allows us to fully appreciate the greatness of
their debate in Book 3, and it allows us to accept what Milton dares to show us: an
“incensed” God and a challenging Son. The Son’s understanding is limited; he is created
by God, but, unlike God, he is not omniscient. Just as we can only understand God’s
omniscient powers in our own terms, so does the Son. As Catherine Gimelli Martin
explains, this is the problem with an all-knowing but unknowable being:
On the one hand, his [Milton’s] epic God is not only deductively defensible but
even logically defends himself. Yet, on the other hand his accommodated truths
can be fully “known” only in the paradoxically dark light of his historical design.
His theological treatise presents a similar dichotomy, for while it spends
considerable effort in logically demonstrating the unitary (as opposed to the more

For example, William Empson famously connects Milton’s God to Cromwell calling him a
dictator and then compares Him to Stalin saying they have “the same thorough unscrupulousness.” Milton's
God (London: Chatto & Windus, 1965), 144-46. For a counterargument to Empson’s charges see: Dennis
Richard Danielson, Milton's Good God: A Study in Literary Theodicy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982).
22

Michael Lieb, “Milton's ‘Dramatick Constitution’: The Celestial Dialogue in Paradise Lost,
Book III,” Milton Studies 23 (1988): 219.
23
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mysterious threefold) nature of God, it concludes that his “wonderful” nature is
also ultimately “incomprehensible” (CD 14:43, 61)—as do the angelic hymns of
his epic.24
As Martin continues, we find that there is hope after all as she calls our attention to
Milton’s statements in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce: Restor’d to the Good of
Both Sexes: “The hidden wayes of his providence we adore & search not; but the law is
his reveled will, his complete, his evident, and certain will; herein he appears to us as it
were in human shape, enters into cov’nant with us, swears to keep it, binds himself like a
just lawgiver to his own prescriptions, gives himself to be understood by men, judges and
is judg’d, measures and is commensurat to right reason” (CPW, 2:292). Accordingly, the
law is our way to know God and His will, and Milton uses monarchical language to
portray God’s divine sovereignty because it is the only time when monarchy is justified.
God’s monarchy is the only legitimate one because, as Abdiel explains to Satan, He is
above His creatures; there is no equality in this case (5.831-36). Later, God himself
proclaims the Son as the only divinely anointed monarch: “worthiest to be Heir / Of all
things, to be Heir and to be King / By Sacred Unction, thy deserved right” (6.707-09).
Understanding divine sovereignty is beyond our capacity, but Milton uses
accommodation and legal language in order that we may be able to understand “ideal”

24
Catherine Gimelli Martin, The Ruins of Allegory: Paradise Lost and the Metamorphosis of Epic
Convention (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 324-325. The Son is not fully divine; he was begotten
and is of God’s substance but not His essence; see God’s conversation with Adam when He explains that
He is “alone /From all Eternitie, for none I know / Second to mee or like, equal much less” (PL, 8.405-07);
see also Catherine Gimelli Martin, Milton among the Puritans: The Case for Historical Revisionism
(Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2010), 97 note 88.
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justice. God’s monarchy is the only one we should not fear because His will is always
good.25

The Contractual Language of Book 3: The Broken Pledge and the
Doom of Man
Book 3 begins with Milton’s prayer to the light, which he says is co-eternal with
God. In his prayer, Milton informs us of his flight through Hell and Chaos, both of which
are in stark contrast to the light that he now hails. His flight serves to associate Milton
with Dante, who also claimed to have journeyed through Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven in
his epic, La Divina Commedia. Even though Dante was a monarchist, Milton greatly
admired him, especially Dante’s ideas about justice and the separation of church and
state.26 It is not surprising then, to find echoes of Dante’s work in Paradise Lost. This is
especially true of Book 3, which directly treats God’s justice and is greatly influenced by
Dante’s De Monarchia as well as Paradiso’s own section on justice.
The idea of sovereign justice is extremely important to Dante. He addresses it in
De Monarchia and in La Divina Commedia when he argues that Christ being condemned
to death by the Roman Empire is an important part of our salvation. He explores the
question of God’s justice and our salvation in Cantos 4 through 7 of the Paradiso, with
the Emperor Justinian serving as his main “teacher” in this section. Justinian’s Corpus
25

For a counter view of the effectiveness of divine accommodation see Paul Cefalu,
“Incarnational Apophatic: Rethinking Divine Accommodation in John Milton’s Paradise Lost,” Studies in
Philology 113 no. 1 (Winter 2016): 198-228.
26
Milton argues against the church’s interference in secular matters in his prose writings and also,
briefly, in Paradise Lost (12.508-51). For a detailed account of Dante’s influence on Milton see Catherine
Gimelli Martin, Milton's Italy: Anglo-Italian Literature, Travel, and Connections in Seventeenth-Century
England (Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2016), especially 206-14. Recently, Giorgio Agamben has made a
similar argument regarding the church, saying it has lost its vocation through its meddling in “worldly”
affairs. The Church and the Kingdom, trans. Leland de la Durantaye (New York: Seagull Books, 2012).
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Iuris Civillis, the great codification of the Roman laws, is introduced in terms of a
religious mission. It seems Dante believes God had willed the codification of the Roman
law, and by making Justinian the main character of Paradiso 4, we immediately
understand the theme of law in the canto. Furthermore, Dante’s investigation of God’s
justice appears in conjunction with the idea of free will and the sanctity of the oath.
In Paradiso 5, Beatrice answers Dante’s question of whether an unfulfilled vow can be
“paid” by some other service. She tells the pilgrim:
The greatest gift that ever in his bountifulness
God gave in creating, the most conformed
to his goodness, the one that is most prized,
was the freedom of the will, with which the
creatures with intelligence, all of them and only
they, were and are endowed.
Now you will see, if you argue from this premise,
the high worth a vow has, if it is such that
God consents when you consent,
for, when such a pact is made between God
and man, this treasure is sacrificed, precious as
it is, and this is done by his own act.27
With these words, Beatrice tells the pilgrim that free will and the oath are mutually
dependent in our relationship with God. It is only because He has endowed us with free

27

Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: Volume 3: Paradiso, trans. and ed.
Robert M. Durling and Ronald L. Martinez, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5.19-30;
emphasis added. Citations from Paradiso are from this edition; hereafter cited parenthetically as Par.
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will that we are able to swear to a pact with Him. In addition, because He is divine that
pact becomes a sacrament, which is part of the reason Dante condemns the Church’s
practice of dispensation. We cannot simply be “excused” from our vows; a sacrifice must
be made.28
Later in Canto 7, Beatrice senses that Dante is struggling with the idea of God’s
justice: “According to my infallible awareness, how a / just vengeance could be justly
punished is puzzling you” (Par, 7.19–21). In response to his questioning, she informs
Dante that Adam (“the man who was not born”) damned the entire human race when he
fell, and it was only when Christ (“the Word of God”) died for our sins that justice was
served. She further stresses that it was beyond man’s capabilities to be able to atone for
his own sins, which is the reason it was necessary for Christ to be sacrificed. It was
simply beyond his power as a human being seeing as the offended party was divine. Still,
God could not simply forgive man for his sins, because, according to Beatrice, He would
be going against justice:
For every other means fell short of justice,
except the way whereby the Son of God
humbled Himself when He became incarnate (Par, 7.116–18).

28
Durling and Martinez note that “Religious vows (chastity and obedience, and sometimes
poverty) involve a voluntary sacrifice that renders back to God his greatest gift to man, that of free will”
(113). This particular section on free will is of such great importance for Dante that it is the only passage
from the Commedia that he cites in De Monarchia (1.12.6), see Monarchy, 20. On the sanctity of the oath
see Agamben, The Sacrament of Language.
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In Dante’s work, the need for the incarnation is of vital importance to our relationship
with God. By submitting himself to the degradation of the human experience, He showed
us His infinite love.29
Milton follows a similar outline when addressing the question of God’s justice in
his own epic. He first reiterates the importance of free will and then moves on to discuss
man’s broken pledge, justice, and mercy. Milton differs from Dante, however, in that for
him the Son is not fully divine. Although the Son’s death does serve to show his infinite
love, the purpose of his death is not simply to fulfill the need for “divine incarnation” that
Dante posits. Instead, the Son’s death comes as payment when he renegotiates the
contract God had originally made with Adam.
As Milton finishes his prayer to the light he asks it to “Purge and disperse” the
mist so that he may “see and tell / Of things invisible to mortal sight” (PL, 3.53-55). His
prayer is answered with the image of God enthroned, who, with his sight, can see past,
present, and future all at once. As He beholds His creation, He sees Satan flying towards
earth and declares man’s fall to the Son:
For Man will hearken to his [Satan’s] glozing lies
And easily transgress the sole command,
Sole pledge of his obedience. So will fall
He and his faithless progeny. Whose fault?
Whose but his own? Ingrate! He had of Me
29
Beatrice tells the pilgrim that “just vengeance was later avenged by a just court” (Par. 7:50–51).
In addition to fostering the peace that would welcome the birth of Christ, the Roman Empire was the lawful
civil body during Christ’s death, which gave it standing to pass judgment on Christ. To Dante, civil laws
have a direct link to divine law; thus, the emperor is the only human who can lawfully exercise God’s
vengeance on earth, and it is only because of the legality of the monarch that we are saved through Christ’s
death. See Dante, Monarchy, Book II, especially 58-62.
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All he could have. I made him just and right,
Sufficient to have stood though free to fall. (3.93-99)
This is the first time in the poem that we hear God speak, and we are immediately struck
by His language. It is hard not to notice that He is “incensed” as he accuses man of
something that has not yet happened, but what is important here is the accusation God
levels against man. He will break the pledge of obedience and it will be entirely his fault
because of his freedom of will. Here, God emphasizes the role Adam plays as regards
justice in the world, which stands only as long as Adam stands. When He says He made
Adam “just and right,” He means that Adam was made perfect since he was created in
God’s own image (Adam was both mentally and physically erect, and not bent or
crooked), and He also means that Adam was made “consonant with justice” (OED).30 In
addition, He made Adam “sufficient,” which refers to the idea that Adam was created
with sufficient grace to resist evil. Had he turned to God instead of choosing to fall,
Adam might have understood how amends might still have been made for Eve’s sin,
which as yet is not the sin of the entire human race. God granted man free will because
that was the only way He would be able to test man’s obedience. Without free will,
Adam’s covenant with God would have been meaningless and would not be binding as a
sacrament or as a legal contract because that requires a free exercise of the will from both
parties. The contract formed between God and Adam is entered into willingly and
includes all aspects of a debt contract: the quid (eternal life), the quo (eternal obedience),
30
Most editions of Paradise Lost comment on God’s use of verb tenses as arbitrary because He
sees all events at once. Also, contrast God’s description of Adam here with what he says of Satan just a few
lines prior, “so bent he seems / On desperate revenge” (84-85). In this case, “bent” means intent on revenge
but also crooked or deformed, as Satan’s outward appearance is changing to correspond to his inner being.
OED Online, “right, (n.)” accessed March 23, 2018,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/165853?rskey=ACuPCI&result=1.
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and the sanction in case of breach of contract (death). Once the son intervenes in our
favor, the quid pro quo (this for that) changes, but the idea of the debt contract remains.
As God continues speaking about the importance of free will, he makes three very
important points. The first is when He informs us that “reason also is choice” (3.108),
which echoes Areopagitica, where Milton makes the argument that “when God gave him
[Adam] reason, he gave him freedom to choose, for reason is but choosing; he had bin
else a meer artificiall Adam, such as Adam as he is in the motions” (CPW, 2:527;
emphasis in original).31 This point leads us to the second one, which is that His
foreknowledge does not influence Man’s fault. Humans are “authors to themselves,” that
is, they are responsible for their own lives and choices; they have authority to make their
own decisions. The third important point God makes is that Man will find justice and
mercy, which is denied to Satan and the rebel angels. He declares:
I formed them free and free they must remain
Till they enthrall themselves. I else must change
Their nature, and revoke the high decree
Unchangeable, eternal, which ordained
Their freedom: they themselves ordained their Fall.
The first sort by their own suggestion fell,
Self-tempted, self-depraved. Man falls deceived
By th’ other first: Man therefore shall find grace,

31
Prior to making this assertion in Areopagitica, we see Milton argue in favor of reading “evill”
books as a way to strengthen our resolve because “that which purifies us is triall, and triall is by what is
contrary” (CPW, 2.515); this is only necessary because of Adam’s fall. In Areopagitica, Milton clearly
states the problem: God had not forbidden knowledge; He had forbidden Adam and Eve from eating of the
fruit that would give them knowledge of “good by evill”.
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The other none. In mercy and justice both,
Through Heav’n and Earth, so shall my glorie excel,
But mercy first and last shall brightest shine. (124-134)
Employing seventeenth century legal custom, Alison Chapman explains why Satan and
the rebel angels cannot be pardoned. One important aspect of her argument is that, for a
special pardon, the Son would have to intercede on behalf of the rebel angels, which does
not occur. Not only that, but Satan would no doubt refuse the Son’s intercession.32 On the
other hand, the Son does intercede on behalf of the human couple, who immediately
accept with overwhelming gratitude. This shows that they never truly stopped loving God
but merely began loving themselves and their desires more.
Unlike other rulers, God can see the future and the negative (and positive—the
Son “earning” his title) consequences of His decisions. Still, He refuses to create a state
of exception. He refuses to “revoke the high decree” that gives Man free will. There is a
crisis brewing in Eden, an actual state of emergency, with Satan threatening to pervert
Man by “some false guile,” and yet, God refuses to suspend the law that He created.
God’s actions place Him in direct contrast with Charles I, who attempted to institute a
state of emergency during his rule and exercised authority beyond the law. To better
understand Milton’s ideas about justice, then, it is helpful to discuss the royal prerogative
and the concepts of state of emergency and state of exception.
According to Carl Schmitt, the “sovereign is he who decides on the exception,”
which he says is a borderline concept, so “This definition of sovereignty must therefore

On the seventeenth century aspect of the law, see Alison A. Chapman, “Satan’s Pardon: The
Forms of Judicial Mercy in Paradise Lost,” Milton Studies 55, no. 1 (2014): 117-206, especially 192-95.
32
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be associated with a borderline case and not with routine.” He further affirms that one
precondition of the state of exception is an unlimited jurisdiction and clarifies that the
sovereign is the one who “decides whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what
must be done to eliminate it. Although he stands outside the normally valid legal system,
he nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who must decide whether the constitution needs
to be suspended in its entirety.”33 Milton would have had no problem understanding these
concepts as Schmitt defines them. It would have resonated with him as Charles I’s ruling
style and indiscriminate use of the king’s prerogative, especially as Charles concocted a
state of emergency in order to exercise extrajudicial power. Two very important cases to
help us understand Charles I’s use of royal prerogative are the Five Knights Case of 1627
and the Ship-money Case of 1637-38.
In the first case, Charles instituted forced loans to finance his wars against France
and Spain. In the autumn of 1627, five members of parliament were imprisoned for
refusing to pay the forced loans to the Crown. They sought release through a writ of
habeas corpus, which was denied by the King’s Bench.34 The government claimed their
detention “was ‘by his majesty’s special commandment’ a form of words which,”
according to Thomas Poole, “was designed to shift the attention of a court away from the
forced loan and on to the stronger ground of the king’s prerogative.” No charges were
filed against the defendants, and so they were refused bail with the judges claiming that

33

Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, 5-7.

34
The writ of habeas corpus literally means “have the body.” It was originally intended to secure
a person in custody, but over time it was used to challenge arbitrary imprisonment by requiring anyone
“believed to be keeping a subject in improper confinement, to produce the body and the ‘cause’ for
scrutiny.” Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 146-47, 472-74.
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“the lack of specification amounted to a matter of state.”35 The knights were later
released, but the episode led to debates in Parliament over discretionary imprisonment
and the prerogative, eventually giving rise to The Petition of Rights.36
In the Ship-money Case, Charles I attempted to levy ship-money taxes without
parliamentary consent during peacetime and to extend them to inland counties. When the
case went to trial, Victoria Kahn informs us, “Charles’s lawyers invoked reason of state,
citing the ‘imminent danger’ of war, which demanded that new ships be built to protect
England’s coastline,” that is, he attempted to create a state of emergency in the country.
The problem caused by these two cases, Kahn succinctly explains, is that “both involved
the relation of the royal prerogative to the common law and to the rights and fundamental
liberties of the subject, including the right to property. Both thus addressed the
relationship between the king’s promises and the implicit contract of Magna Carta.”37
Royal prerogative was closely associated with the courts of Chancery and Star Chamber,
which had early on been praised for their beneficent decisions, but had, during the
Stuarts’s reign, become corrupt.38
35

Thomas Poole, Reason of State: Law, Prerogative and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2016), 28-29.
36
The grievances addressed by the Petition were discretionary imprisonment, non-parliamentary
taxation, compulsory billeting, and the use of martial law. John A. Guy, “The Origins of the Petition of
Right Reconsidered,” The Historical Journal 25, no. 2 (1982): 289-312. See also Kahn, Wayward
Contracts, 86-90.

Kahn, Wayward Contracts, 86-90; see “Chapter 4: Imagination” for a detailed explanation of
the two cases and their repercussions. See also Conrad Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), “Chapter 6: The Rule of Law: Whose Slogan?,” especially 153-60; and
Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 167, 213, 472-474.
37

38
Star Chamber and Chancery were conciliar courts, and although Star Chamber “did not become
a court of conscience in the same way as the Chancery,” Baker says that “it was an extraordinary or
supplementary court of law, particularly for cases with a criminal element” (118). Baker claims “The
association of the Star Chamber with unpopular prosecutions and vindictive punishments in the 1630s was
its undoing” (119), which led the Long Parliament to abolish the court as one of its first acts (213). The
problem of royal prerogative during Stuart rule ran deep within the judicial system. After dismissing
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Milton would agree with Kahn’s assessment as he accuses the king of breaking
the coronation oath by taking arms against his people in The Tenure (CPW, 3:213-16),
Eikonoklastes (3:589-97), and The Readie and Easie Way (7:409-11). In Eikonoklastes,
he describes the King’s indiscriminate use of prerogative powers to try and take away the
freedom the English people already enjoy and to veto new laws passed by the Commons
(3:413-17). Milton says that in breaking the oath, the contract between himself and his
people was broken: “his authority was by the People first giv’n him conditionally, in Law
and under Law, and under Oath also for the Kingdom’s good, and not otherwise: the
Oathes then were interchang’d, and stood and fell together” (3.592-93). He explicitly
places the king under the law, invoking “the Code of Justinian” in The Tenure to argue
that “a prince is bound to the Laws; that on the authority of the Law, the authority of the
Prince depends” (CPW, 3:206), and he says that the law may judge the king (something
Charles I argued against during his trial).39 Furthermore, Milton argues that “the power of
Kings and Magistrates is nothing else, but what is only derivative, transferr'd and
committed to them in trust from the People, to the Common good of them all, in whom
the power yet remaines fundamentally, and cannot be tak'n from them, without a
violation of thir natural birthright” (3:202). More importantly, the contract once entered is
not permanent and can be renegotiated as often as necessary according to the people’s

Edward Coke for not submitting to the Crown’s desires, James I and then Charles I “removed several more
judges who refused to behave as the government wished,” and “within a few decades the awesome
judiciary which the people had revered at the beginning of the century came to be regarded, rightly or
wrongly, as an instrument of prerogative rule,” laments Baker (167). An Introduction to English Legal
History. This change in attitude towards “extraordinary” justice may help explain why equity, which was
closely identified with Chancery, is a crucial concept for Spenser’s idea of the good exercise of justice in
Book V of The Faerie Queene but does not feature in Milton’s poem in the same way.
Charles is following his father’s example in his opinion since James had written about this issue before
becoming King of England (see notes 27, 30, and 42 in chapter 3 of this dissertation).
39
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will because the kings and magistrates only hold authority in order to serve the good of
the people.40
If God were to suspend “the high decree” that gives Man freedom, He would be
acting like Charles I and creating a state of exception. Milton’s belief in the supremacy of
justice and the law is why he ensures his God is law-abiding. To Milton, it appears that
even a divine sovereign must obey the laws in order to be considered just. God’s
omniscience and omnipotence incite us to want him to interfere, to change the laws, and
the “fate” of Man; doing this, however, would incite Him to act against his own law,
which would be contrary to justice.41 As long as Man keeps his pledge of obedience, he is
within God’s justice and under God’s law, but as Man breaks his pledge, God places him
in the threshold; he is included while also being excluded, inside and outside of God’s
law.
As the Son challenges God on His justice and mercy for Man, God declares that
Man will be saved “Not of will in him, but grace in me” (PL, 3.174). Yet, as he continues
to explain how Man will achieve mercy and salvation, he breaks his speech of grace and
turns to declare the doom of Man:

40

Milton quotes from another oath-breaking sovereign in The Tenure. He uses the language of
equivocation from Shakespeare’s Macbeth to describe the behavior of the Presbyterians, linking them to the
witches (5.10.19-22), saying that:
after they have juggl'd and palter'd with the world, bandied and born armes against thir
King, devested him, disannointed him, nay curs'd him all over in thir Pulpits and thir Pamphlets, to
the ingaging of sincere and real men, beyond what is possible or honest to retreat from, not only
turne revolters from those principles, which only could at first move them, but lay the staine of
disloyaltie, and worse, on those proceedings, which are the necessary consequences of thir own
former actions. (CPW, 3:191)
See Dzelzainis, “Milton, Macbeth, and Buchanan.”
Just as Man is free to act or not, so is God. See Stephen Fallon, “‘To Act or Not’: Milton’s
Conception of Divine Freedom,” Journal of the History of Ideas 49, no. 3 (Jul.-Sept. 1988): 425-49.
41
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But yet all is not done; Man disobeying
Disloyal breaks his fealty, and sins
Against the high supremacy of Heav’n,
Affecting godhead, and so, losing all,
To expiate his treason hath naught left,
But to destruction sacred and devote
He with his whole posterity must die. (3.203-09; emphasis added)42
As sacred, Man is now blessed and cursed. He has become what Giorgio Agamben
describes as the homo sacer, “An obscure figure of archaic Roman law, in which human
life is included in the juridical order [ordinamento] solely in the form of its exclusion
(that is, of its capacity to be killed).”43 Man is still included in the juridical order because
of the punishment of corporal death, but he is also excluded now because he has lost his
immortal life. He is on the threshold because he has left the protection of God and His
laws. God charges Man with treason (line 207), so it is only fitting that his lands (Eden)
be confiscated; thus, Man is banned and in a state of exile—of not belonging—and has
entered a zone of indistinction, a threshold of exclusion and inclusion.44 Only the

42
Teskey annotates line 208 as follows: “sacred: set apart and formally doomed. (One of the Latin
senses of sacer.) devote: cursed formally and outlawed” (61). The Kastan edition annotates the same line as
“sacred and devote: set apart and condemned; both adjectives keep their Latin meanings of ‘dedicated to a
deity’ for some holy purpose (here, sacrifice)” (87). Adam also uses the word “sacred” in a similar way
when he refers to the fruit before he chooses to fall with Eve: “to eye /That sacred fruit, sacred to
abstinence, / Much more to taste it under ban to touch” (PL, 9.922-24).
43

Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8. For other uses of the homo sacer concept in this dissertation, see note
4 in chapter 2 and notes 23 and 43 in chapter 3.
44
Agamben clarifies “Sovereignty is the idea of an undecidable nexus between violence and right,
between living and language—a nexus that necessarily takes the paradoxical form of a decision regarding
the state of exception (Schmitt) or ban (Nancy) in which the law (language) relates to the living by
withdrawing from it, by a-bandoning it to its own violence and its own irrelatedness.” Means without End:
Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
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sovereign, God, has the power to “suspend” Man’s sentence, but God refuses to simply
suspend the law and has bound Himself to it.
Binding Himself to the laws, however, does not prevent God from interpreting the
law to provide mercy. Better than any other sovereign, God understands the need for
mercy when exercising justice, and mercy is one of the prerogative rights held by the
sovereign under English law. Historically, it was an essential part of justice used to
mitigate harsh sentences imposed by the common law courts, especially those related to
capital offences. Even after the rise of the courts of equity, the sovereign was still entitled
to exercise the prerogative of mercy. Baker writes that James Morice, a member of
Parliament during Elizabeth’s reign, “held the prerogative of mercy to be so
unrestrainable that, even if Parliament forbade all pardons, the king could still grant them
non obstante the statute.”45 We know that God is a just sovereign, so we expect him to
grant mercy to ameliorate the harsh punishment required by the law, which He does, but
not by simply pardoning the couple.
He provides mercy through the Son, God’s accommodated reflection, so that we
can understand Him on our terms. Even though mercy is a prerogative right of the
sovereign, closely examining God’s decision to grant us mercy, we see that He does so
lawfully, and the law is followed through to the end. By once again claiming the law may

Press: 2000), 11,2-112,3; emphasis in original. See also “Chapter 6: The Ban and the Wolf” of Homo
Sacer. For punishments against treason, see Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 526-529.
45
John Baker, The Reinvention of Magna Carta 1216-1616 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2017), 188 note 254. See also Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 515-17. Regarding a
recent case, Thomas Poole points out the Court’s decision that the prerogative of mercy should now be seen
“not as an 'arbitrary monarchical right of grace and favour' but, rather, as a 'constitutional safeguard against
mistakes'.” “Judicial Review at the Margins: Law, Power, and Prerogative,” 103.
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not be changed, God first allows the Son to intercede on behalf of the human couple and
then to renegotiate the contract that originally had been made with Man. God declares:
Die he or Justice must, unless for him
Some other able and as willing pay
The rigid satisfaction, death for death.
Say Heav’nly Pow’rs, where shall we find such love?
Which of ye will be mortal to redeem
Man’s mortal crime and, just, th’ unjust to save?
Dwells in all Heaven charity so dear? (3.210-16)
He is not offering to lift the punishment. Instead, He is offering mercy for Man with the
condition that someone else pay the price. That is to say, someone else must satisfy/atone
for Man’s treason. His offer is made in economic/legal terms: “dear” with the meaning of
expensive here reflects the words pay, satisfaction, and redeem. God proposes that
someone become Man’s surety.46 As the Son accepts his place as Man’s surety, it is
important to remember that Man has not yet broken the pledge. The Son decides to
renegotiate the contract because he knows Man must find grace before he needs it

Two of the definitions of surety in the OED are important here, the first is 1a: “A pledge, bond,
or security given as a guarantee of good conduct, the fulfilment of certain duties, etc. Also: money, etc.,
deposited or pledged by or on behalf of a person, and liable to be forfeited in the event of failure to abide
by an agreement or fulfil certain conditions;” the second is 2b: “Denoting Christ, esp. with reference to his
undertaking to take upon himself the sins of mankind.” OED Online, “surety, (n.),” accessed March 23,
2018, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/194881?rskey=IYhhR1&result=1. Also, OED Online, “satisfaction,
(n.),” accessed March 23, 2018, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/171223?redirectedFrom=satisfaction. 1a:
“The payment in full of a debt, or the fulfilment of an obligation or claim; the atoning for (rarely of) an
injury, offence, or fault by reparation, compensation, or the endurance of punishment. Also quasi-concr.,
the pecuniary or other gift or penalty, or the act, by which a debt or obligation is discharged or an offence
atoned for.”
46
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because “He her aid / Can never seek once dead in sins and lost” (3.232-33), and as he
continues, he replies to God in similar terms:
Atonement for himself or offering meet,
Indebted and undone, hath none to bring.
Behold Me then, Me for him, life for life
I offer. On Me let thine anger fall.
Account me man. I for his sake will leave
Thy bosom and this glory next to Thee
Freely put off and for him lastly die
Well pleased. On Me let Death wreck all his rage!
Under his gloomy pow’r I shall not long
Lie vanquished. Thou hast giv’n me to possess
Life in myself for ever. By Thee I live
Though now to Death I yield and am his due:
All that of Me can die. Yet that debt paid
Thou wilt not leave me in the loathsom grave (3.234-47)
As the Son reframes the contract, our attention is again called to the numerous words
with an economic/legal bearing: atonement, indebted, account, freely (will), possess,
yield, due, debt, paid, subdue, and spoiled. Milton’s choice to use economic words to
describe the transaction between God and the Son is important because it was only
around the mid-seventeenth century that the word contract “began to acquire its looser
modern sense of ‘agreement’;” before then, “a legally binding agreement, was conveyed
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by the word ‘covenant.’”47 A breach of covenant was seen as a breach of promise, which
describes Adam’s sin well; he broke his pledge of obedience. On the other hand, there
was a great deal of uneasiness and uncertainty regarding “promises” during this time.
With the Reformation and the break with the Catholic Church, Protestants attacked
monastic vows, claiming these should be broken (the vow of chastity, for example), while
at the same time, attempting—unsuccessfully—to establish the sanctity of the oath.48
Because of this contentious history, it is important for Milton that the contractual
language in Paradise Lost be as legally binding as possible, especially since Milton had
already affirmed that the law is how God reveals Himself and His will to us.
Furthermore, Milton grew up with the language of legal economic transactions all around
him because of his father’s profession as a scrivener, which Barbara Lewalski states
“combined some functions of a notary, financial adviser, money-lender, and contract
lawyer.”49 Therefore, to ensure that his audience understood the passage as a debt
contract, it was important that he frame it in economic terms that specifically recall
legally binding contracts, which must involve some sort of exchange.50 As the Son offers
himself as sacrifice for man (“Me for him, life for life”), we now have a different quid
pro quo from the original contract. That is, by offering himself up for sacrifice (his death

47

Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 317-18.

See Gray, “Vows, Oaths, and the Propagation of a Subversive Discourse.” Milton might be
pointing to this problem in Paradise Lost through Satan, who uses the word “vow” when speaking of his
oath of obedience (PL, 4.97), see also 1.441 and 11.493.
48
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Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, The Life of John Milton: A Critical Biography (Malden: Blackwell,

2003), 2.
50
Note that the need for legal contracts arise from the growth of commerce, which helps explain
some of its shared terminology. See Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 317-78;
Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “Contract,” accessed September 24, 2018,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/contract-law.
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on the cross), the Son will free man from damnation (man’s eternal death). In God’s
acceptance of the new contractual terms, He reiterates the idea of “this for that:”
So Man, as is most just,
Shall satisfy for Man, be judged and die,
And dying rise and rising with Him raise
His brethren, ransomed with His own dear life. (3.294-97)
It is only because the Son agrees to give his life for us that we are redeemed; his mortal
life is the “ransom” for our immortal life. In sacrificing himself on behalf of Man, the
Son also shows that he has “earned” his title, he has “been found / By merit more than
birthright Son of God” (3.308-09), which was an important aspect of government for
Milton, that officials should be chosen based on merit, not custom.51
Here the most important thing to remember about God is that he is a law-abiding
sovereign. Questions have been raised about whether He is just, and I argue that,
according to Milton’s concept of justice, He is just because He obeys the laws.52 The
legitimacy of God’s justice is due, not only to His divinity, but also to His lawful exercise
of justice and mercy. He is a sovereign under the law, unlike the human “usurpers” we
meet later in the poem.

The Son’s sacrifice also fits Milton’s ideas of kingship since he is doing his duty by serving “his
people;” In his commonplace book, Milton quotes Berni’s revision of Boiardo’s Orlando Innamorato that
“A king, if he wishes to do his duty, is not truly a king, but a steward of the people” (CPW, 1:439).
51

52
God’s justice has long been debated, with some critics siding with William Blake that Satan is
the true hero of the poem. The most famous critique of God’s justice is Empson’s Milton's God with
Danielson’s Milton's Good God serving as a direct counterargument. See also Stanley E. Fish, Surprised by
Sin; Neil Forsyth, The Satanic Epic (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2003); and Michael
Bryson, The Tyranny of Heaven: Milton's Rejection of God as King (Newark: University of Delaware
Press, 2004).
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Judgment and Tyranny in the Final Books of Paradise Lost
The opening lines of Book 10 reiterate the conversation between God and the Son
in Book 3 using some of the same legal/economic terminology as before, with the
significant difference that the fall has actually happened. Once again, the Son is tasked
with being the redeemer of mankind, but this time he is asked to perform the duties of a
judge. In making the Son the judge, God emphasizes his intention to be merciful since he
says that the Son is everything to Man: his judge, friend, mediator, ransom, redeemer,
and destined man himself (PL, 10.55-62). Furthermore, because the Son is God’s
“Vicegerent” (10.56), it is not a contradiction for Milton that when the Son descends to
pass judgment on the now mortal couple, he assumes the title of God (10.101).53
In judging Man, the Son is also “judging” himself since he has become human
and taken the burden of saving our souls upon himself.54 He will temper justice with
mercy as God intended, but he knows that only his death will satisfy. As he speaks to the
couple, he is “gracious” and “without revile,” and after judging them, he takes away their
fear of death and clothes them. Later in Book 11, when the couple repents and prays for
forgiveness, the Son once again intercedes on their behalf and we see a repetition of the

The Son’s title as God on earth is not related to a trinitarian idea. For Milton, the Son earns the
title of God on earth because of his judicial function. He explains, “The name of God is given to judges
because, in a way, when they administer justice, they are God’s substitutes” (CPW, 6:237-38).
53

54

This intermingling of his nature with Man and not being able to separate one judgment from the
other appears to be what also happens between Satan and the serpent. As the Son speaks with God before
the judgement, he says, “the third, best absent, is condemned, / Convict by flight, and rebel to all law. /
Conviction to the serpent none belongs” (10.82-84). However, we later learn that the serpent is “unable to
transfer the guilt” and has been “vitiated in nature” (10.164-74). The judgment of the serpent and the other
animals has been a source of controversy for many critics and jurists. For example, Jillisa Brittan and
Richard A. Posner. “Classic Revisited: Penal Theory in Paradise Lost.” Michigan Law Review 105.6
(2007): 1049-66, and Sarah R. Morrison. “The Accommodating Serpent and God's Grace in Paradise
Lost.” Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 49, no. 1 (2009): 173-95.
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language of Book 3 yet again. The Son asks God to “bend Thine ear / To supplication”
and:
Let me
Interpret for him, me his advocate
And propitiation, all his works on me
Good or not good ingraft: my merit those
Shall perfect and for these my death shall pay. (11.32-36)
This particular plea is important not only because it reiterates the legal/economic
language of the renegotiated contract between God and the Son, but also because the Son
is acting in the capacity of a “patron or intercessor” as a “defender or advocate before a
court of justice” and follows the standards for special pardons during Milton’s time.55
However, the pardon still entails penalty, one of which is the forfeiture of lands (11.4557). God further explains that since Man has lost happiness, death now comes as a mercy,
and He bewails that:
like one of us Man is become
To know both good and evil …
Happier had it sufficed him to have known
Good by itself and evil not at all! (11.84-89)
So it is that the “the sinful pair” must leave Paradise and Michael is assigned the task of
driving them out.

55
Chapman, “Satan’s Pardon,” 194-95. Chapman points out that this intercession by the Son is
only possible because Adam and Eve first intercede on each other’s behalf. Their attitude contrasts with
Satan’s who never thinks of anyone else. Additionally, the Son says he will “interpret” man’s prayers,
which may imply that the accommodation of language must now run both ways.
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The end of Book 12 sees Adam and Eve leave Paradise hand in hand with the
knowledge that in the end, their seed will bruise the serpent’s head. Before this happens,
however, Michael presents Adam with the history of humankind; it is a gruesome history,
full of violence and destruction with only a few tales of good men woven in. In Book 11,
Adam hears of how the corruption of Man’s soul begins with the first murder onwards
and by the time of Noah, “Justice and temp’rance, truth and faith forgot” (11.807). After
the flood and the new covenant between God and Man, Adam learns of the tyranny of
Man.
In The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, Milton describes a tyrant as “he who
regarding neither Law nor the common good reignd onely for himself or his faction …
because his power is great, his will boundless and exhorbitant, the fulfilling whereof is
for the most part accompanied with innumerable wrongs and oppression of the people”
(CPW, 3:212). Milton chooses Nimrod, who tried to build a tower to reach the heavens,
to represent the tyranny of man after the flood in Paradise Lost. We are told that he was
“not content / With fair equality, fraternal state,” and to gain dominion over other men, he
claimed “second sovereignty” from heaven (PL, 12.25-35). Adam immediately
understands the problem; God has not given Man dominion over other humans. On
seeing this “crime,” he cries:
O execrable son so to aspire
Above his brethren, to himself assuming
Authority usurped from God not giv’n:
He gave us only over beast, fish, fowl
Dominion absolute. That right we hold
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By His donation. But man over men
He made not lord, such title to himself
Reserving, human left from human free. (12.64-71)
This section reflects Milton’s writings in The Tenure where Milton asks, “How then can
any King in Europe maintain and write himself accountable to none but God, when
Emperors in thir own imperial Statutes have writt’n and decreed themselves accountable
to Law. And indeed where such account is not fear’d, he that bids a man reigne over him
above Law, may bid as well a savage Beast” (CPW, 3:206). Adam’s words ring out
against tyranny because the rule of one man over others is illegitimate; it is a rule without
real authority since there is no true monarch save God. However, Michael informs Adam
that tyranny is a punishment man must now suffer “Since thy original lapse true liberty /
Is lost” (12.83-84).
As previously discussed, Milton’s concept of justice was greatly influenced by
Dante’s writings. In De Monarchia, Dante explains that in a postlapsarian society, laws
are necessary to guide humans in their affairs, and the civil order is necessary for
mankind to achieve justice. He claims that mankind’s purpose is to actualize our
intellectual potential, which is easier to do when there is universal peace. Like Dante,
Milton shows high regard for the rule of law throughout his prose works, but they differ
in their idea of how to achieve justice.
Dante argues that justice and universal peace can only be accomplished when
there is only one ruler. He concludes, “It follows from this that mankind is in its ideal
state when it is ruled by one person; and thus monarchy is necessary to the well-being of

167

the world.”56 For Milton, there is no such thing as “divine right of kings”; on the
contrary, God is not a pattern for absolutism, and he uses scripture as a source in his
argument against kingship (for example, in The Readie and Easie Way CPW, 7:422-24).
Milton’s writings reflect the idea that justice can only exist if the laws are obeyed and if
everyone is inside the law. In order for authority to be legitimate, it must be bound to the
law, which must be created by the people. “Justice” executed by a monarch is arbitrary.
True justice can only be executed by a free people ruled by laws, and Milton claims that a
people who cannot change their government is not free:
For as to this question in hand what the people by thir just right may doe in
change of goverment, or of governour, we see it cleerd sufficiently; besides other
ample autority eev'n from the mouths of Princes themselves. And surely they that
shall boast, as we doe, to be a free Nation, and not have in themselves the power
to remove, or to abolish any governour supreme, or subordinat, with the
goverment it self upon urgent causes, may please thir fancy with a ridiculous and
painted freedom, fit to coz'n babies; but are indeed under tyranny and servitude;
as wanting that power, which is the root and sourse of all liberty, to dispose and
oeconomize in the Land which God hath giv'n them, as Maisters of Family in thir
own house and free inheritance. Without which natural and essential power of a
free Nation, though bearing high thir heads, they can in due esteem be thought no

56
Dante, Monarchy, 25. The emperor holds the civil authority and he is chosen by God (in Dante’s
time, His choice was announced through German electors). Therefore, the emperor serves as the
embodiment of God’s justice on earth, which contrasts with Milton’s ideas about the judges serving the
same role.
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better then slaves and vassals born, in the tenure and occupation of another
inheriting Lord. (3:236-237)
Freedom does not exist in England’s monarchical regime because in a free
government those who rule can do so only through the people’s consent, and consent can
easily turn to dissent if those in government become wicked. The best form of
government is one that maintains the freedom of the people and obeys the laws.57 It is
also a representative government (it represents the desires/goodwill of the people) and is
chosen through elections. Milton’s free Commonwealth “aims most to make the people
flourishing, vertuous, noble and high spirited”—that is, it allows the people to actualize
their intellectual potential—and it allows people “to have the administration of justice
and all public ornaments in thir own election and within thir own bounds” (7:460-61).
Liberty is essential for the exercise of justice, which can only happen when everyone is
bound to the same laws, when there are no exceptions. Milton’s God shows us that it is
possible even for a divine, absolute ruler to be just.
In the end, Paradise Lost is as much a lesson in political thought as The Tenure of
Kings and Magistrates and The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free
Commonwealth. The only truly divine king is also a legally just one. He is the only one
who always knows when it is appropriate to use mercy instead of violence and viceversa, and he is also the only one who understands the social contract as something that
binds both sides, each with a particular duty to perform. It is this example of sovereignty
Milton wants us to emulate to produce justice. Nevertheless, by the end of Paradise Lost

57

In Paradise Lost, Michael explains to Adam that the chosen people are ruled by laws because
that is what God has ordained and the reason there are so many laws is because the “Law can discover
sin”;” it does not, however, remove the sin (12.214-90).
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we find ourselves in a state of oppression because the sovereigns in the world have no
boundaries; they are absolute and powerful and there is no power to rein them in. In order
to leave the sacred state Man found himself in after the fall, it is necessary to follow
God’s example and create a free society bound by laws. As long as the English people
insist on a form of government like the monarchy at that time, they are doomed, even
cursed by their own hand, as we see from the Nimrod passage in Paradise Lost. The only
way they can come close to God’s version of justice is if they move towards a republican
form of government or at least one where the monarch is bound to the laws. The latter
form of government was finally enacted in 1689 with the Declaration of Rights and the
creation of the constitutional monarchy, in which the king is subject to the law and owes
duties to his subjects. Sadly, Milton did not live to see it.
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Coda
This dissertation has relied on works by Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton to help
elucidate how ideas about the royal prerogative and its relation to justice were changing
during the early modern period. Furthermore, I have argued that their writings not only
reflect the shift in political and social attitudes but also attempt to affect policy to achieve
justice. In his study of the Elizabethan subject in The Faerie Queene, Louis Adrian
Montrose discusses Spenser’s subversion of authority saying that while he is a subject of
the Queen of England, the Queen is the most important reader as well as the “subject” of
his epic. Montrose writes that “In the process of representing the Queen within his
discourse, the subject is in some very limited but nevertheless quite real sense also
constituting the sovereignty in relation to which his own subjection and subjectivity are
constituted. Every representation of power is also an appropriation of power.”1 Spenser’s
and Milton’s epics were published over seventy years apart, and, along with
Shakespeare’s two different historical dramas, their poetry coincides with significant
events in the English monarchy. Additionally, their works provide vivid examples of the
type of representation that can be seen as an appropriation of power because of what
these authors are apparently trying to accomplish as well as because of their lasting
influence.
These writings appeared during a time when the world was undergoing a dramatic
transition in concepts of legitimacy and authority, and these changes greatly affected the

1

Montrose, “Elizabethan Subject and the Spenserian Text,” 331.
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authors’ own ideas about sovereign justice, with a definitive shift in how the royal
prerogative is perceived and portrayed in their popular works. These representations
probably had little effect on the sovereigns’ own thinking about these issues, but they
ultimately ignored them at their peril.
Spenser began writing the second part of The Faerie Queene when Elizabeth was
still at the height of her power, and her capable performances informed the way the royal
prerogative was perceived. In Book V of The Faerie Queene, Spenser clearly portrays a
sovereign who possesses divine right to power, and we witness Artegall acting as the
instrument of the divine justice she (or her alter ego, the Faerie Queene) enacts. Book V
emphasizes the importance of equity, which was directly linked to the royal prerogative
through its association with the courts of Chancery and Star Chamber, in achieving
justice. The law is an important parameter of justice, but it becomes clear through
Artegall’s early interactions with his fictive world that a strict interpretation of the law
can lead a judge to commit injustices. It is only after Artegall learns the correct
interpretation of mercy and equity that he is able to complete his mission of rescuing
Irena, which reflects Spenser’s wish for Ireland. In his view, the way to solve the
problems in Ireland is not through “wild” violence, but through the use of royal
prerogative to provide equitable justice.
First staged roughly four years after the publication of the second part of The
Faerie Queene, Shakespeare’s Henry V serves as evidence of already shifting attitudes
towards the use of royal prerogative. In Henry V, legitimacy and authority are intertwined
with the sovereign’s ability to perform, something that, once again, is a direct reflection
of Elizabeth’s powerful performances. However, the play clearly shows a ruler who is not
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strictly bound to the English laws and chooses prerogative over the law in every instance
he is asked to serve as a judge. He nevertheless “appears” to act in a lawful manner, and
public anxiety over who would succeed Elizabeth and how that successor would rule the
English people is evident in the epilogue of the play. The epilogue signals the
complications that can arise when a powerful sovereign who relies heavily on prerogative
to rule is no longer around. While Henry V’s decisions work out in a positive way for
Britain, they are temporary, and because of their “extralegal” nature, there is no clear
direction for others to follow.
Once James I succeeded Elizabeth on the English throne, ideas about the royal
prerogative continued to shift in a negative way, and with Macbeth, we have the example
of a sovereign who acts not simply in an “extralegal” manner, but one who uses
prerogative to commit acts that, under any other circumstance, would have been
considered illegal. Macbeth’s use of the throne to murder his adversaries and maintain
power serves as the ultimate example of the danger in having a sovereign who believes
he is above the law. Macbeth, however, is not the only sovereign in the play to place
himself above the law. Duncan’s choice to name his son Malcolm as his heir to the throne
goes against the Scottish custom of tanistry and sets the precedent for Macbeth’s actions.
In Paradise Lost, we finally have an example of justice that is lawful in every
instance. God is the ultimate example of a just sovereign because He binds himself to the
laws He creates and refuses to go against them; He understands that true justice can only
exist if the laws are obeyed. By the time Milton completed Paradise Lost, England was
under the restored Stuart monarchy of Charles II. The Republican government he had
wished for England had come and gone with no lasting accomplishments. In Paradise
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Lost, he responds by showing us that legitimate authority cannot or at least has not
existed under the English monarchy. Because the English monarchy remains unbound to
the law, and parliament still has no overriding control, England essentially finds itself
under an illegitimate and implicitly Satanic monarchy. As long as human sovereigns
remain “outside” of the law and retain broad prerogative powers, justice will remain
elusive in England because true justice can only be achieved when the sovereign submits
himself to the law as Milton’s God does. Of course, England is not directly represented in
this biblical epic, but in the archangel Michael’s concluding narrative, all monarchs are
represented as lawless, godless tyrants.
Only after the Glorious Revolution did Parliament approve the Bill of Rights of
1688, which limited the powers of the sovereign. A new coronation oath was written to
include the promise “to Governe the People of this Kingdome of England and the
Dominions thereto belonging according to the Statutes in Parlyament Agreed on and the
Laws and Customs of the same.”2 However, the fact remains that the royal prerogative
has simply changed hands. Instead of the sovereign concentrating power, the prerogative
is now exercised by ministers and government officials, and the long-standing ruling that
the courts can establish limits on prerogative but cannot question or review its exercise
has only recently been questioned.3 The use of prerogative power is still a very
contemporary and contentious issue in both England and America (where it is called

2
Coronation Oath Act 1688, c. 6 (Regnal. 1_Will_and_Mar) Section III. Accessed February 20,
2019. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/WillandMar/1/6/section/III. See also Bill of Rights [1688], c. 2
(Regnal. 1_Will_and_Mar_Sess_2). Accessed February 20, 2019.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/WillandMarSess2/1/2

Thomas Poole, “Judicial Review at the Margins: Law, Power, and Prerogative,” The University
of Toronto Law Journal 60, no. 1 (2010): 88.
3
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executive power), hence the importance of understanding how the use of royal
prerogative to achieve justice in early modern period underwent such a dramatic change.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, a number of theorists such as Carl
Schmitt, Leo Strauss, Walter Benjamin, and Ernst Kantorowicz all engaged with some
aspect of political theology and found themselves looking back to the medieval and early
modern periods to explore what they understood as a crisis in legitimacy and authority.
Victoria Kahn claims that the events of those years, especially World War I, Hitler’s rise
to power, and World War II, compelled these authors to search for answers to the
political upheavals of their time by looking back to where they believed the crisis in
authority originated.4 In recent years, there has been a definitive growth in the use of
arbitrary power by governments around the globe. The march towards an authoritarian
form of government in countries that have typically enjoyed a stable democratic rule is, at
the very least, disconcerting. Similar to the writers of the early twentieth century, I find
the early modern period the most logical place to search for answers to our current
problem because of the very nature of prerogative powers and their relation to justice.
Although Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton use their work to comment on issues that
were pressing during their own lives, their ideas about the law, equity, and mercy and the
role of the sovereign in providing justice for their people are timeless.

4

Kahn, The Future of Illusion, 2.
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